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Summary
This thesis explored cognitive functioning in Type 2 diabetes and investigated whether
there is a relationship between cognitive functioning and diabetes self management.
Studies 1-3 (Chapter 4) evaluated the effectiveness of a newly-developed task to assess
implicit memory. Non-diabetic volunteers provided data which were used to assess the
effects of depth on processing and the congruency effect on implicit memory (Study 1,
N=71) as well as to establish that the different versions of the task elicited similar implicit
memory responses (Study 2, N= 143). Study 3 (N=474) evaluated the task in terms of
construct validity. It was found that a deep processing orienting task provided a better
environment for the dissociation of implicit and explicit memory. Additionally, all versions
of the task elicited similar implicit memory responses. Finally, the task was found to be
high in construct validity.
The study (N=51) reported in Chapter 5 assessed whether there is a relationship between
cognitive function and diabetes self management and to what extent cognitive and diabetes
— specific cognitive variables may predict self care. A relationship was found between
cognitive function and self -reported self care and both cognitive and diabetes-specific
cognitive factors were found to be predictive of self care behaviours.
The work presented in Chapter 6 examined whether there is cognitive impairment in Type
2 diabetes. Analysis l(N=66), which adopted strict methodological and statistical controls,
provided evidence of limited impairment in the sample with diabetes. Analysis 2 (N=84)
adopted similar controls and confirmed the findings of analysis 1. Analysis 3 (N=51)
adopted no statistical or methodological controls and found evidence for apparent
extensive cognitive impairment in the diabetes sample.
The studies reported in Chapters 7 and 8 assessed the self report of self care behaviours.
Studies 1 (N=61) and 2 (N=33) of Chapter 7 evaluated the effectiveness of two research
designs in eliciting bias-free self—reports of frequency of healthy and unhealthy self care
behaviours over the recent past, from diabetes-free volunteers. The results of this work
provided the basis for the design of the main study (N =53) with people with diabetes,
reported in Chapter 8. Appropriately modified versions of the Summary of Diabetes Self
Care Activities questionnaire were used throughout. Evidence for biases in self report were
identified in all studies although the pattern of findings was not consistent across studies.
The implications of the above for current research and practice were discussed.
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1Chapter 1
Aims and Overview
1.0.	 Aims
The overall aim of this thesis is to explore cognitive functioning in people with Type 2'
diabetes and to examine the extent to which cognitive processes in this sample may be
related to and predict diabetes self management. The specific aims of this piece of research
are thus:
• To review current knowledge in the fields of cognitive functioning in Type 2
diabetes as well as diabetes self management
• To briefly review knowledge about cognitive functioning in Type I diabetes in an
attempt to identify any common trends in these two fields of research
• To identify new research areas in cognitive functioning in Type 2 diabetes that may be
appropriate for further exploration and to develop, if necessary, appropriate measures
to explore such areas further
• To establish whether there is cognitive impairment in a typical sample of Type 2
diabetes patients
• To establish whether cognitive functioning as measured by current neuropsychological
...
tests is related to and may predict diabetes self management as measured by self report
• To investigate the accuracy of self report in Type 2 diabetes with regard to the effects
of time and category frame the self care questions are framed
In exploring the above, the following research questions are posed:
• Is cognitive functioning related to and / or predictive of diabetes self care activities ?
• Is there cognitive functioning impairment in Type 2 diabetes ?
• If there is cognitive impairment, is implicit memory preserved in Type 2 diabetes ?
• To what extent are responses to self report measures- of diabetes self care subject to
effects of item format ?
22.0.	 Overview
In answering these questions, the thesis is organised in 9 chapters, including this present
chapter. Chapter 2 introduces the area of research by giving an overview of the history and
physiology of diabetes as well as a brief outline of the complications that may be brought
about by the illness.
Chapter 3 reviews current knowledge in two distinct areas of research, that of cognitive
functioning in Type 2 diabetes and research into diabetes self management. This chapter
also includes a brief section on cognitive functioning in Type 1 diabetes however, as this
thesis is centred around Type 2 diabetes, the review of cognition in Type 1 diabetes is only
intended to give a general introduction to this area rather than systematically explore it. In
the end, this chapter brings the cognitive literature and self management literature together
and proposes that the two should be examined in combination to assess whether difficulties
in diabetes self management may be related to and be predicted by difficulties in cognitive
functioning. Finally, the present review ends with an identification of implicit memory as
an area of research worthy of further exploration in the field of cognitive function in Type
2 diabetes.
The following chapter (Chapter 4) presents work purtogether in an attempt to design a
practical, quick and simple to use test of implicit memory that is subsequently used in
research described later in the thesis. The newly developed implicit memory test is
evaluated in terms of several forms of reliability and validity.
Chapter 5 attempts to bridge the gap identified in the literature review of Chapter 3 in
investigating the extent to which cognitive functioning in Type 2 diabetes is related to and
may predict several areas of diabetes self management. It examines the extent to which
cognitive functioning, as assessed by currently available and widely used in the field
psychometric tests in addition to the newly developed implicit memory test described in
Chapter 4, is related to diabetes self management as measured by the Summary of Diabetes
3Self Care Activities questionnaire. In the end it identifies specific areas of cognitive
functioning that are related to and predict specific areas of diabetes self care.
Chapter 6 also builds on the literature reviewed in Chapter 3 and examines the proposition
that people with Type 2 diabetes show cognitive deficits in comparison to non diabetic
controls. In doing so, the present study employs the same psychometric tests used in the
work reported in Chapter 5. Further, it adopts strict matching criteria as well as statistical
control to establish to what extent previously reported cognitive deficits in Type 2 diabetes
may in part be attributable to factors related to poor methodological control.
Chapters 7 and 8 examine the accuracy of the Summary of Diabetes Self Care Activities
measure in eliciting reliable reports of self care for the recent past. Chapter 7 reviews work
that investigates the cognitive processes involved when non diabetic people are asked to
give autobiographical self reports using questionnaires. From the vast number of areas of
research that are potentially examinable and have not to-date been examined using diabetic
participants, two areas are selected for further research. These have to do with the wording
of a self report question in terms of both the time and category frame it asks people to
think back to and report on.
Chapter 7 further reports preliminary pilot work undertaken with nondiabetic volunteer
participants to examine which one of two plausible study designs may be the most viable
for use with diabetic participants. The work reported here employs appropriately modified
versions of the Summary of Diabetes Self Care Activities questionnaire that may sensibly
be used with nondiabetic respondents.
Chapter 8 is based on the findings of Chapter 7 and explores the effects of time and
category of reference of the self report question on diabetic participants' responses about
their self care activities over specified periods of time. In doing so, the effectiveness of the
Summary of Diabetes Self Care Activities questionnaire to elicit bias-free reports of past
self care activities is evaluated.
4Finally Chapter 9 critically evaluates the work presented in previous chapters making links
where appropriate, identifying new research questions that the research presented in this
thesis poses and suggesting areas worthy of further research.
5Chapter 2
What is diabetes ?
2.0. Summary
This section gives a brief description of the history, physiology, complications and
treatment of diabetes. The aim is to give a general picture of the illness rather than go
into detailed descriptions of the biological and physiological abnormalities with which it
is associated.
2.1.	 Introduction
Diabetes mellitus (DM) is a diagnostic term for a collection of disorders which, among
other features, have in common chronic elevation of blood glucose (BG) concentration
commonly referred to as hyperglycaemia. Diabetes is a result of the body's inability to
effectively control usage and storage of the body's main source of fuel (glucose).
It is the leading cause of foot amputations, kidney failure, and blindness and is a major
contributor to cardiovascular complications, such as heart attacks.
Diabetes has been known to physicians for thousands of years and in that time
numerous hypotheses regarding its aetiology have been put forward. These include
ideas such as Galen's who in second century A.D proposed that diabetes was the result
of a 'weakness of the kidneys which attracted fluid and could not hold it back' (Matins,
1968). Other ancient writings proposed grief, diet and alcohol intake as causes of the
illness.
The first major breakthrough was made in 1889 when Von Mering and Monowski
showed that diabetes could be experimentally produced by removing the pancreas, a
gland situated in the upper part of the abdomen. About the same time, Langerhans
found that damage to specific cells (beta cells of the islets of Langerhans) in the
pancreas produced certain forms of diabetes. When Banting and Best in 1921 (in
Matins, 1968) succeeded in isolating the active secretion of those islets and christened
the hormone 'insulin', a major breakthrough in research into the causes of the disorder
was made.
6Following these early discoveries much progress has been made. It is now known that
diabetes and its main feature, hyperglycaemia, is caused by irregularities in insulin
production and / or utilisation. As insulin is a hormone heavily involved in the
metabolism of glucose to energy and as glucose is the only fuel available to the brain, it
soon becomes apparent that any abnormalities in insulin - mediated processes can have
life-important consequences.
The function of insulin is multiple in the process of food metabolism, energy
production and storage. In non diabetic individuals hunger signals that body cells are in
need of energy. When food is consumed, fat, protein and carbohydrate enter the gut and
the digestion process is initiated. Fat enters the blood stream in the form of fatty acids,
some of which provide energy for the body cells while the rest are stored into a fat
storage as triglycerides for later use. Protein is converted into amino acids in the
bloodstream and like fat, some is used by the body's protein structures (e.g. muscles)
and some is stored for later use. At the same time, carbohydrates in the gut are turned
into glucose in the bloodstream (Day, 1986). The presence of glucose in the blood
stream is sensed by the pancreas which, in response, triggers insulin production and
inhibits glucagon production. Glucagon is another pancreatic hormone which stimulates
the liver to convert stored glucose into energy, thus raising BG levels. Insulin enters the
bloodstream and converts some of the present glucose into energy, causing the glucose
levels in the bloodstream to fall. Excess glucose is stored either in a fat (in triglyceride
form) or a glucose (in glucogen form) storage again by an insulin-mediated process and
glucose levels in the bloodstream fall back to pre - hunger, lower but normal levels.
In the diabetic individual this process is defective. Insulin is either absent due to
destruction of the pancreatic beta cells which produce it, or the beta cells malfunction
so that the insulin produced is too little to cope with demand. In both of these insulin -
deficiency cases, glucose can not be converted into energy so it builds up in the
bloodstream into abnormally high levels and spills in the urine. At the same time the
body cells are starving.
7It can be seen that insulin is involved not only into turning glucose into energy but also
promoting glucose storage and inhibiting further glucose release from the body storage.
As insulin is heavily involved in such vital energy - producing mechanisms it is evident
that insulin - related disorders such as diabetes can be life threatening.
Diabetes is divided into two major categories which differ in terms of aetiology, age on
and type of onset, prevalence, symptomatology and treatment. These are outlined next.
2.2.	 Prevalence, types of diabetes, complications and treatment
Diabetes prevalence in adults world-wide was said to be around 4% in 1995. This figure
has been estimated to rise to 5.4% by the year 2025 meaning that the number of people
affected by the illness around the globe will rise from 135 million in 1995 to about 300
million people in 24 years time (King, Aubert and Herman, 1998). If these estimates are
accurate, it follows that the socioeconomic and health burden of diabetes is likely to be
an issue for many years to come.
Type 1 (or insulin dependent) diabetes mellitus is said to be caused by a combination
of genetic, immunologic and infectious conditions, the exact pattern of which is still
under investigation. What is clear however is the end result of the work of such
mechanisms, which is total destruction of the insulin-producing pancreatic cells and
hyperglycaemia.
Type 1 diabetes is usually first diagnosed in childhood and adolescence so it is
sometimes called juvenile onset diabetes. It accounts for about 10% of all people with
diabetes (Marks, 1996) and usually presents with clear, rapidly developing symptoms.
These, among others, include polyuria (excessive urination) which comes about from
the body's effort to eliminate excess glucose which has spilled from the bloodstream to
the urine, polydipsia (excessive thirst), weight loss, tiredness and blurring of vision.
Hypoglycaemia (abnormally low BG levels) is another symptom caused by efforts to
control BG levels by external factors such as insulin injections or intensive exercise.
Additionally, a compensatory fat metabolism present in untreated Type 1 diabetes can
produce ketoacidosis (also known as diabetic coma) i.e. a state of overproduction of
8ketones (fat breakdown products) which leads to the build-up of acids in the blood and,
in severe cases, coma and death. The long term complications of the illness include heart
disease, neuropathy, nefropathy, blindness and peripheral vascular disease.
A second type of diabetes mellitus currently known as Type 2 diabetes has also been
known in the past as non insulin dependent diabetes. Although this type of diabetes is
the most prevalent of the two, it has traditionally been overshadowed by Type 1
diabetes. This is evident in several ways, not least the terminology used to describe it;
'not dependent on insulin', 'type 2', 'mild diabetes' are terms suggesting that this form
of the illness is somewhat less dangerous and less complex. The emphasis on Type 1
diabetes is understandable to a certain extent; Type 1 diabetes presents as an acute
disease and used to be fatal until the discovery of insulin in the beginning of the
century. Type 2 diabetes however is responsible for a greater number of health
complications and lost years than Type 1 diabetes and deserves at least the same level
of attention.
Unlike Type 1, Type 2 diabetes carries a very strong genetic component where the
probability of someone developing the condition increases with presence of family
history of the disorder. This finding is supported by studies of identical twins where
concordance rates for this type of diabetes approach 100% (Pyke, 1981). Its aetiology
remains questionable. What is known however is that the insulin deficiency which
presents in the condition is caused by a combination of beta cell dysfunction, rather
than complete destruction, and insulin resistance. The latter factor is possibly related to
the fact that the vast majority of Type 2 diabetic patients are obese and obesity is
known to be a major contributor to insulin resistance.
Type 2 diabetes is usually first diagnosed in middle and old age which is the reason
why it is sometimes called maturity onset diabetes. It accounts for about 85% of cases
in developed countries (Dowse and Ziinmet, 1989) but unlike Type 1 diabetes it does
not present with clear rapid developing symptoms. `...onset is insidious and symptoms
long delayed.: (Marks, 1996, p.8) consequently diagnosis is usually only made as part
of routine tests of the urine for sugar and only elicited upon direct questioning. In fact,
9Harris, Klein, Welborn and Knuiman, in 1992 estimated that onset of diabetes occurs at
least 4-7 years before clinical diagnosis. This is because the directly observable
symptoms of thirst, polyuria and loss of weight might be present but are seldom severe
and rarely reported.
The fact that the short term complications of this type of diabetes are often concealed
does not mean that the Type 2 diabetic patient is spared the long term complications
following diabetes. So, this type of patients are also prone to develop any of the
following long term complications;
• Retinopathy: this condition is the most common complication of diabetes and is
normally evident in almost all diabetic people who have had the illness for over twenty
years. In short, retinopathy is due to diabetes-induced long term damage of particular
retinal arterioles in the eye. These small blood vessels are said to leak plasma and blood
into the retina which then becomes ischaemic i.e. suffers from a decreased supply of
blood. New blood vessels develop in order to correct the ischaemia, however these new
vessels are abnormal and likely to bleed into the vitreous. Subsequent scar formation
which follows can finally lead to blindness.
• Nephropathy: also known as kidney disease, nephropathy is seen in the vast
majority of people suffering with retinopathy. In short, nephropathy involves
arterioles in the glomerulus (that part of the kidney that filters the blood) becoming
abnormal and leaking out protein, first in small amounts (in a condition known as
microalbuminuria) and then in larger amounts (proteinuria). These leakages eventually
destroy the glomerulus. The result of such damage has several consequences; protein is
lost in the urine, blood pressure rises to abnormal levels, and creatinine (the substance
formed from the metabolism of creatine, 'an important nitrogenous compound produced
by metabolic processes in the body', Anderson and Anderson, 1995, p.192) clearance is
decreased, the latter producing terminal renal failure.
• Neuropathy: the term is used to describe peripheral and autonomic nervous system
damage. Peripheral neuropathy begins with pain and / or abnormal sensations in the
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extremities of the body (usually the feet) which then progress to loss of sensation and
unawareness of things like touch, pain, temperature and so on. Young, Boulton,
MacLeod, Williams and Sonsken (1993) found that this type of neuropathy affects
over 50% of Type 2 patients who are over 60 years of age. Autonomic neuropathy
may affect a range of systems (e.g. cardiovascular, gastrointestinal) and hypotension is
the most common symptom. Other symptoms involve diarrhoea, urinary incontinence,
abnormal sweating etc. Although autonomic neuropathy is mainly prevalent in Type 1
diabetes recent studies have detected its presence in the Type 2 diabetic population too
(Ewing, 1994).
• Diabetic foot: Last but not least, both types of the illness can lead to patients being
faced with complications of nerve and blood vessel damage which may result into
decreased awareness of foot injury and impaired ability for such injuries to heal. This
condition is related to the peripheral neuropathy complications described earlier and in
severe cases can lead to foot amputations.
All these long term complications are observable across the two types of the illness,
with variations in the prevalence rates in each type of diabetes. Diabetes and its
associated long term complications described above are the leading causes of lower
extremity amputations, blindness and kidney transplants in the US (Cox and Gonder -
Frederick, 1992). It thus seems to be the case that research into diabetes prevention,
management and treatment is crucial for both health and wellbeing as well as for
financial reasons.
Treatment of both types of the illness involves efforts to normalise BG levels and
prevent long term complications. These efforts are centered around four behavioural
components, mainly adherence to strict diet regimens, regular exercise taking, repeated
self monitoring of BG levels and medication-taking (Cox and Gonder - Frederick, 1992).
Although the first three components are quite similar for both types of diabetes there
are differences in the last behavioural component, that is medication taking. Here Type
1 diabetic patients are faced with daily insulin injections, while Type 2 diabetic
treatment usually takes the form of oral medication taking. Insulin injections however
1 1
can often be required in this type of diabetes too, if normal glycaemic control is not
achieved with diet, exercise and oral hypoglycaemic agents.
In short, diabetes is a serious chronic illness. Diabetic patients are faced with the
challenge of regulating their life style in order to behaviourally achieve what would
otherwise be an automatically controlled physiological, metabolic process. In doing so,
it is reasonable to assume that people with diabetes may face both practical and
psychological difficulties brought about from the burden of having to live with a chronic
illness which hugely impinges upon patients' lifestyle in order to be managed
efficiently. Such issues are explored in Chapter 3 that follows.
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Chapter 3
Cognitive function in Type 1 and Type 2 diabetes:
implications for diabetes self management
3.0. Summary
The aim of this chapter is to provide a general introduction to research examining the
effects of diabetes on cognitive functioning. In doing so, research carried out on the
effects of both Type 1 and Type 2 diabetes on cognitive function is considered. As the
specific area of interest of this thesis is Type 2 diabetes, the review of research in Type
1 diabetes is only selective and consequently fairly brief. A review of findings in this
area, however, has been included here in an attempt to identify common links (or
indeed the absence of any such links) between the two research areas.
The selective review of research in Type 1 diabetes describes studies comparing people
with the illness and nondiabetic controls, studies examining cognitive dysfunction in
relation to frequency and severity of hypoglycaemic attacks, and finally research using
laboratory controlled, acute episodes of hypoglycaemia.
The chapter continues with an extensive review of studies investigating the effects of
Type 2 diabetes on cognitive performance. Cross-sectional studies focusing on the long
term, reportedly adverse effects of the illness are considered as well as physiological
studies and studies adopting a longitudinal research design. A section on work
investigating the effects of metabolic control on cognition in this sample of people is
also included, followed by a brief consideration of factors other than diabetes that may
be present in diabetic samples and may perhaps be explanatory of any observed
cognitive decline. Finally the cognitive findings discussed in both types of the illness
are summed up and common links / research questions are identified.
The chapter finishes with a section on diabetes self management (a term used
throughout this thesis to replace 'adherence') and a consideration of how cognitive
function may be related to and perhaps be predictive of diabetes self management in
Type 2 diabetes.
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3.1.	 Introduction 
A substantial body of research into diabetes has examined the effects of the illness on
cognitive functioning. The reason why researchers have identified cognition as an area
likely to be affected by the illness and have hence expressed an interest in examining.
the possibility of detrimental effects of the illness on cognition, is based on two
observations. Firstly, that glucose is the only fuel available to the brain and secondly
that the brain is unable to store excessive glucose when faced with glucose over-
availability (e.g. as in hyperglycaemia) or synthesise glucose during acute supply
deprivation (e.g. as in severe hypoglycaemia). It follows that brain - controlled
processes such as learning, memory, attention, reasoning, sensory / motor coordination
and so on may suffer following diabetes - induced abnormalities in glucose availability.
3.1.1.	 Studies comparing Type 1 samples with healthy controls
Numerous studies have been conducted in the area of cognition and Type 1 diabetes,
however, it is suggested that few consistent results have been found. The main reason
for the observed discrepancy between findings lies in the observation that researchers
have used a wide range of different neuropsychological tests to test varied sample sizes
with no agreement over what is the ideal age range to be examined. Not least, studies
exhibit varying degrees of control over demographic and other possible confounding
variables. As Ryan, Williams, Orchard and Finegold (1992, p.107) noted 'To date
virtually all studies of diabetic adults have been plagued with methodological
problems'. Taking this observation in mind it follows that any study suggesting the
presence or lack of cognitive dysfunction in diabetic populations need to be critically
evaluated and its findings accepted with caution.
Skenazy and Bigler (1984) compared two Type 1 diabetic groups (a visually impaired
and a non visually impaired) with a group of chronically ill people who were free from
any neurological conditions and a sample of healthy volunteers, on a range of
neuropsychological measures to include the Halstead- Reitan Neuropsychological
Battery and the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS). Although the authors do
not mention whether their groups were matched for demographic characteristics it
seems that they were not, and that in fact, significant age differences existed between
participants. Nevertheless, they found that in general, the two diabetic groups'
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cognitive performance was similar to, and significantly worse than, that of the samples
of chronically ill and healthy volunteers. Cognitive problems were evident in tasks
requiring visual and motor efficiency and somatosensory discrimination only. Sex
differences were also found with men generally performing worse than women in tass
requiring somatosensory accuracy. The findings further suggested a relationship
between severity of diabetes and cognitive dysfunction but severity of disease was
unrelated to overall cognitive skills and memory performance. Despite the limited
evidence suggesting that diabetic groups are impaired in cognitive function as
compared to other chronically ill people, the authors, surprisingly, concluded that
'cognitive skills and memory remain intact among most diabetics' (Skenazy and Bigler
1984, p.246).
Similar conclusions were reached by Lawson, Williams Erdahl, Monga, Bird, Donald,
Surridge and Letemendia in 1984, who examined the neuropsychological performance
of a sample of 48 Type 1 patients and 50 age-matched controls. A range of cognitive
tests was used, but the study failed to provide evidence of impaired intellectual
functioning in the diabetic group and was criticised for methodological flaws such as
low statistical power (Ryan et al., 1992). What is more, it seems that the researchers
used samples which included both early and later onset diabetic people, and thus failed
to discriminate between subjects who might have been affected by the illness at a
young age and hence while still in the maturity acquisition phase of their life, and those
affected after maturity acquisition was reached.
At the same time, Franceschi, Cecchetto, Minicucci, Salvatore Mizne, Baio and Canal
(1984) studied the performance of a group of 34 Type 1 diabetic individuals and 26
normoglycaemic controls on, among other well known tests, sub tests of the Weschler
Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS). They found that although the diabetic group showed
a tendency to score lower than the control group on all neuropsychological tests, these
differences were statistically significant only in the areas of global (but not verbal or
visual) memory, and abstract reasoning. The authors concluded that diabetic people
were no different from nondiabetic controls in global intelligence, visuospatial
analysis, concentration, attention and psychomotor performance.
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Pozzessere, Valle, De Crignis, Cordischi, Fattapposta, Rizzo, Pietravalle, Cristina,
Morano and Di Mario (1991) using an electrophysiological method, the P300 Event -
Related Potential Analysis, and a battery of psychometric tests found a significant
impairment of higher order cognitive function in a group of Type 1 patients as
compared to age and sex matched controls. Further, a discrepancy between
psychometric and physiological measurements of dysfunction was found suggesting
that psychometric measurements may be less sensitive in their ability to detect subtle
neuropsychological changes.
Using psychometric assessment rather than physiological measures, Ryan, et al. (1992)
examined samples of people with childhood onset diabetes and demographically
similar nondiabetic controls. They found evidence to suggest that psychomotor
efficiency and spatial information processing might be impaired in Type 1 diabetic
patients. Additionally, psychomotor efficiency was found to be related to the presence
of neuropathy and poorer metabolic control, but not to age of diabetes onset, or
duration of illness.
This last finding comes in direct contrast with the results shown in a study by Prescott,
Richardson and Gillespie (1990) who concluded exactly the opposite to Ryan et al.
(1992), mainly that duration of illness correlates with degree of cognitive dysfunction
but not with levels of glycaemic control. The test used by Prescott et al., however is
rarely used (a test developed by Richardson, 1974 using mental imagery) while Ryan et
al's. (1992) work has used tests which, although not directly developed for samples
with diabetes, are widely used. Ryan et al.'s findings are thus more amenable to cross-
study comparisons.
3.1.2. Long lasting cognitive impairment in Type 1 diabetes as a function of
frequency of hypoglycaemic episodes
Cognitive function in Type 1 diabetes has been widely explored in the context of
severe hypoglycaemic episodes. Acute hypoglycaemia is a common and feared side
effect of intensive Type 1 diabetes treatment regimens that aim to achieve optimal
glycaemic control. This is the case because as repeated insulin injections are necessary
to control the condition any anomalies in the optimal level of insulin available in the
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body (e.g. due to intensive exercise) may lead to blood sugar levels dropping
excessively and hence hypoglycaemia may result. As a result, it would seem
reasonable to propose that acute fluctuations in glucose availability to the brain may be
expected to be related to subsequent brain dysfunction. However, as Langan, Deary,.
Hepburn and Frier note, the evidence is not really conclusive: 'Depletion of the supply
of glucose to the brain rapidly causes impaired neuronal function manifested by acute
neuroglycopenia but it is not known whether this can cause any permanent or
cumulative damage resulting in a decline in intellectual capacity' (1991, p. 337).
In a study that attempted to examine whether frequent hypoglycaemic episodes may be
related to long term cognitive dysfunction, Wredling, Levander, Adamson and Lins
(1990) compared two groups of Type 1 diabetic patients, one free of history of severe
hypoglycaemic episodes, the other characterised by recurrent episodes of severe
hypoglycaemia. They found that the latter group was more heavily impaired in terms of
performance on a battery of neuropsychological tests assessing motor ability, short
term and associative memory and tasks assessing problem solving abilities. This study
however did not control for premorbid IQ differences between the samples and the lack
of such differences was, rather poorly, inferred from the examination of the
participants' level of education.
A study that controlled for premorbid IQ was carried out by Lincoln, Faleiro, Kelly,
Kirk and Jeffcoate (1996). They examined 70 patients who were diagnosed with
diabetes at age 18 or older and thus after the maturity acquisition phase was over.
Premorbid IQ was measured with the National Adult Reading Test (NART) while a
short form of the WAIS was used as a measure of current intelligence. They found a
significant correlation between intelligence decline and frequency of severe
hypoglycaemic attacks, however the authors warned against generalisation of their
findings due to methodological and sampling problems.
Despite sampling difficulties this study did provide some support for the findings of a
well controlled study which was free from such methodological and sampling
difficulties by Langan, et al. (1991). The authors accounted for confounds such as
premorbid IQ, age, diabetes duration and social class. They reported that frequency of
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severe hypoglycaemic attacks might be significantly related to the degree of cognitive
impairment as signalled by impaired performance IQ, inspection time and reaction time
in 100 insulin dependent diabetic people. Specifically, it was found that subjects with a
hypoglycaemic episode history showed a greater drop in IQ (5.8 IQ points more) than
subjects without such a history. These findings were later confirmed (Deary, Langan,
Graham, Hepburn and Frier 1992). Deary et al. (1992) further observed that as the
cognitive tasks increased in difficulty the effects of severe hypoglycaemia history
became more apparent. It was concluded that hypoglycaemia affects decision /
response initiation processes rather than encoding, storage, comparison or classification
processes in short term memory. Deary, Crawford, Hepburn, Langan, Blaclunore and
Frier's (1993) work supported such findings and also showed that while performance
IQ deteriorates as frequency of severe hypoglycaemic attacks increases, verbal IQ is
unrelated to hypoglycaemia and is probably related to social rather than organic
factors.
Ryan, Williams, Finegold and Orchard (1993) on the other hand found that the
relationship between severe recurrent hypoglycaemia and cognitive dysfunction may
not be as straightforward as implied by the above studies. Ryan and colleagues (1993)
failed to find a relationship between severe recurrent hypoglycaemia and performance
on cognitive tests, however they observed such a relationship when the effects of
hyperglycaemia were considered along with other diabetic complications such as
neuropathy. Their study however did not consider premorbid IQ as a potential
confound and their selection of the healthy comparison group was questionable (asking
the diabetic subjects to nominate a friend or spouse to be tested) as it is far from
random hence methodological difficulties may have arisen here. Nevertheless, it was
concluded that recurrent hypoglycaemia does not influence cognitive performance
directly, however it may interact with neuropathy (and possibly other diabetic
complications) and in that sense exacerbate the extent.of any neuropsychological
dysfunction.
A study by Kramer, Fasching, Madl, Waldhausl, Irsigler and Grimm (1996) compared
a group of 55 Type 1 diabetic people with a history of at least one severe
hypoglycaemic episode, with 53 diabetic people with no history of hypoglycaemic
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attacks. They found significant differences in neither psychometric (Mini Mental
State, Trail Making tests) nor physiological (P300 latencies) performance between the
two groups and concluded that episodes of severe hypoglycaemia may not necessarily
cause permanent cognitive impairment. This study however failed to consider and
control for any other confounds apart from age and sex so it is suggested that these
findings are questionable.
A correlational study by Ferguson, McCrimmon, Perros, Best, Deary and Frier (1999)
investigated the effects of previous hypoglycaemic episodes on cognitive functioning
and brain structure. Participants were young, normotensive adults who were diagnosed
with the illness before they attained full intellectual maturity. The findings failed to
suggest a relationship between hypoglycaemia and cognitive impairment or brain
atrophy. It was suggested that 'severe hypoglycaemia.... unless protracted, does not
have a significant impact on central nervous system function' (p.252).
Similar results were provided by a study reporting results obtained from the re-analysis
of the Diabetes Control and Complications (DCCT) data. In this study, Austin and
Deary (1999) investigated the extent to which patients who experienced 5 or more
hypoglycaemic episodes over a long period of time were different in terms of cognitive
function from people who did not experience any such episodes. No evidence was
found to suggest a relationship between repeated hypoglycaemia and cognitive
dysfunction, although, as noted by the authors, the research design adopted by the
DCCT was not one that would support the reliable study of cognitive changes. It was
concluded that 1 ... the broader question of hypoglycemia and cognitive decline remains
unresolved' (p.1276).
Finally, cognitive impairment was suggested in a recent study by Howorkan, Pumprla,
Saletu, Anderer, Krieger and Schabmann (2000) using electroencephalograms (EEG).
They found that patients with a history of recurrent severe hypoglycaemia showed
significantly reduced vigilance as compared to diabetic people without such a history
as well as nondiabetic control participants. In this study age and gender were factors
that the samples were matched on, however no consideration was given to other
potential confounds such as e.g. premorbid intellectual ability.
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3.1.3. Acute cognitive impairment in Type 1 diabetes in studies of
experimentally induced hypoglycaemia
Findings to suggest that hypoglycaemic events may be responsible for acute cognitive
impairment during hypoglycaemia are presented in studies using within-subjects
designs and examining cognitive function for the same individuals within different
glycaemic levels in experimentally induced hypoglycaemic conditions.
Holmes, Hayford, Gonzalez, and Weydurt (1983) Holmes, Koepke, Thompson, Gyves
and Weydert (1984), and Holmes, Koepke and Thompson (1986) used experimentally
induced hypoglycaemia paradigms, in studies of young Type 1 diabetic participants.
They found that although reading and word recognition processes were unaffected
during hypoglycaemia, attention, fine motor skills, visual reaction time, naming and
labelling skills were impaired. Similar results were found using visual, simple and
choice reaction time (RT) tests with a sample of young Type 1 diabetic men. No
evidence was found to support the hypothesis of simple cognitive processes suffering
from hypoglycaemic episodes.
Pranuning, Thorsteinsson, Theilgaard, Pinner and Binder (1986) using a similar
experimental design, found reduced neuropsychological functioning and attention
during hypoglycaemia in a group of 16 insulin dependent men tested at four different
blood glucose concentration levels. Among other findings, they noticed that
neuropsychological performance deteriorated at a blood glucose concentration just
below 3 mmo1/1 in 71% of the subjects tested though none perceived this as
hypoglycaemia. Pramming et al. went on to conclude that 'Symptoms and signs thus
appear to be unreliable indices of neuroglycopenia 	 the claim that relatives are often
able to detect impending hypoglycaemia before the patient is in keeping with our
findings, since cerebral functioning seems to alter before symptoms appear' (1986, p.
650).
In a study by Hoffman, Speelman, Hinnen, Conley, Guthrie and Knapp (1989), diabetic
patients performed a range of different neuropsychological tests under conditions of
experimentally induced hypoglycaemia, hyperglycaemia and normoglycaemia. The
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authors observed slow motor responses and control, reduced sustained concentration,
impaired sensory vigilance and inhibited planning and mental flexibility during
hypoglycaemia. However, simple reaction time and driving as tested on a driving
simulator were unaffected, which poses a question as to whether over learned activities,
such as driving, might be spared Type 1 diabetes-related deterioration.
In study also examining the effects of hypoglycaemia unawareness, Gold, MacLeod,
Deary and Frier (1995) found that people with impaired hypoglycaemia awareness
were more prone to the deleterious effects of controlled hypoglycaemia than those
hypo — aware subjects. The measures they used assessed complex cognitive
functioning such as complex visual attention (Trail Making B) and complex auditory
attention as assessed by the Auditory Paced Serial Addition Task (PASAT). It was also
found that the cognitive dysfunction persisted for longer in the unaware group than it
did in the normal hypoglycaemia — awareness sample.
Driesen, Cox, Gonder-Frederick and Clarke (1995) evaluated the effects of controlled
mild and moderate hypoglycaemia on simple and complex RT in a sample of 25 adults
with Type I diabetes. They found great individual differences between participants in
the extent to which they were affected by mild hypoglycaemia, but overall, complex
rather than simple cognitive tasks were more likely to be affected by moderate
hypoglycaemia.
Apart from RI, visual information processing may also be impaired in acute
hypoglycaemic episodes. Ewing, Deary, McCrimmon, Strachan and Frier (1998)
investigated the effects of controlled hypoglycaemia on both overall cognitive function
and specific visual information processing, in a sample of 16 adults with Type 1
diabetes. They found that global cognitive processes were impaired by hypoglycaemia
as were inspection time and visual change detection. An impairment trend was also
seen in contrast sensitivity.
The adverse effects of hypoglycaemia on cognitive processes that have been reported
so far may be fairly short lasting. A prospective study was carried out by Strachan,
Deary, Ewing and Frier (2000) assessing both cognition and mood in insulin-treated
21
diabetic people who had recently experienced a severe hypoglycaemic episode. It was
found that the cognitive dysfunction that the acute hypoglycaemic event had caused
was neither long — lasting nor persisting. The authors suggested that any cognitive
impairment brought about by a severe hypoglycaemic episode is likely to be complete
within 36 hours of the event taking place.
3.2.	 Cognitive function in Type 2 diabetes 
As seen, a lot of work carried out on the detrimental effects of Type 1 diabetes on
cognition has focused on cognitive impairment that may result as a consequence of
frequent and severe hypoglycaemic episodes. As Type 1 diabetes is very closely
associated with complications that can prove fatal such as severe hypoglycaemia and
diabetic coma, it easily becomes apparent why a lot of emphasis has been placed on
this area of research. Although few definite conclusions have been reached, it seems
that most researchers would agree that some cognitive impairment may be associated
with Type 1 diabetes, its severity and complexity possibly being mediated by a range
of different factors such as duration of the illness, age at onset, number and severity of
hypoglycaemic attacks, degree of metabolic control and so on. Methodology and
statistical shortcomings however, as well as the lack of well designed prospective .
studies would suggest caution when interpreting such findings.
In Type 2 diabetes the picture is as, or perhaps even more, complicated and the results
reported so far are far from conclusive. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, as
Type 2 diabetes is usually present in elderly populations, cognitive studies face an
extraneous variable that can confound any obtained results, namely that of
complications arising from old age rather than diabetes. Secondly, most of the present
research into Type 2 diabetes - related cognitive changes has utilised psychometric
tests which, though quick and easy to administer, might not be able to detect subtle
cognitive changes brought about by the illness (Pozzessere, 1991). Finally, a further
problem is posed by the fact that much of the research into cognitive function in
diabetes has been carried out in the laboratory using psychometric tests which although
are said to tap specific cognitive functions, their ecological validity and relevance to
everyday life tasks for people with Type 2 diabetes may be questionable.
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This section aims to introduce findings in the area of cognitive functioning in Type 2
diabetic patients, and then consider factors that might mediate any cognitive deficits
seen in Type 2 diabetes. The implications of all of the above for self management of
the illness will be discussed.
3.2.1.	 Type 2 diabetes and long term effects on cognitive function
Studies on the effect of Type 2 diabetes on cognitive performance have generally
focused on patients' performance on three major areas; on simple perceptual tasks,
simple and choice reaction time tasks and complex cognitive processing such as
memory, attention, problem solving and reasoning. Although work in this area has
been reported since the 1920s (Miles and Root, 1922), this review will focus on studies
appearing in the literature from 1980s onwards. The reason for this is, firstly that pre-
1980s studies have been extensively reviewed by others e.g. Meuter, Thomas,
Gruneklee, Gries and Lohmann (1980) and secondly because it seems that systematic
attempts to examine cognitive function in Type 2 diabetes rather than diabetes in
general, have mainly taken place after 1980. A further characteristic of the studies
reported here is that, in their majority, they have demonstrated some attempts to control
for variables that might confound findings in the area of cognition and Type 2 diabetes
e.g. depression, age, weight, height, premorbid IQ, past medical history, socio
economic status (SES), duration of diabetes, BG levels at the time of testing and finally
type of Type 2 diabetes control (diet / medication) and presence of diabetic
complications. Naturally, there are differences between studies in the number of
variables they have controlled for and inevitably some are better controlled than others,
however the term 'well - controlled' will be used throughout this review to describe
work that has satisfied most of the above described conditions.
The picture that emerges from the work that is reviewed here seems to suggest that
although Type 2 diabetic patients can usually perform as well as age - matched controls
on tasks requiring simple cognitive processing, their performance gets impaired as task
complexity increases.
A team of researchers to first look at cognitive performance in Type 2 diabetes in the
1980s were Meuter, Thomas eta!. (1980). They tested 147 pairs of diabetic people
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(Type 1 and Type 2) and well matched control subjects on a battery of psychological
tests. Measures included critical flicker fusion frequency detection, multiple reaction
time tests, digit span tests, paired associate tests, measures of concentration and also
visual short term memory tasks. They found reduced reaction speed as well as
decreased performance in memory concentration tasks for both diabetic groups. The
last observation was especially true for Type 2 diabetic patients. Simple visual
perception was unaffected in both diabetic groups, the results thus seem to suggest that
complex rather than simple cognitive processes are more likely to be impaired in Type
2 diabetes. The authors matched diabetic and control participants on years of education
(a rather questionable, as to its usefulness, variable) excluded participants with
dementia, and alcoholism but failed to provide any data on the depression levels and
cardiovascular conditions of participants.
Perlmuter, Hakami, Hodgson — Harrington, Ginsberg, Katz, Singer and Nathan (1984)
focused on the effects of Type 2 diabetes rather than both types of the illness. They
tested 140 Type 2 diabetic patients and 38 healthy education - matched controls on a
battery of psychometric cognitive tests such as Forward Digit Span (testing attention),
Backward Digit Span (testing attention and mental flexibility), Serial Learning (testing
learning, memory and retrieval) as well as a test of reaction time. It was found that,
although there was no difference between the diabetic and healthy groups on the
Forward Digit Span, the former performed more poorly in the Backward Digit Span
and Serial Learning tests. Their results also seemed to show that although attention was
unaffected by Type 2 diabetes, memory storage and retrieval processes might in fact be
impaired. The authors concluded that there was evidence to suggest that diabetic
patients' cognitive deficits were probably due to a decline in the effective use of
memory retrieval mechanisms, rather than to encoding or attentional deficits and noted
that such findings have implications for patients' adherence to medical regimens.
Mattlar, Falck, Ronnemaa and Hyyppaa (1985) on the other hand, failed to find any
cognitive impairment in a study which examined a group of 33 Type 2 diabetic patients
and controls performing a battery of neuropsychological and EEG tests. Among the
tests used were the Weschler Memory Scale, the Adult Intelligence Scale and
Subtraction test, the Schultze Word memory test, a depression measure and a
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symmetrical drawing test. The researchers failed to find any evidence of cognitive
impairment in the diabetic group as compared to the control one and concluded that
'cognitive performance does not place any restrictions upon the rehabilitation and
counselling ofpatients with Type 2 diabetes without complications' (Mattlar et al.
1985, p. 104). This study has been criticised on a range of methodological grounds
such as using a younger sample than the one normally studied with a mean age 56.3
years (e.g. U'Ren, Riddle, Lezak and Bennington — Davies, 1990) and excluding
diabetic people with hypertension thus looking at an atypical diabetic sample i.e. 40%
of potential subject population (e.g. Reaven, Thompson, Nathan and Haskins, 1990).
Although the latter criticism is valid the former seems rather weak in that Mattlar et
al's results, though not applicable to older samples, could sensibly generalise to
younger samples of Type 2 diabetic patients.
Methodological criticisms were also suggested for the study by Robertson-Tchabo
(1986) who found no effects of Type 2 diabetes on cognitive performance in a
longitudinal study of diabetic men. The researcher used only two cognitive tests, the
Benton Visual Retention test (testing non verbal memory) and the vocabulary subset of
the WAIS and was hence criticised for not administering a comprehensive enough
battery of tests. As Meuter (1980) noted 'Assessment of performance is precarious if
based on a single psychological test or even on only a few tests' (Meuter et al. 1980,
p.14). Also, the samples tested were of a much higher educational attainment level
(65% of the diabetic sample held a bachelor's or higher degree) than the ones normally
examined. Finally, if Tun, Nathan and Permuter (1990) are right in suggesting that
`...vocabulary scores are based on long term semantic memory [where] storage is
relatively impervious to changes with age and therefore is unlikely to change in Type 2
diabetes' (Tun et al., 1990, p. 737), then it seems that the fact that Robertson-Tschabo
(1986) failed to find any differences between Type 2 diabetes and control subjects is
hardly surprising.
Perlmuter, Tun, Sizer, McGlinchey and Nathan (1987) built on their earlier study
(Perlmuter et al., 1984) and further explored the relationship between Type 2 diabetes,
age and changes in verbal fluency with a sample of 174 middle aged (55-64 years) and
older (65-74 years) diabetic people and 38 controls. Among other tests, they used a
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verbal fluency test which required the participants to recite aloud as many words as
possible beginning with the letter S (and also with the letter F) in 90 seconds. In
addition to the number of words elicited, the number of repetitions and word
elaborations (i.e. producing a word containing a root word identical to one previously
recited) were recorded. It was found that although there were no differences in the
number of words elicited between groups, older and diabetic people were more likely
to repeat previously cited words. This finding was attributed to participants' impaired
ability to self - monitor their performance rather than to a memory deficit, although the
latter possibility was not ruled out. It was suggested that older adults and diabetic
people may be less competent in keeping track of the words they have cited so they
tend to reproduce already elicited words. Evidence to support the results of Perlmuter
et al. (1984) was also provided with diabetic participants performing more poorly than
controls on the Backward Digit Span, Serial Learning and Digit-Symbol Substitution
tests, the latter measuring attention, rapid responding, visual scanning and associative
learning, but not on the Forward Digit Span. This study accounted for premorbid IQ
differences between the samples, however no blood glucose (BG) testing took place
during or after cognitive testing. Also, the confounding effects of depression and
hypertension among the samples tested were not addressed in this study.
Memory self assessment as compared with performance on objective cognitive tests in
Type 2 diabetes was investigated by Tun, Perlmuter, Russo and Nathan, in 1987. Their
study sought to investigate whether Type 2 diabetic patients tend to report more
memory problems in their everyday life than non diabetic, age-matched controls and
whether such self assessments are associated with performance on laboratory tasks.
They studied two groups of diabetic subjects (N=119), a younger (55-64 years) and an
older group (65-74 years) as well as two groups of age-matched controls (N=25). They
controlled for confounds such as premorbid IQ, years of education and presence of
other medical conditions that might interfere with cognitive performance such as
cardiovascular illness, alcoholism, drug dependency and dementia. They found that
people with diabetes reported more frequent memory problems than controls for things
like momentary absent - mindedness, problems recognising people and recalling
errands as well as recalling conversations. Diabetic people also showed higher levels of
depression than controls on both somatic and psychological subscales as revealed by
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their performance on the Zung Depression Scale (Zung, 1965), a self rated scale of
depression. The authors initially concluded that frequency of self reported memory
problems was reliably associated with performance on some (but not all) cognitive
tests as well as with increasing age and presence of diabetes. When, however the
effects of depression were statistical controlled for, the increased frequency and
severity of memory problems among diabetic subjects was no longer significant. It
would seem that the relationship between test performance and self reported cognitive
problems is mediated by depression and that the depression associated with Type 2
diabetes may account for some of the cognitive problems that allegedly accompany the
illness.
The effects that physiological variables may have on cognitive performance in Type 2
diabetes were examined by Perlmuter, Nathan, Goldfinger, Russo, Yates and Larkin in
1988. They measured the cognitive performance of 246 Type 2 diabetic patients and
related it to variables that may be reasonably thought to be involved in cognitive
decline such as poor glucose control and elevated levels of triglycerides. The tests used
involved the Forward and Backward Digit Span, the Digit-Symbol Substitution test and
a simple reaction time task. Evidence to suggest that high levels of triglycerides,
independently of BG control, might contribute to a decreased ability to perform short
term memory tests in Type 2 diabetes was provided. The authors concluded that
although immediate memory may be spared even by extreme elevations of triglyceride
levels, more complex cognitive processes could be adversely affected as observed in
the diabetic subjects' impaired performance in Backward Digit Span, Digit-Symbol
Substitution and reaction time tests.
At around the same time Moorodian, Perryman, Fitten, Kavonian and Morley (1988)
compared 43 Type 2 diabetic men with 41 male, non diabetic age - matched controls.
Subjects with recurrent hypoglycaemic episodes, history of drug abuse / alcoholism,
dementia and cardiovascular conditions were excluded. The samples were tested by,
among other measures, the Digit Span (forward and backward), a test examining
auditory verbal learning and finally the Benton's Visual Retention test (BVRT). EEG
recordings were also obtained. It was found that the diabetic group's performance was
much worse than control's in the BVRT and serial learning tests but no differences
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were found in Digit Span performance, recognition memory or auditory attention. On
examination of the physiological measures obtained as well as performance on
psychometric measures, the authors suggested that the cause of cognitive impairment
in diabetes is likely to be related to chronic sustained hyperglycaemia. Also, the
decrease in memory function seen in this study was said to be suggestive of cortical
neuronal changes. The implications of such findings for diabetes self management are
great and as the researchers noted 'because much of the successful management of the
patient with diabetes mellitus depends on patient education and compliance, these
modest changes may have major clinical significance 	 it would appear prudent for
the clinician to at least carefully assess memory function in all elderly diabetics and
take into account the possibility of minor but significant impairments when planning
the management of these patients' (Moorodian et al., 1988, p.2372).
A very comprehensive, well controlled neuropsychological study was undertaken by
U'Ren, et al., (1990). They examined the performance of a rather small sample of 19
people with Type 2 diabetes (aged 65-77, mean HbA 1 c 11.4), 19 controls with normal
BG levels (mean HbAl c 8.4), and a third group of 7 people with unrecognised
hyperglycaemia (average HbAl c level 11.5). The samples were matched in terms of
education levels and age and participants with neurological and cardiovascular
conditions, alcohol and / or drug abuse were excluded. Among other tests, the Forward
and Backward Digit Span, Serial Subtraction and Symbol Digit Modalities tests were
employed. The authors found that the diabetic group performed significantly less well
than the controls in measures of verbal learning and retrieval, complex mental tracking
and abstract reasoning. No differences were found in simple visuomotor tasks and tests
requiring simple verbal responses. The average performance of the untreated
hyperglycaemic group was found to fall, in general, between the performance of the
diabetic and control groups suggesting that different levels of BG can be reflected in
impaired cognitive performance.
At about the same time, Cerizza, Minciotti, Meregalli, Garosi, Crosti and Frattola
(1990) examined the effects of Type 2 diabetes in a sample of 20 older (63 years and
above) diabetic patients and 20 age- matched non diabetic controls. Although no
matching took place for premorbid IQ, the authors reported that they excluded people
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with peripheral nervous system conditions. Data on the samples' engagement in
behaviours likely to affect cognition such as smoking, alcohol and drug abuse was not
reported. Neither was reported any control for psychiatric illnesses and depression. The
samples differed significantly in their body mass index (BMI) score with the diabetic
group being significantly heavier. Nevertheless, it was found that people with diabetes
were no different to nondiabetic people in terms of performance on the WAIS with the
exception of impaired performance on the information subscale. Given the relaxed
methodological controls of this study however, such results ought to be replicated
before accepted as reliable.
Jagusch, Cramon, Renner and Hepp (1992) on the other hand, carried out a slightly
better controlled study to examine cognitive function in a sample of 26 older Type 2
diabetic people who were compared to a healthy sample (N= 13). Differences in
cognitive performance were also investigated in a within group fashion as a function of
the type of treatment (oral agents, oral agents + insulin, insulin only) the diabetic
group received. Participants with severe hypertension, neurological and
cerebrovascular conditions as well as history of drug abuse were excluded. The
diabetic sample was matched with the healthy group in terms of occupation but on no
other variable. A battery of neuropsychological tests was administered to include Digit
Span, Block Span, verbal memory, Faces and Names Paired Associates, simple RT,
and a test resembling Trail Making A (Zahlenverbindungtest). It was found that people
on insulin only, as well as insulin + oral agents did worse than the healthy and oral —
agents only groups in most recall and learning tasks. Overall, the greater the duration
and severity of the illness the greater the cognitive impairment observed, with people
with the shortest duration who were treated by oral hypoglycaemic agents performing
no differently to healthy non diabetic controls. People treated by insulin performed the
worst of all three groups even in simple RT tasks. The authors concluded that '...
elderly patients with diabetes of long duration and / or severity show impairment in
retention and learning of verbal and non verbal information and predominantly in
complex information tasks when the disease is insufficiently controlled although
overall cognitive performance is not impaired to a significant degree' (p.265).
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In contrast, Soininen, Puranen, Helkala, Laakso and Riekkinen (1992) failed to find
any cognitive impairment when they compared the cognitive performance of 25 Type 2
diabetic people and 59 healthy controls on simple, everyday cognitive tasks such as
general reasoning, understanding of speech, orientation, up-to-date knowledge and so
on. They found no evidence to support the idea that Type 2 diabetes might impair
cognition, however they reported evidence to suggest that diabetes and poor glucose
control may carry a risk for accelerated brain atrophy in the elderly. These findings are
particularly interesting in that they suggest that simple everyday skills, as opposed to
complex, lab-based cognitive tests seen in most studies of cognitive functioning in
diabetes might be unaffected by Type 2 diabetes. It is unfortunate that this study failed
to test participants on widely used lab-based psychometrics too in order to compare the
performance of diabetic subjects on these tests as opposed to everyday measures.
Worrall, Moulton and Briffett (1993) examined the cognitive performance of 50 Type
2 diabetic patients and 90 age-matched controls on a very limited selection of cognitive
tests, the Modified Mini Mental State (MMSE) and the Delayed Word Recall (DWR)
test. They found that people with Type 2 diabetes had significantly poorer scores on
both of these psychometric tests, this difference however needs to be examined
carefully given that there were educational differences between the diabetic and non
diabetic groups (the former had a lower educational attainment level than the latter,
p<0.001) and that no matching on premorbid IQ was achieved. In addition, the diabetic
sample had a greater prevalence of both cardiovascular conditions and hypertension
neither of which were statistically controlled for in subsequent analyses. Finally the
control sample was reported to differ significantly from the diabetic participants in
their alcohol consumption with alcohol consumption being 1.5 times greater than that
observed in the diabetic sample. Despite these shortcomings, the authors concluded
that the illness process may be affecting simple cognitive functions and could affect
higher brain functions too, as it progresses. It was recommended that physicians be
aware of the possibility of cognitive deterioration in Type 2 diabetes and advise such
patients accordingly. Given the serious methodological limitations of this study,
however, such results need to be replicated and further evaluated before being
generalised.
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Lowe, Tranel, Wallace and Welty (1994) examined the cognitive performance of a
population of diabetic people exhibiting a very high prevalence of Type 2 diabetes,
namely older Native Americans. Several popular psychometric tests were utilised.
Among them the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test (measuring immediate memory),
the WAIS-R Digits Forward and Backward test, the similarities subtest of the WAIS-R,
Block design and the BVRT. The only significant differences between the two groups
of 80 Type 2 diabetic and 81 control subjects were seen in cognitive tests of verbal
fluency and similarities, the latter difference becoming non significant after accounting
for hypertension, depression and current alcohol use. The researchers offered
alternative explanations for their failure to find evidence of a cognitive deficit in their
diabetic sample. Such explanations included the cultural background of the participants
(Native Americans) and the relatively shorter duration of diabetes in the diabetic group
studied (6.8 years as compared to 7-13 years in studies finding cognitive decrements).
It was concluded that the diabetes related cognitive decrements found in other studies
might be explainable by risk factors other than Type 2 diabetes.
Helkala, Niskansen, Viinamaki, Partanen and Uusitupa (1995) also found some
evidence to suggest that Type 2 diabetic patients may differ in their cognitive
performance from non diabetic people. They tested 20 diabetic and 22 matched
controls on a comprehensive battery of cognitive tests such as a list learning test,
Spatial, Digit and Corsi Span tests, Verbal and Category Fluency, Block design, and
Trail Making A and B. The researchers failed to find any differences between diabetic
and non diabetic samples in short term verbal and visual memory, executive
functioning and visuo - constructional reasoning, however it can be argued that a group
of approximately 20 participants is rather small for statistical power to be enough to
detect an effect, so such results need to be accepted with caution. Poorer recall was
observed in the diabetic group's performance in the list learning test, however, when
they were given a reminder of the list of words they had been asked to recall this group
recalled significantly more words than the control subjects. An interesting observation
arose from this finding in that in reminding Type 2 diabetic patients of the learned
material, their recall performance improved, however they tended to repeat words they
had already recalled. So, the authors suggested, it seems that when their attention was
divided between remembering previously recalled words and listening to a reminder of
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forgotten words, people with diabetes were more impaired in controlling the learning
process. Evidence was also offered to support the findings of Perlmuter et al., (1988)
that increased triglyceride levels could be associated with cognitive impairment. It was
concluded that Type 2 diabetic patients may be less able to monitor their performance
in response to feedback. The methodological difficulty with the present study lies in
the fact that no attempt was made to match samples in terms of premorbid IQ. Further,
the authors did not report whether they excluded participants or controlled for the
presence of neurological conditions, drug and / or alcohol problems and other
conditions that may interfere with cognition.
A similarly problematic study in terms of methodology was carried out by Croxson
and Jagger in 1995. They compared the cognitive performance of a newly diagnosed
and an already diagnosed as having Type 2 diabetes sample, to that of a diabetes — free
group. All participants were 75 years or older. The test used was the MMSE which
revealed that the samples with known diabetes performed much worse than the diabetes
— free. Apart from the limitation inherent in using only one cognitive measure, the
authors failed to report whether they measured and controlled for any other factors that
may have affected cognition in these older samples of people. Information on exclusion
criteria was not provided.
At about the same time, a study that carried out extensive matching and adopted a
series of exclusion criteria reported no cognitive impairment in Type 2 diabetes. In this
study, Atiea, Moses and Sinclair (1995) examined the cognitive performance of 40
diabetic people with (N=20) and without (N=20) hypertension and 20 non diabetic
controls. Having controlled for premorbid IQ and carefully matched subjects on this
factor, they also utilised several exclusion criteria: they excluded patients on the basis.
of level of depression (score of 14+ on the Geriatric Depression Screening Scale),
hypoglycaemic episodes, functional disorders (e.g. vision, hearing, handwriting) and
patients with heart or other neurological conditions which might affect
neuropsychological functioning. They found no differences between the samples in
tests of recall, forward and backward digit span, verbal fluency, digit symbol
substitution, psychomotor speed and concentration. The authors concluded that their
results do not provide support for an association between cognitive dysfunction and
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presence of Type 2 diabetes in older subjects. In excluding patients on several criteria
however it may be argued that this study suffered from atypicality of samples and
hence the results may only generalise to an atypical, complications — free diabetic
sample. Apart from this potential limitation, these results suggest that perhaps Type 2
diabetic patients are no different to matched controls in cognitive tests performed in the
lab and findings from previous studies need to be re-evaluated.
Another study adopting stringent exclusion criteria was carried out by Zaslavsky,
Gross, Chaves and Machado (1995). They examined two groups of Type 2 diabetic
people (one with neuropathy and one without) and an age and education - matched non
diabetic sample. They excluded people with cerebrovascular disease, cardiovascular
illness, neurological conditions, psychiatric illness to include depression, alcohol and
drug abuse as well as those receiving medication that may interfere with cognition. No
data was provided as to whether people with hypertension were included. The authors
tested samples on immediate, recent and long term memory as measured by a word
test, a famous faces test and recognition of tower silhouettes. They found that diabetic
people with neuropathy performed more poorly than both controls and diabetic people
without neuropathy in tests measuring visual memory, however no differences were
found in verbal memory. An association was also found between performance at visual
tests and degree of cardiovascular impairment. It was concluded that visual cognitive
impairment is related to degree of autonomic neuropathy in Type 2 diabetes. Although
this study appears promising in the extent to which appropriate methodological
controls are employed, it is suggested that the extensive list of exclusion criteria
perhaps limits generalisation of the results to an atypical sample of diabetic people who
are free form any other conditions that are usually present.
In a brief communication 'a definite neurocognitive and electrophysiological
dysfunction' (Dey, Misra, Desaim Mahpatra and Padma, 1995, p.251) was found in a
young sample (mean age 48.6 years) of adults with Type 2 diabetes and no history of
severe hypoglycaemic episodes. The authors reported the results of a preliminary study
utilising a new measurement, the Neurobehavioural Cognitive Status Examination
(NOSE) assessing a wide range of cognitive functioning. Impairment was found in the
diabetic group in attention, construction ability and short term memory but calculation,
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language and reasoning ability were unaffected. Electrophysiological measures
confirmed the cognitive impairment as observed in psychometric performance.
Although the findings were only preliminary and resulted from the comparison of a
small (N=15) sample of diabetic people with an extremely small (N =5) control group,
they nonetheless seemed to be supportive of the notion that relative complex cognitive
processes may be affected in people suffering of Type 2 diabetes.
The same group of authors later reported a study upon which the earlier paper was
based, which reached similar conclusions (Dey et al., 1997). In the present study results
from the testing of larger samples were reported (N =28 in each group) and information
was provided as to the exclusion criteria adopted. So, all diabetic patients were treated
by methods other than the administration of insulin and were excluded if they had a
history of neurological, medical or psychiatric illness likely to interfere with cognition.
Subjects were matched on presence / absence of hypertension as well as ischaemic
heart disease. BG levels were checked to ensure that testing occurred under non —
hypoglycaemic conditions. No difference was found in the MMSE, comprehension,
naming, construction and calculation, the latter being tested by the NGSE used in the
preliminary study by the same authors. Differences were found however in attention,
memory and repetition with diabetic people performing significantly worse than the
control sample.
Earlier, Bent, Rabbitt and Metcalfe (1996) had investigated a sample of both Type 1
and Type 2 patients ranging in age from 50 to 91 years and compared their cognitive
performance with a sample of healthy subjects. An intelligence test (AH4) and three
memory tests (cumulative learning, verbal free recall, picture recognition) were used.
Diabetic people performed less accurately than the healthy sample on the intelligence.
test and also had poorer scores on the cumulative learning test, free recall and picture
recognition tests. The authors also reported differences in impairment between diet -
managing diabetic subjects and those relying on drug control of the illness, the latter
group being more heavily impaired. Alternative explanations offered for this finding
were longer duration of diabetes and longer presence of undiagnosed illness in the drug
- treated group. The authors provided no information about the extent to which they
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controlled for any confounding factors or whether they excluded people on the basis of
other conditions that may interfere with cognitive functioning.
Likewise, a physiological study suggesting cognitive impairment in type 2 diabetes,
was carried out by Kurita, Katayama and Mochio (1996) who recorded auditory P300
event-related potentials in 60 Type 2 diabetic patients with no history of stroke,
dementia or other neurological illnesses. The P300 wave is 'a late cortical
neurophysiological event that reflects some cognitive functions especially attention and
short-term memory' (Kurita et al., 1996, p. 361). Longer than normal P300 latencies
are thought to signal altered higher brain functions. In this study, there were significant
differences in P300 latencies observed in diabetic and control groups, diabetic people
with retinopathy exhibiting even longer latencies than non-retinopathy diabetic
subjects. The authors concluded that their findings support the presence of pathological
processes in the central nervous system of people with Type 2 diabetes which are likely
to affect adversely higher brain functions.
Vanhanen, Karhu, Koivisto, Paakkonen, Partanen, Laakso and Riekkinen (1996) on the
other hand, failed to find any cognitive differences when they examined a very small
(N=9) sample of people with Type 2 diabetes and 9 non diabetic controls. People with
stroke, dementia and depression were excluded as were people with hypertension and
diabetic patients managing the illness by insulin. The battery of tests administered
included the Visual Reproduction Test of the Weschler Memory Scale, Digit Span and
the WAIS vocabulary test. The Finger Tapping Test was used to measure motor speed.
The authors reported no differences between samples in any of the tests they
administered, although a trend for impaired performance in the diabetic sample was
seen in Backward Digit Span. Physiological measures however did reveal differences-
between the two samples with the diabetic group appearing impaired in physiological
tests of automatic stimulus processing, detection of input /arousal and ability to redirect
attention.
Similar methodological difficulties were apparent in a study by Assissi, Alimenti,
Maceli, Di Pietro, Lalloni and Montera (1996). They tested a very small sample of
diabetic (N= 12) and control (N=17) people of similar age and schooling background on
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a battery of cognitive tests to include the MMSE, Raven's Progressive Matrices,
BVRT, Digit Span and the Corsi Block. They failed to find any significant differences
between the performance of the two samples, an observation very likely to be due to
the small samples they examined. In terms of methodology, the authors report
excluding people with depression and illnesses that may be interfering with cognition,
but they fail to report what such illnesses were and how extensive their exclusion
procedure was. In addition, no premorbid IQ matching took place and no information is
provided as to confounding factors that may have been controlled for such as
hypertension, or BMI.
Prospective studies also seem to lend their support to the notion that people with Type
2 diabetes may be cognitively disadvantaged than people without the illness. Elias,
Elias, D'Agostino, Cupples, Wilson, Silbershatz and Wolf (1997) reported results from
the Framingham study, a large prospective study that followed a cohort of diabetic and
diabetes — free people for approximately 30 years. As the only exclusion criterion was
the absence of stroke, it may be argued that the study examined a typical sample of
both hypertensive and non — hypertensive diabetic patients. However there were
significant differences in the existence of other conditions that may interfere with
cognition in that the diabetic sample had higher systolic and diastolic blood pressure
readings, a greater proportion of diabetic people were hypertensive and also there was a
greater instance of cardiovascular illness in the diabetic sample than the healthy one.
This is to be expected in a longitudinal study of this sort and reflects the fact that both
hypertension and cardiovascular illness are more likely to be seen in samples with
Type 2 diabetes than nondiabetic individuals. A comprehensive battery of widely used
psychometric tests was administered during the subjects' 14th
 or 15 th biennial
examination. Tests used were mostly subtests of the WAIS and evaluated immediate
and long term verbal memory, learning, visual organisation, visual memory, learning,
attention and abstract reasoning. The authors found that Type 2 diabetes and
hypertension interacted such that the presence of both diagnoses increased the risk of
impairment in tests of visual memory. People with diabetes were more impaired in
delayed verbal memory recall than non diabetic people. In addition duration of the
illness was found to be related to poor performance on both immediate and delayed
logical memory, visual memory and abstract reasoning. No differences were found
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however in tests measuring attention and mental flexibility suggesting that these areas
are spared the effects of both Type 2 diabetes and a long duration of the illness.
Finally, diabetic people managing the illness by insulin were found to be at a higher
risk for cognitive dysfunction than those on diet and / or oral agents, on both
immediate and delayed recall and visual memory.
In another prospective study, Scott, Kritz - Silverstein, Barrett - Connor and
Wiederholt (1998) followed up a sample of 1700 people between 1972 and 1991.
Participants were screened for factors that may have increased their risk for developing
heart disease at the initial stage of the study and later (i.e. between 1984 and 1991). A
battery of cognitive tests was administered which included the MMSE, Trail Making
B and visual reproduction test from the WAIS Memory scale. Cognitive functions
tested included verbal memory, visual memory, auditory attention and mental
flexibility and visuomotor tracking. Statistical analysis controlled for the effects of age,
education, obesity, depression, blood pressure and estrogen use in women. The authors
found no evidence for cognitive impairment in Type 2 samples as compared to
nondiabetic controls and samples with impaired glucose tolerance. They
acknowledged the need for '...aggressive attempts should also be made to reduce
biases and to control for the effects of multiple potential confounders, particularly
depression' (Scott et al., 1998, p.1222).
More recently, another prospective study reported results of cognitive tests carried out
on a substantial sample of older (mean 71.7 years) women with (N=682) and without
(N=8997) Type 2 diabetes (Gregg, Yaffe, Cauley, Rolka, Blackwell, Narayan and
Cummings, 2000). There were significant differences between the healthy and diabetic
samples in several demographic variables such as education, depression, poor self -
rated health, visual impairment, stroke, heart disease, hypertension, alcohol intake and
estrogen use. These factors were statistically controlled for in subsequent analyses.
Three cognitive tests (MMSE, Digit Symbol and Trail Making B ) were administered
at baseline and then 6 years later. The diabetic sample was found to show poorer
performance in all three tests with people who had greater diabetes duration (5-14
years) being at a higher risk for cognitive decline than women who had diagnosed
diabetes for less than 5 years. A limitation of this study was the selection procedure for
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the diabetic sample: no medical confirmation of diagnosis was obtained. Instead,
women were asked whether they had ever been told they had diabetes and if the
response was affirmative this was taken as evidence that they must be Type 2 diabetes
patients. Given this liberal way of assigning participants to conditions as well as the
limited selection of cognitive tests used, such results need be interpreted carefully.
The latest, most recent cross sectional study by Ryan and Geckle (2000) also found
evidence for cognitive decline, but this time in a younger (mean age 50.8 years) sample
of adults with Type 2 diabetes. Unlike the previously reported study a wide range of
neuropsychological tests were administered to samples of physician- diagnosed
diabetic adults as well as non diabetic controls, though the latter were recruited in a non
randomised manner and were all friends or relatives of the diabetic people tested.
Despite this recruitment anomaly, the study was fairly well designed in that although
matching only took place for age and sex, there were no significant differences
between participants in years of education, depression, premorbid intelligence and
alcohol consumption. The authors excluded people with psychiatric illness, drug abuse
or head trauma but failed to report whether people with heart conditions were included.
Differences were evident in systolic blood pressure between the diabetic and healthy
samples but these were statistically controlled for in analyses. Statistical analysis
adopted a very interesting approach in evaluating differences between samples where
cognitive tests were subjected to factor analysis and then differences between groups
were sought as a function of 4 principal components i.e. learning, memory, problem
solving and psychomotor efficiency. Differences were found only in the latter
component where the diabetic sample was less efficient, however, no differences were
found in memory, learning and problem solving.
A summary of the findings of the studies discussed above, without any consideration of
their methodological strengths and weaknesses follows in Table 3.1 below. An
inspection of the table will confirm that, in general, there is extensive disagreement
over the effects of Type 2 diabetes on cognition.
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Table 3.1: Summary of findings on the long term effects of Type 2 diabetes on cognitive function
Study Simple
attention
& / or
motor speed
Simple
perceptual
performance
Simple
everyday
tasks
Complex
Attention
(Mental
Flexibility)
Learning
& / or
Memory
Problem
Solving
& / or
Reasoning
Language
processes
& / or verbal
fluency
Assissi et al.,
(1996)
v V V v ?
Atiea et al.,
(1995)
V v v V
Bent et al.,
(1996)
x x
Cerizza et al.,
(1990)
v V v x v
Croxson and
Jagger (1995)
x
Dey et al.,
(1995)
V
x x v V
Elias et al.,
(1997)
V v x x
Gregg ct al.,
(2000)
X x
Helkala et al.,
(1995)
v V X
.
Jagusch et al.,
(1992)
7 X ? X
Lowe et al.,
(1994)
V	 - V V V X
Mattlar et al.,
(1985)
x V V
.
Meuter at al.,
(1980)
x V X
Moorodian et
al., (1988)
v X
Perlmuter et
al., (1984)
v x x
Perlmuter et
al., (1987)
V X X V
Reaven et al.,
(1988)
v x x v
Reaven et al.,
(1990)
v X x x V
Robertson-
Tschabo (1986)
V V
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Study Simple
attention
& / or
motor speed
Simple
perceptual
performance
Simple
everyday
tasks
Complex
Attention
(Mental
Flexibility)
Learning
& / or
Memory
Problem
Solving
& / or
Reasoning
Language
processes
& / or verbal
fluency
Ryan and
Geckle
(2000)
X v v v
.
Scott et al.,
(1998)
V V V V
Soininen et al.,
(1992)
Tun et al.,
(1987)
v x x
U'Ren et al.,
(1990)
V v x x x
Vanhanen et
al., (1996)
v v v v
Worrall et al.,
(1993)
x x
Zaslavsky et
al., (1995)
?
(NB: V= performance unaffected, X = performance impaired, ? = performance impaired at
some but not all measures)
3.2.2. Cognitive function in relation to metabolic control in Type 2 diabetes
Although the evidence regarding the long term effects of Type 2 diabetes is not
straightforward in that there is no overall agreement about the existence and extent of
Type 2 diabetes-related cognitive dysfunction, results from studies examining
cognition as a function of glycaemic control in Type 2 diabetes are much more clear. In
general, the view seems to be that in Type 2 diabetes improved glycaemic control is
related to improved cognitive performance. This finding is in agreement with studies of
the effects of different BG levels on cognitive performance in non diabetic people.
3.2.2.1. Studies with healthy participants
Gonder-Frederick, Hall, Vogt, Cox, Green and Gold (1987) tested a sample of 11
healthy elderly volunteers (aged 58-76 years) under two ilycaemic conditions i) with
fasting BG levels and ii) in an experimentally-induced hyperglycaemic condition.
Subjects were tested on four WAIS cognitive tasks, the Paired Associate Word List,
Narrative Memory, Digit Span and Visual Memory. The study found evidence of a
memory enhancing effect of relative BG increase as seen in enhanced WAIS test
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results in the hyperglycaemic condition. This finding replicated work seen in
experimental research with animals.
In a later study, Hall, Gonder -Frederick, Chewning, Silveira and Gold (1989)
elaborated on these findings and showed that memory can be enhanced in the elderly
by glucose level increases, however younger people were not found to benefit as much.
They tested two small samples of healthy participants, one younger (mean age = 20
years) and one older (mean age = 67.4 years) on several memory tests from the WAIS
to include logical and visual memory. The study adopted a repeated measures approach
where both samples were tested under conditions of fasting and increased BG. The
present work supported previous findings of memory enhancement by glucose in
animals. In animals however, the glucose dose response curve resembles an U pattern
suggesting that although moderate doses of glucose enhance memory, higher doses
impair it. It follows that although acute hyperglycaemic episodes may have some
memory enhancing function, chronic hyperglycaemia, as seen in Type 2 diabetes is
likely to be associated with cognitive deterioration.
3.2.2.2.	 Metabolic control: long term effects
Such findings point, indirectly, to the importance of good, long term glycaemic control
for elderly patients with Type 2 diabetes. On this issue, studies have directly examined
Type 2 diabetic people's cognitive performance as a function of glycaemic control.
For example, in the study by Perlmuter et al. (1984) reported earlier, the authors found
that although diabetic participants in general performed more poorly than controls on a
series of neuropsychological tests, cognitive performance impairment was greater in
patients with elevated HbA i c levels (and thus poorer glycaemic control), suggesting
that long term glycaemic control is important in avoiding cognitive deterioration in
Type 2 diabetes.
Similarly, Reaven and Thompson (1989) examined 60 Type 2 diabetic and non diabetic
individuals. They found, and reported in a brief abstract, that among other measures
obtained the diabetic sample performed worse than the controls in tasks requiring
abstract reasoning and complex psychomotor abilities. Cognitive impairment was also
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positively correlated with HbA l c concentration levels. The authors noted this
relationship and concluded that it was not clear whether the decline in cognitive
function was due to hyperglycaemia per se or whether hyperglycaemia and reduced
cognitive function were due to secondary vascular abnormality complications.
Reaven, et al., (1990) further explored the nature and extent of cognitive impairment
in a sample of 30 diabetic and 29 healthy volunteers. The measures tested verbal
learning, abstract reasoning, complex psychomotor functioning, simple verbal skills
and motor speed. Apart from the two last measures, the diabetic group performed much
worse than controls in all other measures with individuals with poorer metabolic
control performing more poorly on tests involving learning, reasoning and other
complex cognitive processes. Levels of glycaemic control did not relate to performance
in simpler cognitive tasks. The authors also added that the cognitive impairment seen
in Type 2 diabetes only applies to tasks involving complex cognitive processing and
that over learned verbal responses might be spared.
3.2.2.3. Metabolic control: short term intervention effects
The effects of short term optimal glycaemic control (fasting plasma glucose FPG<153
mg/di) were examined by Gradman, Laws, Thompson and Reaven (1991) who reported
findings of cognitive tests on 26 men and women with Type 2 diabetes tested at
baseline, a month later - having been off hypoglycaemic medication and then again
after being treated with glupizide to achieve normoglycaemic control. Cognitive tests
examined learning and memory, complex psychomotor function, attention and verbal
ability. After optimal BG control, improvement was seen in learning and memory,
complex psychomotor function and sustained attention. Simple verbal ability and
simple reaction time remained unaffected. The authors concluded that their data
suggested that improved glycaemic control may lead to improvement in some cognitive
processes in older Type 2 diabetic patients.
Similar conclusions were reached by Zuccaro, Menasci, Calvetti, Ventura, Paparella,
Palleschi, Coen, Spizzichino and Manor (1991) who looked at the cognitive
performance of 10 Type 2 diabetic patients before and after diabetic treatment to
improve BG levels and 10 diabetic patients assigned to a placebo group. Cognitive
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measures included the MMSE and digit span tests. An improvement in BG levels in the
experimental group was associated with improvement in memory performance.
In a later study, Gradman et al. (1993) examined a sample of 30 people with Type 2
diabetes and 13 control subjects at four different time points i) at baseline, ii) after 1
month's washout of diabetic medication iii) after 2 and iv) after 4 months of optimal
glycaemic control. Subjects were tested on measures of learning, memory, complex
perceptual / motor function, and sustained attention. It was found that learning and
memory improved over time with glycaemic control, the improvement being specific
to verbal material. Although the previous findings of attention and complex
psychomotor processing were not replicated the authors concluded that
uncontrolled hyperglycaemia in patients with Type 2 diabetes may have an untoward
effect on verbal learning and! or memory and that this specific facet of cognitive
function may improve when plasma glucose concentration is decreased' (Gradman et
al., 1993, p.1311). It seems that improved glycaemic control may have beneficial
effects on cognitive performance in Type 2 diabetic patients, this finding stressing the
importance of good diabetes self management.
This same conclusion is also supported by a study by Meneilly, Cheung, Tessier,
Yakura and Tuokko (1993) who found improved cognitive performance on several
cognitive tests after six months of optimal glycaemic control in 16 elderly, originally
untreated Type 2 diabetic patients. The authors reported that improved glycaemic
control led to cognitive function enhancement in domains such as attention,
concentration, conceptual thinking as well as retrieval of new material.
Finally, more recently, Naor, Steingruber, Westhoff, Schottenfield — Naor and Gries
(1997) reported findings that supported the results of the above studies. They tested a
group of Type 2 diabetic people before and after in-patient treatment to achieve
optimal glycaemic control on a RT test, a German version of the Trail Making A test, a
letter cancellation task and another focused attention task (Bourdon-Freyberg
concentration task). They found that after intensive treatment to improve metabolic
control, patients with Type 2 diabetes performed better at tests measuring psychomotor
S43
performance, and visual motor speed. They also found that glycaemic control was
positively related to improved performance at cognitive tests.
A table presenting a summary of the findings from the studies described in this section
follows. It is suggested that, in general, better glycaemic control is seen to be
associated with better performance in psychometric tests.
Table 3.2: Metabolic control and cognitive function in Type 2 diabetes
Study Simple
attention
& / or
motor speed
Simple
perceptual
performance
Simple
everyday
tasks
Complex
Attention
(Mental
Flexibility)
Learning
& / or
Memory
Problem
Solving
& I or
Reasoning
Language
processes
& / or verbal
fluency
Grandman et al.
(1991)
v V v
Grandman et al.
(1993)
V
Meneilly et al.
(1993)
V V
Zuccaro et al.
(1991)
V V
(NB: V = performance enhanced with optimal control)
3.3.	 Contribution of other factors on cognition in Type 2 diabetes 
Type 2 diabetes does not normally occur in isolation. Other minor or more important
events which can affect cognitive function could take place in the patient's life which
can lead to cognitive decline, independently of the presence of diabetes. Such factors
are likely to confound any research into diabetes-related cognitive dysfunction and are
briefly considered here.
• Old Age: As Type 2 diabetes is seen in older populations - hence the no longer .
used term maturity-onset diabetes - any research into the illness' detrimental effects
on cognition will be plagued by confounding factors arising from cognitive decline
related to older age rather than diabetes. Extensive research into the psychology of
ageing has reported cognitive decline associated with age. Various theories have
been put forward as to why such a decline comes about, however no definite
answer has been given yet. Suggestions include the elderly being unable to focus
on the cognitive task at hand, failures to integrate the memory context with the
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information they are trying to remember and thus lacking context-related cues
which would otherwise aid retrieval, and failures to inhibit conflicting information
(Smith, 1996). In a very informative paper, Tun et al., (1990) reviewed cognitive
studies of the elderly and, in sum, suggested the following. Firstly, evidence seems
to suggest that older adults are poorer than young adults at recalling the source of
their memories i.e. they are able to recall information but are unsure as to where
they heard it. Secondly, vast individual differences exist in that cognitive decline is
neither inevitable nor is there a steady process involved; socioeconomic status,
verbal ability, formal education attainment and other factors are proposed
moderators of cognitive changes. Finally, although complex numerical and spatial
experimental tasks might be prone to ageing-related decline, there is little or no
decline in abilities which depend on long term knowledge and immediate or short
term memory. As a result of these factors, one might argue that part of the
cognitive deficit seen in older Type 2 diabetic patients is due to ageing /
demographic factors rather than diabetes. These issues point to the importance of
controlling for demographic and ageing factors as well as matching diabetic
subjects with healthy controls with great care.
• Cardiovascular problems: A study by Moorodian and Siverly (1993) looked at the
number of errors made in the Benton Visual Retention test by people with and
people without Type 2 diabetes. They found that the diabetic group made a larger
number of errors than the control one, specifically a greater number of omissions,
distortions, size errors and 'left' errors. These types of errors are said to be
particularly common in patients with cerebrovascular disease (Benton, 1974 in
Moorodian and Siverly, 1993, p.67). Consequently, the authors suggested that their
test results are suggestive of a cardiovascular aetiology of cognitive deficits seen in
Type 2 diabetes. It follows that presence of cardiovascular disease needs to be
controlled for in studies of Type 2 diabetes-related cognitive decline.
• Hypertension: Hypertension is yet another condition that might affect cognitive
performance. For example, abstract reasoning, memory and attention have been
found to be impaired in people with hypertension as opposed to normotensive
subjects (Elias, Schultz, Robbins, Elias, 1990). As most Type 2 diabetic patients
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also suffer from hypertension, the effects of the condition need to be controlled for
in studies of cognitive functioning in Type 2 diabetes.
• Hypoglycaemic episodes: In Type 1 diabetes insulin treatment of the condition
carries the side effect of mild / severe hypoglycaemic attacks. Such events have
been proposed to have adverse effects on patients' cognitive performance (e.g.
Langan et al. 1991). A study by Meneilly, Cheung and Tuoldco (1994), examined
the incidence and results of experimentally induced hypoglycaemia in elderly, non-
obese Type 2 diabetic subjects. Both diabetic and control groups exhibited
decreased hypoglycaemia awareness but diabetic people also showed greater
impairment than healthy controls in tests of simple and choice reaction time. It
seems to be the case that, as in Type 1 diabetes, hypoglycaemic attacks may have
serious detrimental effects on cognition and hence frequency of such episodes
should perhaps be recorded and statistically controlled for in cognitive studies of
Type 2 diabetes. As hypoglycaemic episodes are less likely among Type 2 diabetic
people though, it is argued that such episodes may be less important in the context
of Type 2 diabetes.
• Depression: Depression is associated with cognitive decline and preliminary
research shows that most diabetic patients will be affected by the disorder
(Leedom, Meehan, Procci and Zeidler, 1991). For example Lustman, Griffith,
Clouse and Cryer (1986) found that lifetime prevalence rates for major depression
and dysthymic disorder were 36.5% and 17% in a sample of 57 Type 2 and 57
Type 1 diabetic patients. Similarly, in a study of 1339 elderly healthy and diabetic
adults Amato, Paolisso, Cacciatore, Ferrara, Canonico, Rengo and Varrichio (1996)
reported that Type 2 diabetes was significantly associated with depression
independently of age, gender, loneliness, cognitive impairment and other chronic
conditions. Additionally depression has been found to be related to poor blood
glucose control (von Dras & Lichty, 1990, van der Does, de Neeling, Snoek,
Kostense, Grootenhuis, Bouter and Heine, 1996). As depression is associated with
cognitive decline and is likely to affect Type 2 diabetic patients, researchers need to
either control for it or exclude clinically depressed diabetic people when examining
cognitive function in Type 2 diabetes.
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3.4. Summary and conclusion 
The review of the cognitive literature in both Type 1 and Type 2 diabetes has suggested
that the question as to whether there is cognitive impairment associated with diabetes
has been asked in slightly different ways for the two conditions. In Type 1 research,
the greatest emphasis has been on whether there is cognitive impairment as a result of
past, frequent and / or severe hypoglycaemic episodes, usually a side effect of
treatment of the illness. In Type 2 research, however, the focus has been on the long
term effects of the illness on cognition. The answers reached so far however are quite
similar. So it would appear that there may be some link between cognitive impairment
and frequency and severity of hypoglycaemic episodes in Type 1 diabetes, but such a
link has 'not been proven' (Deary and Frier, 1996, p.767). The results as to the long
term effects of Type 2 diabetes on cognition are also far from conclusive. In general,
studies in this field are finding some cognitive impairment but the extent and specific
loci of such dysfunction are strongly debated. It is also interesting that studies have
used a substantial number of cognitive tests, none of which have been specifically
developed to address cognitive processes specific to people with Type 2 diabetes.
Finally there is extreme variation as to what methodological criteria have been adopted,
with some studies controlling for and excluding a great number of potential confounds
while others have failed to control for any such factors.
3.5. Self management in Type 2 diabetes
3.5.1. Definition
Chronic disease has been suggested to be disproportionately intrusive for both patients
and their families (Strauss, Corbin , Fagerhaugh, Glaser, Maines, and Suczek, 1984).
The reason why this may be the case is really quite simple; in order to manage a
chronic illness a range of behaviours is required. These include following complex
regimens to prevent medical and symptomatic complications, attempting to control the
illness while adjusting to the illness - brought lifestyle changes, and finally coping with
the social, psychological and financial problems that arise from having a chronic
condition.
Diabetes self management is a term which has developed after the more commonly
used terms 'compliance' and 'adherence' were found to be problematic (Glasgow,
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Wilson and McCaul, 1985; Goodall and Halford, 1991). The reasons why these
concepts are problematic centre around both conceptual and methodological
inconsistencies with defining, measuring and quantifying disease management
behaviour in diabetes and will be briefly discussed here.
'Compliance' has been used to refer to 'the extent to which a person's behaviour (in
terms of taking medications, following diets or exercising lifestyle changes) coincides
with medical or health advice' (Haynes et al., 1979, in Glasgow et al., 1985). This
definition carries the following assumptions:
• that the behaviour to be adhered to can be compared to a known standard,
• that there are objective, well validated measures of compliance and
• that there are ways to partial out inadvertent noncompliance attributable to other
factors (e.g. lack of knowledge, patient-provider miscommunication etc.) than the
patient's conscious noncompliance efforts.
It seems, however, that the state of affairs in compliance with diabetes regimens is far
more complex than the above definition would imply. Further, the three assumptions
described above that are inherent in the term 'compliance', are violated in the case of
diabetes. The reasons for this have been widely discussed by Glasgow et al., (1985),
Johnson (1995) and many others. In sum, the first assumption is violated in that for
some aspects of the diabetes regimen, specific instructions which the patient is
expected to adhere to may have never been given. For example, when asked to increase
the amount of exercise patients engage in, specific instructions as to the frequency,
intensity and type of exercise that are recommended might not be discussed. So the
known standard that behaviour needs to be compared against is lacking. In fact it is
well known that when patients with Type 2 diabetes are asked to exercise, detail as to
how much and how often is rarely given (Krug, Haire-Joshu and Heady, 1991). In
addition, as diabetes regimens are in general complex and consist of numerous
activities, noncompliance with one aspect of the regimen does not necessarily mean
noncompliance with another one. As Eakin and Glasgow (1996) note 'Diabetes self
management is not an 'all-or-none' behavior; ' (p. 1).
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The second and third assumptions fail within the diabetes regimen, in that although
there are numerous measures of 'compliance' there is no single, widely used and
accepted measure that could reliably quantify how well a patient copes with their
diabetes regimen. Methods of measuring compliance include patient self reports,
behavioural observations, diaries, 24 hour recall interviews, health status indicators,
behaviour ratings and physician ratings. Depending on which one method is used to
measure compliant behaviour, researchers are likely to obtain different results. A
reliable, valid, and non reactive measure of compliance that is sensitive to the
complexity of the diabetes regimen is yet to be developed.
Because of the conceptual and methodological problems described above, Glasgow et
al's., (1985) and Goodall and Halford's (1991) suggestions that the terms 'adherence'
and 'compliance' are dropped and replaced by the more accurate 'diabetes self
management' or 'levels of self care behaviours' seem very sensible. As a result, such
terms have been adopted instead of 'compliance' and 'adherence' throughout this
thesis. Self management will thus be used to refer to the sets of behaviours the diabetic
patient needs to perform in order to control the disease and avoid complications. Such
diabetes self care behaviours centre on dieting, exercise - taking, BG level testing, .
medication taking and foot care (Glasgow, Toobert, Hampson and Wilson, 1995).
3.5.2.	 Patient and physician conceptualisations of diabetes self management
Diabetes self management can be conceptualised in inter-related ways. Firstly, self care
from the physician's perspective (physiological aspect) and secondly from the
patient's point of view (psychological and practical aspect).
The Physician's view
For the physician, BG control may be argued to be the main point of emphasis. So a
systematic attempt to control diabetes might focus on i) reducing plasma glucose in an
attempt to avoid microvascular complications, ii) reducing plasma lipids in order to
reduce the risk of ischaemic heart disease and iii) controlling hypertension in order to
minimise the probability of developing nefropathy, retinopathy or suffering strokes
(Taylor, 1993). The tools to achieve any of these depend to a large extent on lifestyle
changes on the part of the patient. For example, plasma glucose reduction involves the
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diabetic patient following a strict diet (usually with a weight losing goal) avoiding high
fat foods and being very careful as to the amounts of carbohydrate, taken. Exercise is
usually also prescribed. Upon failure to control BG with diet and exercise alone, the
Type 2 patient may then be asked to take oral hypoglycaemic agents (such as
sulphonylureas) and on failure of this form of treatment, insulin. Compliance with
medication regimens is then required. Lipid reduction too follows a similar treatment
pattern with changes in eating habits and exercise being the first therapeutic moves
considered, then followed by drug prescriptions should the eating habits fail to be
altered. Hypertension control follows exactly the same pattern; medication is
prescribed following failure of the Type 2 diabetic patient to modify his / her eating
(and / or alcohol intake), smoking and exercise habits.
The Patient's view
Diabetes self management from the patient's point of view, in general, involves the
performance of a range of complex behaviours in order to achieve BG control and
minimise the risk of diabetic complications. It is now well known that such behavioural
changes are rather difficult to achieve. As, Glasgow et al., (1995) note 'Achieving long-
term adherence to diabetes regimens remains a challenge for patients, educators and
researchers. Several factors combine to make diabetes self management particularly
difficult. First.... diabetes regimens are complex... Second, component tasks of the
regimen are difficult in and for themselves.... Third the diabetes regimen is challenging
because it is a lifetime regimen... .Finally, many older persons with diabetes also suffer
from other diseases or complications that introduce additional regimen complexities...'
(p.33). On a similar general level, McCullogh, Glasgow, Hampson and Wagner (1994)
provide a very informative model of the assumptions underlying the prescription of
intensive diabetes management. In sum, they suggest that there are several basic
assumptions that physicians make in developing self care plans. Such basic
assumptions involve the patient knowing what BG control is, feeling that their current
BG control is inadequate, knowing how to improve BG control and finally being
(psychologically and practically) able and prepared to improve it. It follows that, if any
one of the above assumptions is not shared by the diabetic patient, the whole self care
plan will be extremely likely to collapse.
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More specifically, in any such plan, Type 2 diabetic patients are faced with numerous
important and complex decisions to do with their day to day life. For example,
complying with low fat reduced calorie meals, eating meals at consistent times, getting
used to habitual exercise taking, timing physical activity and testing BG before and
after it in order to avoid hypoglycaemia, testing BG levels regularly and adjusting their
behaviour in response to BG test results, remembering to take diabetic / hypertension
medication at set times, remembering to carry anti hypoglycaemic products with them
to treat unexpected hypoglycaemia, learning to recognise hypoglycaemic symptoms,
remembering how to deal with medication side effects, remembering to attend diabetic
clinic appointments, are only some of the required behavioural changes needed in
managing Type 2 diabetes. What is more, all these activities need to be performed
knowing that i) they are there to stay with the patient for the rest of his/her life ii) if
they are not performed medical complications will result iii) if they are performed there
will be no short term rewarding results to be seen, rather a lack of long-term adverse
consequences (Krug et al., 1991).
3.5.3.	 Factors related to the self management of diabetes
In a critical review, Goodall and Halford (1991) summarised factors that have been
seen to play a crucial role in predicting successful self management. Age is one of them
and appears to be related to different self management skills. For example, it has been
found that older people on oral hypoglycaemic medication manage their diabetes more
effectively than younger ones with Type 2 diabetes (Diehl, Bauer and Sugarek, 1987 in
Goodall and Halford, 1991) but, as the authors note, this relationship is complex and
might be confounded by other variables such as length of time since diagnosis and type
of diabetes' (p.3).
There has been a considerable amount of research examining the psychosocial factors
that may influence self management of diabetes. For example, researchers have
examined, among others, factors such as social support (e.g. Glasgow and Toobert,
1988), barriers to self care (e.g. Glasgow, Hampson, Strycker and Ruggiero, 1997),
stress (e.g. Surwit and Schneider, 1993), personal models of diabetes (e.g. Hampson,
Glasgow and Foster, 1996; Nurymberg, Kreitler and Weissler, 1996), self efficacy (e.g.
Kavanagh, Gooley and Wilson, 1993), locus of control (e.g. Peyrot and Rubin, 1994)
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and patient — physician communication (e.g. Hampson, McKay and Glasgow, 1996;
Samaras, Ashwell, Mackintosh, Campbell and Chisholm, 1996).
However, notably lacking is research on how cognitive functioning may be associated
with diabetes self management. In fact, to the best of the author's knowledge, at the
time of writing, only one very recently (December 2000) published study exists which
has directly addressed the question of cognitive function being related to diabetes self
management (Sinclair, Girling and Bayer, 2000). The authors assessed 396 older
people with diabetes (5% of which were diagnosed with Type 1 diabetes) and 393 non
diabetic controls on two tests of cognitive function, the Mini Mental State Examination
and the Clock Drawing Test (Shulman, Shedletsky and Silver, 1986). They found that,
overall, people with diabetes were cognitively impaired compared to the diabetes-free
controls. They also found that the greater the apparent cognitive impairment the less
likely participants were to be involved with diabetes self management and diabetes
monitoring.
Although these preliminary findings would suggest that there is a relationship between
cognitive dysfunction and diabetes self care, there are serious methodological problems
with this particular research. Firstly no attempt was made to measure or control for
premorbid IQ, depression or medical history. The sample included both Type 1 and
Type 2 diabetes patients. Of these, 67% had received basic schooling only, a variable
which control and diabetes groups significantly differed on. The cognitive testing
employed was not extensive and one of the tests (the Clock Drawing Test) has not
routinely been tested with samples with diabetes. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, diabetes self management was very dubiously defined as the extent to
which the recruited patients relied upon themselves for monitoring their blood glucose
and taking diabetes medication.
In summary, it would appear that a range of different factors may be associated with
diabetes self management. Because of the complexity and range of the factors that may
be relevant, it would be unrealistic to expect that any two diabetes patients would face
the same difficulties in managing the condition, and so to try to prescribe general rules
of what would constitute successful diabetes self care would probably be unwise.
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However, the suggestions of Eakin and Glasgow (1996) on how physicians could help
patients help themselves are worth considering as an overall care plan that could be
adapted to individual patient needs. In summary, the researchers suggest that for any.
improvement in management of diabetes to be seen, physicians need to:- i) focus on 1-
2 specific self care behaviours to be discussed in each visit, ii) review a behavioural
assignment the diabetic patient has been working on, iii) ask patients about expected
barriers when discussing new behavioural requirements and try to develop solutions for
the identified barriers, iv) ask patients for their views on what area of the self care plan
they would like to discuss and finally, v) address the area of the management regimen
that is of most concern to the patient rather than trying to deal with every self care area
at once.
3.5.4. Summary and conclusion
It is evident that although a substantial number of factors have been considered in
defining what may influence the chances of the diabetic patient following complex
diabetes self management plans, no systematic research has taken place to determine
what cognitive abilities are required from the older Type 2 diabetic person in order to
be able to perform prescribed self care recommendations. From the earlier discussion
on what behaviours constitute self management of Type 2 diabetes, it is easily seen that
a range of fairly intact cognitive abilities are required on the part of the diabetic patient
in order to successfully manage his/her diabetes. The following table presents some of
the tasks required in the management of Type 2 diabetes as well as the cognitive
abilities that may be involved in the completion of each task.
It can be seen that most self care activities require the patient to engage in complex
thinking, planning and problem solving. Complex, rather than simple, attentional
processes and mental flexibility are required for most aspects of diabetes self care in
addition to simple attention, motor and everyday task performance abilities. It is also
evident that good cognitive processing abilities are required for the completions of vital
diabetes self care behaviours, lack of which will make the completion of such
behaviours difficult if not impossible. The question that needs to be asked then is "Do
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Type 2 diabetic patients have the abilities required to perform detailed and perhaps
complex diabetes self management plans ?"
Table 3.3: Summary of main cognitive skills required in completing specific self care behaviours
as part of any Type 2 diabetes self management plan
COGNI- Simple
attention
& / or
motor speed
Simple
perceptual
abilities
Ability to
perform
simple
everyday tasks
Complex
Attention
(Mental
Flexibility)
Learning
& / or
Memory
Problem
Solving
& / or
Reasoning
Language
processes
& / or verbal
fluency
TIVE
ABILI-
TIES
SELF CARE
TASK
Comprehension
of instructions
v v v v v v v
Instruction
recall
v v v V V
Questioning
self care plan
v v v v v v V
BC testing v v v v v
Change
of plans
due to BC
results (e.g. after
exercise)
v v v v v
.
Diet planning v v v v
Diet
adherence
v v v v V
Weight
control
v v v v v v
Exercise
taking
v v v v v v
Exercise
planning
v v v v v v v
Medication
taking
v v v v v v
Medication
adjustment
v v v V
I-Iypoglycaemia
recognition +
treatment
v v v v v v
Appointment
making
v v v v v
Appointment
keeping
v v v
(NB: V= cognitive ability required)
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3.6.	 Overall summary and conclusion 
The work reviewed in this chapter has looked at the specific effects of Type 2, and to a
lesser extent Type 1, diabetes on cognitive functioning. Although there is no agreement
as to the specific effects of the illness on cognition, there seems to be a trend in the .
literature for studies to repoit some impairment in cognitive function in both Type 1
and Type 2 diabetes.
The two areas of research seem to differ on their focus of interest. Although quite a
substantial piece of literature has examined the effects of hypoglycaemia in Type 1
diabetes and as such the effects of a side effect of treatment of the illness, the more
long term effects of the illness on cognition have received less attention. On the
contrary, studies on Type 2 diabetes have tended to focus more on the long term
cognitive impairment that the illness per se may bring. The common areas within the
two pieces of literature on Type 1 and Type 2 diabetes seem to lie in the cross sectional
nature of the cognitive studies that have been carried out, the variability in the
cognitive tests used as well as the exclusion criteria adopted. Finally some uncertainty
about the effects of the two types of illness on cognition is also shared perhaps to a
greater extent in the area of Type 2 diabetes.
More specifically, studies investigating the cognitive performance on Type 2 diabetic
samples have failed to reach agreement over the existence and extent of diabetes
related cognitive deficits, the emerging conclusion, however, seems to be that if there is
a deficit, it is likely to be seen in complex rather than simple cognitive processes and in
individuals with poor rather than good glycaemic control. Of those exhibiting cognitive
decline, cognitive decrements have, in general, been seen in tasks requiring learning
and memory processes, complex attentional and mental flexibility abilities, problem
solving and abstract reasoning and, in some cases, verbal fluency and language
processes. In particular, Type 2 diabetic patients may i) fail to adjust their performance
in response to feedback (Helkala et al., 1995) which has implications for occasions
where successful management involves adjusting one's behaviour in response to BG
tests, ii) exhibit a decline in the effective use of memory retrieval mechanisms
(Perlmuter et al., 1984) which has implications for all aspects of diabetes self care
especially in medication, diet and exercise taking, iii) repeat material they have already
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dealt with (Perlmuter et al., 1987) which has implications for medication taking and
patient - physician communication, iv) show impaired complex cognitive processes and
or problem solving and reasoning (Perlmuter et al., 1988, U'Ren et al, 1990 and others)
which has implications for virtually all self management behaviours from remembering
to test BG to organising one's lifestyle so as to follow complex diet and exercise
regimens and keep physician appointments.
A separate area of research has focused on diabetes self management. The behaviours
and skills required in self care plans were discussed and the difficulties encountered in
adhering to complex regimens were highlighted. Factors that are thought to be playing
a role in the management of diabetes were briefly noted. The lack of research into the
cognitive functioning of people with Type 2 diabetes in relation to diabetes self
management, was also noted. Finally it was proposed that before any or all of the
prescribed self care - related behavioural and lifestyle changes may happen, patients
with Type 2 diabetes need to have understood the instructions they have been given in
connection with managing their diabetes (Keen, 1996, Williams, 1995), believed that
they will benefit from following them (Hampson et al., 1995), consciously agreed to
the lifestyle changes that accompany successful diabetes self care plans (McCulloch et
al., 1994) and last but not least have the necessary cognitive and socio -environmental
resources to cope with the demands that management plans may pose on them.
These findings call for the need to account for cognitive decline in Type 2 diabetes self
care plans. Williams (1994) for example, in talking about diabetes self management
suggests that 'Advice and targets must be clear and tailored to the patient's social and
ethnic background, and his / her understanding must be regularly checked, updated
and reinforced' (p.96). Similar recommendations are, among others, made by
Perlmuter et al., (1984), Moorodian et al. (1988), and Keen (1996). What is more, even
healthy older adults seem to have problems with keeping up with lifestyle
recommendations that require a cognitive component; Rost and Roter (1987) for
example, explored healthy older peoples' recall of life style recommendations and
medication regimens in 83 elderly subjects visiting a clinic. They found that over half
of those studied failed to recall post-visit, recommended lifestyle changes. The authors
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emphasised, just like the diabetes researchers quoted above, the need for instructions
and recommendations to be made explicit when treating older adults.
It then appears that there is a need for the two research areas (cognition and self
management) to be put together. If the self management of diabetes requires complex
cognitive abilities from the diabetic individual in order to achieve good BG control and
if at the same time diabetic patients have deficits in engaging in complex cognitive
processing, then we are faced with a serious problem: asking patients with Type 2
diabetes to do the impossible in requiring them to utilise complex cognitive processing
(in which they may be deficient) in order to manage a life threatening disease which
itself is partly responsible for their impaired cognitive abilities.
If we tried to put the reviewed current research findings and recommendations
together, we would be faced with a problem. Type 2 diabetic patients have been seen to
fail in complex, lab-based psychometric tests, however when tested in simple everyday
tasks no impairment is seen (Soininen et al., 1992). Two possible conclusions can be
reached from this observation: i) diabetes self management requires complex cognitive
skills, therefore patients are by nature of their illness inadequate in their performance of
self care behaviours or ii) it could be argued that lab-based psychometric evaluations of
cognitive performance lack ecological validity in that they are not developed
specifically for Type 2 diabetic patients, so any cognitive deficit observed in such test
performance might not reflect diabetic patients' ability to perform cognitively —
demanding, but widely practised and hence over learned, self care plans.
No systematic research has taken place in examining Type 2 diabetic patients'
performance on tasks that are directly related to diabetes self management. It could be
that although these people fail to perform well in lab-based psychometric assessments,
everyday, over learned, diabetes — specific cognitive skills required in diabetes self
management may be unaffected.
In conclusion, this review has identified a big gap in the literature; there has been no
systematic research assessing diabetic patients on both lab based cognitive tests and
more, self management - specific skills and then relating these measures to patients'
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levels of self care. If indeed people with Type 2 diabetes are found to be performing
poorly in cognitive tasks measuring skills of direct importance to everyday diabetes
management, then there would be a need for interventions to address this problem.
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Chapter 4
Implicit memory and Type 2 diabetes:
the development of a task to assess implicit memory
in Type 2 diabetes
4.0. Summary
Although there has been a lot of work attempting to evaluate explicit cognitive processes
in people with Type 2 diabetes, to the best of the author's knowledge no work has been
carried out to examine implicit memory in this group. Given that the area of implicit
memory is still fairly new in psychology, one reliable and valid test of implicit learning
does not yet exist. As a result, a short, simple and quick to administer test was developed
with the view of being used with people with Type 2 diabetes. Some pilot testing with
student volunteers was carried out to ensure that different components of the task yielded
similar responses from participants. This was found to be the case which led to the
decision to adopt the task for use with diabetic samples.
4.1.	 Introduction 
Human memory research has traditionally focused on presenting stimuli to participants
and then asking them to explicitly remember them. In such research the subject's memory
performance is usually measured by tests such as free recall where s/he is asked to simply
recall the presented stimuli, or recognition where the presented stimuli are presented
again at the testing stage usually among distractors, and participants are asked to say
whether they have seen any of the presented material before. So, in this type of memory
research which is termed 'explicit' participants are presented with stimuli which they are
later asked to deliberately show conscious awareness of by recall or recognition.
More recently, a different type of research has focused on how memory performance
might be influenced by past events that participants have been exposed to, but which they
are not asked to deliberately try and recollect in the memory testing phase. Such research,
wherein participants are initially exposed to an event and, although not required to
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deliberately recollect it in the testing stage, they show evidence to suggest that their
performance is influenced by the initial exposure, is termed implicit. Hence 'explicit tasks
reflect conscious or deliberate recollection of a previous study episode, whereas implicit
memory refers to a change in task performance attributable to a prior episode (also
called implicit learning)' (Jelicic and Bonke, 1991, p.1263).
Although the above discussion would suggest that the distinction between the two terms
is clear - cut, careful examination of the literature suggests otherwise. So for example,
although some researchers may use the terms 'explicit' and 'implicit' to refer to two
different types of memory task, others use the distinction to refer to memory tasks, and /
or underlying hypothetical constructs, and/ or states of awareness that may underline
participant performance at such memory tasks (Gardiner and Java, 1993).
4.1.1. Implicit memory tasks and ageing
The detrimental effect of age on explicit memory has been extensively documented in the
literature (for reviews, see Craik and Jennings, 1992 in Smith, 1996). Among the theories
proposed to explain the observed deficits are suggestions that older adults may fail to
actively integrate memory-enhancing, cue-providing context with the material they are
trying to remember (Park, Smith, Morrell, Puglisi and Dudley, 1990), or to inhibit
information which is irrelevant to the memory task at hand (Hasher and Zacks, 1988).
Perceptual speed impairments (Welford, 1958) as well as reductions in the capacity of
older adults' working memory systems (Salthouse, 1991) have also been proposed.
In implicit memory research, the picture is somewhat less definitive. There are several
reasons for this. Firstly, research in this field is still rather young, so not much is known
as to whether ageing may be adversely affecting performance as tested in and measured
by implicit tasks. Secondly, and in parallel to ideas reported in the explicit memory
literature, there may not be one unitary implicit memory system which could explain the
lack of implicit test results currently available. Finally, there is no consensus as to a
universally accepted and reliable implicit memory task that could veritably be used for
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routine assessment of the implicit functioning of normal and cognitively impaired
samples. On the contrary, implicit memory research employs several implicit testing
paradigms, which, unlike those used in explicit research, are not widely accepted or
established but rather, as Greene (1992, p.172) notes `...are still being created'.
In general terms, however, there is some common ground between most implicit memory
tasks. It is observed that such tasks usually involve at least two phases. An 'orientation
stage' where participants are presented with stimuli such as lists of words, pictures and so
on, and which they are asked to process in some way. For example they may be asked to
rate words for likeness. What follows then is an apparently unrelated task, which
constitutes the implicit learning stage, whereby participants are asked to make
judgements about the previously presented (and sometimes some not previously
presented) stimuli. For example, they may be asked to read out a list of words as quickly
as they can. The extent to which participants' responses for previously presented material
are different (usually enhanced) from their responses towards stimuli they were not
exposed to in the orientation stage is taken as evidence for implicit learning. In other
words, although subjects are not instructed to intentionally recollect the earlier presented
items, when given, what would appear to be a completely unrelated task after the initial
orientation stage, their performance at this task is clearly facilitated by the earlier
exposure to the orientation material. Such performance enhancement is known as
'priming' in the literature and is used as a measure of implicit memory.
In a review, Roediger III and McDermott (1993) evaluated current knowledge of implicit
memory tests used in the field. Among the several issues that are currently debated in an
ever changing, widely researched area of psychology, several studies were identified
which have attempted to examine the issue of whether subjects are really demonstrating
learning without awareness in implicit memory tests or whether, and to what extent, such
observations of learning are influenced by explicit recall of orientation lists. For instance,
could it be that when subjects use a previously studied word to complete a word stem
during the implicit stage of the test, such performance is not prompted implicitly but is
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due to conscious, explicit recall of previously studied items ? Roediger III and
McDermott examined numerous different types of tests that have been carried out in the
field to answer such questions. They concluded that, to date, there is no one widely
accepted way of designing a test to evaluate the extent to which implicit memory has.
been contaminated by explicit processes. However, the authors reported that what has
tended to happen in the literature is for the implicit test to be followed by a test
examining explicit recall or recognition of the studied material. To the extent that there
are differences between the rates by which studied material has been implicitly and
explicitly recalled, it may be reasonable to argue that different strategies of reproducing
material might be in place at the two (implicit and explicit) different stages of the test.
Despite the difficulties inherent in studying implicit processes, there is a plethora of tests
that have been put forward to study such processes. So for instance in a more recent
review, Rybash (1996) presented a taxonomy of five different types of implicit memory
tasks that are currently used in the field. These are very briefly described below.
• Perceptual - Item Implicit learning tasks: In such tests, participants are presented with
individual stimuli during the orientation stage by either reading, hearing or seeing the
relevant stimulus. So for example, they may read the word 'car', see a picture of a car or
hear the word 'car' being read to them. In the implicit learning stage, participants are
presented with the orientation items along with distractors i.e. items that were not
presented in the orientation stage and are asked to make decisions about all items.
• Perceptual - Associative Implicit learning tasks: These tasks are identical to the ones
above with one exception. In perceptual - associative implicit learning tasks pairs of
orientation items that are semantically different to one another are used. For example,
where in perceptual - item implicit learning the word 'car' might be used as a stimulus,
here the stimulus would be a non word made from the combination of two words e.g.
'cartree'. The test phase involves presenting participants with the previously seen non
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words and different combinations of nonwords (e.g. 'cartree' and 'treestamp') and
measuring their response to both previously presented and non presented words.
• Conceptual - Item Implicit learning tasks: In this type of test participants are presented
with stimuli at orientation and are asked to process it in some way (e.g. make semantic
decisions about words such as 'lime'). At testing stage, they are given to complete
either word stems ( li_ _ ) or word fragments (1 _ m_ ) which correspond to the
orientation words but could also be completed by other, non orientation, words (e.g.
li	 for 'lime', 'line', 'like' etc.). Implicit memory is demonstrated by the extent to
which orientation list words will be used to complete the word stem (or fragment) more
frequently than would be expected by chance alone.
• Conceptual - Associative Implicit learning tasks: In these tasks participants are
presented with pairs of semantically unrelated words in the orientation stage (e.g.
'letter' - 'carpet' and 'kitchen' - 'school'). At the testing phase, they are given words
along with word fragments which either correspond to the original orientation stage
pairs (e.g. 'letter - c _ _p _t') or not (e.g. 'letter - sc_ _ ol'). Implicit learning is measured
by the extent to which fragments were completed more frequently for the original
orientation word pairs, rather than the non orientation pairs.
• Perceptual — Motor Priming tasks: Such tasks ask subjects to observe a sequence of
asterisks which appear on a computer screen in a repeating sequence. Participants are
asked to observe the screen and press appropriate buttons on a keypad that correspond
to the location of the asterisks on the screen. Implicit learning is measured by the
amount of time that people take to press the appropriate keys when the order in which
the asterisks are presented is of a fixed sequence, rather than random. Reaction time is
faster for sequences of a fixed order than for random ones.
As different implicit memory tasks are said to tap different neurological structures of
the brain and as ageing is said to have differential effects on different brain structures, it
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is reasonable to assume that age differences in implicit memory should vary as a
function of the implicit memory task that is being used.
In his extensive review of the literature, Rybash (1996) concluded that older adults tend
to show implicit memory impairment in conceptual item implicit learning (Chiarello
and Hoyer, 1988; Davis, Cohen, Gandy, Colombo, Van Dusseldorp, Simolke and
Romano 1990; Rybash, 1994) and conceptual associative implicit learning tasks
(Howard, Fry and Brune 1991; Rybash, 1994) but that perceptual item implicit learning
(Light and Singh, 1987; Hashtroudi, Chrosniak arid Schartz 1991) and perceptual
associative item implicit learning tasks (Light, LaVoi, Valencia — Laver, Owens and
Mead 1992) may be spared by age. These conclusions were endorsed by Jelicic (1995)
who, on the basis of his review of the literature, suggested that conceptual tasks are
impaired by age while perceptual tasks should remain intact.
4.1.2. Implicit memory and diabetes
To date, and to the best of the author's knowledge, no research has taken place on the
effects of Type 2 diabetes on implicit learning. So, although numerous studies have
suggested deficits in diabetic participants' explicit recollections (Reaven eta!., 1988;
1990; U'Ren et al., 1990; Bent et al., 1996) implicit memory has not been investigated.
It could be that just like other groups of memory impaired patients (e.g. Alzheimer's
disease patients; Postle, Bradley, Corki and Growdon 1996, amnesic patients; Keane,
Gabrielli, Monti and Fleischman 1997, depressed people; Ilsley, Moffoot and O'Carroll
1995, demented patients; Carlesimo, Fadda, Marfia and Caltagirone 1995), Type 2
diabetic patients might show unaffected implicit processes, a finding which could have
implications for diabetes self management. For example, assuming that good
management of diabetes is positively correlated with cognitive functioning, people with
Type 2 diabetes might benefit from advice and instructions on self management given
implicitly, rather than explicitly.
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4.2.	 The development of a novel implicit memory task
As to-date a universally accepted implicit memory task is yet to become available, a
simple, three stage implicit memory task was developed for the purposes of this study.
The task structure was in general, similar to what would probably be classified as a .
conceptual - item implicit learning paradigm but with a perceptual component. The use
of a somewhat complicated design might appear surprising at first not least because if
Jelicic (1995) and Rybash (1996) are right in their reviews, older adults are likely to
find conceptual implicit tasks difficult to do. However there are several reasons why
this type of task was judged to be appropriate for use in the present study.
Firstly it is a practical task in terms of size, structure and time taken to administer. What
is more, the demands it makes on elderly people in terms of instruction comprehension
are minimal as no complex instructions are given at any point. This makes it a good
candidate to be used in a testing session where a battery of tests is used, the length of
which may place unnecessary cognitive demands on older adults.
Secondly, the task was developed with the view of being used in future in the context of
diabetes self management. In other words a task was needed whose features would be
appropriate for use in testing the learning that is likely to take place when diabetic
people are presented with instructions to do with their self management regimes. Such
situations are likely to involve conceptual rather than perceptual processing in that, it is
argued, self care recommendations are likely to be made on the basis of the patient's
semantic understanding of the concepts involved in managing diabetes rather than the
perceptual 'surface' characteristics of the management tasks.
It is also accepted however that, self management of diabetes is far from being an 'all or
none' situation. So it is acknowledged that some perceptual decisions are also likely to
be made. To account for the fact that some perceptual processing is quite likely to take
place in the self care context the present task adopted a semantic orientation stage
followed on by a structural word fragment completion stage. If the cognitive deficits
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seen in people with Type 2 diabetes are due to age rather than diabetes per se , then
their performance on a conceptual, semantic task should be unaffected as verbal /
semantic processing in older age can be spared (Tun et al., 1990). In this sense, the
present task should be within older participants' abilities. What is more, even if we
assume that participants may have difficulties with a conceptual semantic task in the
beginning (i.e. the orientation stage) their performance should be helped by the fact that
the implicit part of the task utilises a perceptual structural component (incomplete word
stems) which, if Rybash (1996) is correct should be easier for older participants to
handle.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that Rybash's (1996) review does not conclude that
older people do not have not any ability to deal with conceptual tasks. What he seems to
suggest is that in general, older samples may be impaired in this type of task, a finding
which probably needs to be accepted with caution given the relatively small amount of
research done in this field. So, there are still several questions left unanswered and, it
may be that for example, the apparent difficulties seen in conceptual implicit tasks are
due to other causes rather than poor implicit learning. For instance, a study by Howard
(1988) (in Rybash, 1996) suggested that older participants did not show as much
implicit learning as younger participants in a conceptual implicit task which used an
orientation stage of answering questions that included homophones and an implicit
learning stage of a homophones spelling test. However, in a second study by the same
author no age differences were found when the implicit test involved participants using
presented and non presented homophones to write meaningful sentences. In this second
experiment the implicit task required participants to access the semantics of the words
they were presented, a task which, as the results revealed, older people could complete
with ease. However in the first experiment, it is arguable that the nature of the task
subjects were asked to perform (spelling) made higher executive demands, so
processing was effortful and as a result implicit learning appeared to be impaired. It
would seem that the type of additional demands the task at hand makes on the
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participant need to be carefully controlled before any distinctions can be made as to
what type of implicit tasks are and are not affected by age.
4.2.1. Task structure and components
The present task consisted of three stages; an orientation stage, an implicit memory
stage and an explicit memory (recognition) stage.
The orientation stage involved the processing of words (N=20) which comprised either
living things or household items. The words were balanced in terms of number of
syllables, imagery value and associativity, and were equivalent in terms of word
frequency. The instructions asked participants to engage in semantic processing of the
words (although a pilot study was also run where structural processing took place). In
doing so, they were asked to endorse some words (living things) but not others (non
living things). Two versions (word lists a and b) of appropriate orientation words were
developed as alternative forms of the same task. See Figure 4.1 at the end of this section
for a list of orientation words for each of the two versions.
The implicit learning stage involved a word stem completion test (N= 10), however only
the first letter of any given word was given, rather than the first two or three as has been
the case with previous research (see Rybash, 1996 for review). There were several
reasons for this deviation from the norm. Firstly there were practical reasons; the task
had to be very brief for the purposes of this research and giving participants more letters
in a word stem would present them with the more effortful and hence more time -
consuming task of trying to find a word that matched the exact requirements of the
presented stems. For example, it is arguably the case that it would take someone longer
and require more effort to think of a 6 letter word beginning with T H R_ than a 6
letter word beginning with T 	
 as in the first case more search requirements
would have to be considered in a more thorough search (3 requirements in the stem
beginning THR_ _ _ as opposed to 1 in the stem beginning T
	 J. Secondly , one
might argue that the longer the cue given in any implicit learning stage, the more likely
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the results will be contaminated by explicit memory processes; so it may well be that a
longer string of letters given in an implicit learning stage may provide a greater explicit
chunk of information which will remind participants of the orienting material and as
such yield implicit learning results which have been contaminated by explicit
processing.
In addition to the first letter, participants were also given the number of letters each
word stem comprised in agreement with previous research in the field. All word stems
corresponded to words seen in the orienting task, half of which would have been
endorsed as a result of the orienting task instructions. The participants were instructed
to fill in the word stems with the first word that came to mind that fitted the stems.
Evidence for implicit learning was shown by the extent to which orientation words
appeared as stem completions more often than expected by chance.
Four versions of this implicit learning task were developed, two for each orientation list.
For example, for version a of the task (N=20 orientation words) two sets of word stems
(N=10) were available, each corresponding to 5 endorsed and 5 non endorsed
orientation list words. This was done to ensure that all orientation words were given the
chance to appear as word stems and in doing so that they produced similar implicit
memory results. This part of the test would evaluate the measure by examining whether
the implicit learning demonstrated by use of the current test was subject to the
congruency effect (Craik and Tulving, 1975). The congruency effect seen in explicit
memory research refers to the observation that explicit recall is better for material that
has been processed previously (i.e. orientation list words that were endorsed) than
material which has not (i.e. the nonendorsed words). See Figure 4.1 at the end of this
section for a complete list of word stems corresponding to each orientation list version.
The third stage of the task involved an explicit memory test (recognition list). The
reason for this was to check that any word stem completions appearing in the implicit
part of the test were not a result of explicit recollection of the orientation words. In this
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third explicit part, participants were given a list of (N=40) words, half of which
appeared in the orientation task and half of which did not (distractors). The distractors
were chosen to be similar to the orientation words in terms of meaning, imagery,
associativity and categorical structure. So, the distractors for the recognition test
corresponding to the orientation task version a, were the orientation words used for
version b of the task and vice versa (see Fig. 4.1). Participants were asked to recognise
and endorse all the orientation list words they thought they had seen in the first stage of
the test. If participants' implicit learning performance was a result of explicit recall of
orientation words, we would expect their implicit and recognition performance to be
similar in terms of what and how many words they reproduced in the two parts of the
test.
Figure 4.1: Orientation lists of words and word stems developed for the implicit memory task
Orientation list a	 Orientation list b
endorsed nonendorsed endorsed nonendorsed
Robin Candle Thrush Lamp
Frog Spoon Toad Basin
Lion Grill Tiger Oven
Salmon Mop Trout Hoover
Crow Brush Raven Comb
Rabbit Cushion Hare Pillow
Monkey Couch Gorilla Sofa
Pony Dish Horse Plate
Hamster Wardrobe Gerbil Cupboard
Bull Fridge Cow Icebox
Word stem lists Avx..2 41 3
R_ C B_ T_
(robin) (crow) (basin) (toad)
S 	 F T	 C_
(salmon) (frog) (thrush) (cow)
P_ B L_ P_
(pony) (bull) (lamp) (plate)
L_ M	 H_ C_
(lion) (monkey) (horse) (comb)
R	 H	 0_ G	
(rabbit) (hamster) (oven) (gerbil)
M_ B_ R_ T_
(mop) (brush) (raven) (tiger)
C	 C	 P	 H_
(cushion) (candle) (pillow) (hare)
S_ _ _ _ D_ T_ C	
(spoon) (dish) (trout) (cupboard)
F	 G S_ H	
(fridge) (grill) (sofa) (hoover)
W	 C_ G	 I	
(wardrobe) (couch) (gorilla) (icebox)
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Recognition list
Thrush Lamp Toad Basin
Tiger Oven Lion Grill
Bull Fridge Rabbit Cushion
Trout Hoover Crow Brush
Raven Robin Gorilla Sofa
Candle Horse Plate Pony .
Dish Gerbil Cupboard Cow
Comb Hamster Wardrobe Icebox
Frog Spoon Hare Pillow
Salmon Mop Monkey Couch
4.3.	 Study 1: Depth of processing and its effects on implicit and explicit memory
4.3.1. Introduction
The levels of processing effect on explicit recall is widely known; so it is generally
accepted that recognition and recall of stimuli are enhanced when such material has
been processed deeply (e.g. semantically) rather than in a shallow, non semantic way
(Craik and Tulving, 1975).
It has also been suggested that there are differences between explicit and implicit tasks
in the extent to which they are subject to the enhancing effects of depth and quality of
processing (e.g. Roediger III and McDermott, 1993). For example, in a study by Jacoby
and Dallas (1981), subjects were presented with a list of words which they were asked
to process either semantically or in a less elaborative way. They found that, although
recognition memory was affected by the manipulation with better recognition achieved
in the elaborate processing condition, priming for words on a word identification task
was unaffected. Graf and Mandler (1984) presented similar results using a free recall
and a word stem completion task as measures of, respectively, explicit and implicit
performance. Jelicic and BonIce (1991) on the other hand, reported work which showed
that the performance in both free recall and word stem completion tests of subjects who
processed words semantically was enhanced compared to memory for the same words
demonstrated by a group of subjects who had previously processed the words
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structurally. Similarly, Roediger III and McDermott reported the findings of a recent
review by Challis and Brodbeck (1992) who argued that '...levels ofprocessing effects
are small but ubiquitous, yet are more likely to be found in certain types of experimental
designs than others' (in Roediger III and McDermott, p.99). Such findings would
suggest that there is uncertainty as to whether implicit and explicit tests differ in the
extent that they are subject to depth of processing effects, leading the same authors to
propose that '... the conclusion that levels ofprocessing has absolutely no effect on
performance is clearly wrong' (Roediger III & McDermott, 1993, p.99). The same
review has also suggested that in perceptual implicit memory tests (such as the implicit
test component of the present task) the existence of a depth of processing effect may be
an index of how contaminated the implicit task is by explicit processes.
At the time of writing it is still unclear why some implicit tasks may be subject to the
effect while some others are not. It is also unclear why, if implicit tasks are affected by
depth of processing, this should be the case. Nevertheless it was decided appropriate to
examine how the present task would fair under both semantic and structural processing
conditions. It is argued that if there are depth of processing effects in the implicit
component of the task then in line with the literature, such effects should be negligible
and ideally non significant. Large depth of processing effects on the perceptual implicit
memory component of the present task however may suggest that the implicit
component has been contaminated by explicit processes. Finally, it was thought
appropriate to examine to what extent the implicit and explicit components of the task
would be subject to the, somewhat dated now, congruency effect (Craik and Tulving,
1975) seen in the explicit memory literature. The congruency effect simply refers to the
observation that stimuli that participants have endorsed at some stage of an orientation
task (by, for example, circling, ticking, crossing out some stimuli but not others), will
be better explicitly recalled than stimuli that has not been endorsed. To the best of the
author's knowledge no data are available to date as to the extent to which implicit
memory tasks are subject to such congruency effects.
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4.3.2. Research design and method
The effects of depth of processing (semantic or structural) and congruency (endorsed or
nonendorsed words) on implicit memory and recognition were investigated, in an
independent groups design, using word list a, stem version 1 of the task. Seventy-one .
first and third year psychology undergraduates (aged 18-45 years) were tested. All were
naive as to the purposes of the experiment.
Participants were asked either to circle all words denoting living things that appeared in
the first page of a six - page handout (semantic processing condition) or to circle all
words that had 5 or more letters (structural processing condition). They were given a
minute to complete this task. This was followed by a 3 minute distractor task, followed
by a page containing 10 word stems with instructions on how to fill them in ( fill in with
the first word that comes to mind beginning with the given letter). Then, participants
were given a second distractor task and finally, they completed the recognition test.
At the orientation stage some of the participants were given instructions to process the
orientation words semantically (N=46) and some structurally (N=25). Semantically
orienting participants would endorse 10 orientation words and leave 10 unmarked,
while structurally processing participants ended up endorsing 13 orientation words and
leaving unmarked 7. This apparent anomaly was unavoidable and was taken into
consideration in the statistical analysis of the data; thus, all scores were converted into
proportions (e.g. in the semantic test, the number of endorsed completions would be out
of 10 as opposed to being out of 13 for those who processed structurally) and then
translated into percentages.
In both conditions, the word stems appearing in the implicit learning stage corresponded
to 5 endorsed and 5 nonendorsed orientation items. Participants were given 3.5 minutes
to complete this part of the task.
type of
proccessing
111] endorsed
nonendorsed
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The instructions for the recognition test were to think back to the first list of words
participants had originally seen and to put a circle round all the words they thought they
saw in that list.
4.3.3. Results and conclusion
The data were analysed using a two way mixed factor ANOVA where the between
subjects factor was the depth of processing participants engaged in at the orientation
stage and had two levels: semantic or structural. The within subjects factor was the type
of words recalled and had two levels: congruent (i.e. words endorsed at orientation) or
noncongruent (i.e. words nonendorsed at orientation). A separate ANOVA was
completed for each part of the task (explicit recognition and implicit learning). The
results are shown in the graphs seen in Figs. 4.2 and 4.3 respectively.
Figure 4.2: The mean percentage of previously endorsed or nonendorsed words recognised under the two
processing (semantic and structural) conditions. There were significant main effects of both depth of
processing (F (I,69)= 49.51, p<.01) and type of processing (i.e. congruency), (F(I,69)= 48.67, p<.01) but
no significant interaction (F(I ,69)= 1.68, p>.05).
semantic	 structural
depth of proccessing
As expected, both depth and congruency of processing had an effect on recognition.
Participants who processed. the orientation words semantically, recognised a greater
proportion of orientation words in the explicit task than those who processed words
structurally. It also appears to be the case that congruent items (i.e. words originally
1.5 —
0.5 —
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semantic
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structural
type of
procccesing
El] endorsed
Ei nonendorsed
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endorsed at orientation) were recalled better than noncongruent words. These findings
are in support of the original levels of processing (Craik and Lockhart 1972) and
congruency effect ideas (Craik and Tulving, 1975).
Similar effects were not seen in the implicit completions however, suggesting that
implicit memory as measured by the present task was not affected by levels of
processing. This is in support of findings presented by Graf and Mandler (1984) and
Jacoby and Dallas (1981). The congruency effect however was preserved in implicit
word stem completions with endorsed words appearing as stem completions more often
than nonendorsed items. These findings are shown in Fig. 4.3.
Figure 4.3: The mean number of previously endorsed and nonendorsed words appearing as implicit
completions under the two processing (semantic and structural) conditions. There was neither a
significant main effect of depth of processing (F(1,69)= .04, p>.05) nor a significant interaction between
depth and type of processing (congruency) (F( I,69)= .08, p>.05), however the congruency effect seen in
explicit recognition was also seen in implicit completions (F(I,69)= 87.13, p<.01).
depth of proccessing
Overall implicit and explicit memory i.e. irrespective of whether items were endorsed or
not at orientation was also examined. So the results of a mixed factor 2 way ANOVA
with depth of processing as the between subjects factor (2 levels: semantic, structural)
and number of items recalled overall, as the within subjects factor (2 levels: implicitly
produced vs. recognised) showed significant main effects of depth of processing
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(Fo 69f..25.41, p<.01), type of recall (F( I.69f 328.07, p 4.01) and a significant interaction
(F(I,69)=23.47, p<.01). The results are shown in Fig
. 4.4.
Figure 4.4: The interaction between type of learning (explicit vs. implicit) and depth of processing
(semantic vs. structural) in word recall. There were significant main effects of both depth of processing
(F=25.41, p<.01), and type of recall (F =328.07, p‹.01) as well as a significant interaction (F=23.47,
p<.01).
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These results were explored further by independent t-tests for the existence of simple
main effects. There was no significant difference between deep and shallow processing
in the implicit task (t (69) = .71, p>.05) however many more items were recognised in the
semantic condition of the explicit component (t (69) 6.50, p<.01). Also performance
was better when material was explicitly recalled in both semantic (t (45) = 18.58, p<.01)
and structural conditions (t (24) = 8.98, p<.01).
In summary, it seemed that participants showed better learning for items that had been
semantically (rather than structurally) processed, and for explicitly (rather than
implicitly) recalled items. The difference however between implicit and explicit
performance was greater in the semantic processing condition than in the structural,
suggesting that the former might be a better environment .for the dissociation of the two
processes. That and the anomaly seen in the structural version of the task led to a
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decision to proceed with the semantic processing version of the task for use with the
diabetic participants.
4.4.	 Study 2: An examination of the similarity in the implicit and explicit
responses produced by the two different orientation list versions of the task
4.4.1. Introduction
As discussed earlier, two different versions of the task were developed for use with
diabetic participants. The idea behind the creation of two forms of the same task was to
ensure that should repeated testing of the same participants be needed in future this
would be possible by the use of a second format of the same test. In order to be able to
use both versions of the task with confidence as to their producing fairly similar
responses, it was decided to check that the two did not evoke any differences in
performance in either the explicit or the implicit parts of the task. Accordingly, a study
was conducted to look for differences in both implicit and explicit performance across
the four versions of the task as seen in Fig. 4.1.
4.4.2. Research design and method
The extent to which performance on each version of the task differed from any other
version was investigated in an independent groups design, using both orientation word
lists a and b and their corresponding word stems and recognition components as
outlined earlier. One hundred and forty three first and third year psychology
undergraduates, aged 18-45 years took part in the study. Participants were randomly
allocated to complete either version a or version b of the task. All participants were
naive to the purpose of the experiment. Approximately half (N=72) of the participants
were given orientation list a to process, the other half (N=71) were given orientation list
b. Of those processing orientation word list a, half filled in word stem version 1 the
other half were given word stem 3 to complete. Those who processed orientation list b
were randomly allocated to either word stem 2 or word stem 4, as shown in Fig. 4.1. In
all conditions, the implicit memory word stems corresponded to 5 endorsed and 5
Implicit component
endorsed items
nonendorsed items
overall list compltns
non — list compltns
1.13 (.96)
.59 (.83)
1 .72 (1.39)
7.15 (2.21)
Explicit component
endorsed & rcgnsd	 8.48 (1.41)
nonendorsed &rcgnsd 5.89 (2.44)
total recognised	 14.37 (3.09)
false alarms	 2.20 (1.72)
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nonendorsed orientation items. The recognition component of the task was identical for
all groups.
Participants were asked to circle all words denoting living things that appeared in the
first page of a six - page handout. This task took a minute to complete. This was
followed by a 3 minute distractor task, followed by a page containing 10 word stems
with instructions on how to fill them in (fill in with the first word that comes to mind
beginning with the given letter'). Participants were given 3.5 minutes to complete this
part of the task. Finally, participants were given a second distractor task and in the end,
they completed the recognition test. The instructions for the recognition test were to
think back to the first list of words participants had seen and to put a circle round all the
words they thought they saw in that list.
4.4.3. Results and conclusion
Mean and standard deviation of responses for the implicit and explicit components for
each version of the task were calculated. The results are shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 Mean (and standard deviation) of implicit and explicit responses from participants completing
versions a and b of the task. In the implicit component the mean response refers to items appearing as
word stem completions, in the explicit component mean responses refer to items recognised (* = p<.05)
Orientation list a	 Orientation list b
Word stem 1 Word stem 3
	
Word stem 2 Word stem 4
Mean (s.d)	 Mean (s.d)	 Mean (s.d) Mean (s.d)
.81(1.02) .89(1.1) 1.08(1.35)
.58 (.86) .43 (.62) .76 (1.20)
1.38 (1.47) 1.33 (1.46) 1.84 (1.86)
8.46 (1.53) 7.67 (1.97) 7.84 (1.86)
9.19 (1.20)* 8.07 (1.48) 7.84 (1.57)
6.00(1.50) 5.26 (2.29) 5.84 (2.08)
15.19 (2.15) 13.33 (3.16) 13.68(3.06)
2.58 (1.68) 2.67 (2.39) 2.56 (1.94)
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It would appear that there is much better explicit recall than implicit word stem
completions with most participants, on average, completing the implicit word stems
with words other than those that appeared in the orientation part of the task.
Nevertheless some, albeit limited, evidence for implicit memory is present as seen in
the means appearing under the implicit component section of the table.
There were no differences in performance between people completing the two different
versions of the task in any of the measures obtained by examining responses in the
implicit part of the test. This was a reassuring finding that suggested that the two
versions of the task did not elicit implicit memory responses that were overall different
in their magnitude. However, there was a slight difference in the items that were
originally endorsed at orientation and subsequently recognised at the explicit
component of the task, with participants who filled out word stem 3, recognising
somewhat more of those items, than participants in the other three versions of the task.
This difference is not alarming as it is limited to the explicit component of the task and
as such should not interfere with the implicit test itself. However, one might argue that
the reason why in the implicit test version that used word stem 3 more endorsed items
were subsequently recognised is because these items have appeared as implicit word
stem completions in the implicit component of the test more often than in any other
word stem. If that was the case, then this significant difference might be a reason for
concern. To ensure that participants who completed word stem 3 did not recognise more
of the words they endorsed at orientation due to the fact that such words were used as
word stem completions, which in itself acted as a cue to subsequently recognise such
completions, an independent groups ANOVA was conducted on the number of implicit
word stem completions that were both endorsed at orientation and subsequently
recognised at the explicit part of the task. The results of this analysis were non
significant (F(3,139) = .19, p<.91).
Accordingly, it was decided to use both orientation word list versions and b and all four
word stem version of the task interchangeably with diabetic participants.
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4.5.	 Study 3: A study to examine the current implicit memory task in terms of
construct validity 
4.5.1. Introduction
Although it is reassuring to know that all word stems produce equivalent responses
from participants, so in that sense the task is reliable in its different formats (Study 2),
as well as that the task behaves as the literature would expect it to do in terms of levels
of processing effects (Study 1) it is yet unknown whether it elicits any implicit learning.
So it needs to be demonstrated that the implicit completions that are elicited in each one
of the four versions of the task are actually different from those word stem completions
one would expect to see if participants simply filled out the word stems without prior
exposure to the orienting task. Given that the mean implicit responses elicited so far
were somewhat small, it is essential that it is known that such small scale implicit
learning is in fact different to what one would see if participants simply filled out the
word stems with the first word that came to mind. To that effect, a third study was
carried out, the design and results of which follow.
4.5.2. Research design and method
Construct validity was investigated in an independent groups design using the data
obtained in studies 1 and 2. Hence the data that were collected from 143 first and third
year psychology undergraduates, aged 18 —45 years formed the data for the
experimental group. Additionally, 440 students from a range of disciplines filled in one
of the four word stem lists as control data (i.e. without prior exposure to the orientation
words). This was done so as to establish the overall frequency of appearance of
orientation list words, by chance. All participants were naive as to the purpose of the
experiment. The procedure for the experimental data collection has been described
previously. Control participants were given one word stem list each and asked to fill in
the stems with the first word that came to mind. These participants had not been
exposed to the orientation task, thus their word stem completions provided data on the
probability of orientation list words appearing as word stem completions by chance
alone.
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4.5.3. Results and conclusion
The data from participants who provided a full set of word stem responses only were
used in analysis (N=331). In the end, the number of orientation words that appeared as
stem completions from people not exposed to the orientation part of the task was
calculated. The data are shown in the table that follows.
Table 4.2: The number of times orientation list words appeared as list completions, and as a proportion
of the overall number of stem completions. .
Orientation list a	 Orientation list b
Word stem 1 Word stem 3 	 Word stem 2 Word stem 4
Total list word appearances	 18 21 22 11
Total stem completions	 710 780 980 840
p. of list word in control data .025 .027 .022 .013
R list word per subject	 .25 .27 .22 .13
It appears that in the data obtained from control participants, on average, orientation list
words appeared as stem completions only about 2.5 times in 100. These data were
compared to the data obtained from experimental participants' mean list-word stem
completions, as calculated in Study 2 and appearing in Table 4.1. A graph of the
differences in the mean appearance of orientation list words as stem completions, for
each condition, appears in Fig.4.5.
Further statistical analysis by single sample t-tests, explored the probability that the
experimental group data could have come from the control data population. The
obtained p. values for all 4 analyses were p<.001 (stem 1 t(4s) = 7.14, p<.001, stem 2 t(4s)
= 4.90, p<.001, stem 3 t(25) = 4.03, p<.001, stem 4 t(24) = 4.59, p<.001).
It is concluded that experimental participants used orientation list words as word stem
completions more often than would be expected by chance alone. This was taken as
evidence for the task's construct validity.
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Figure 4.5: Mean number of list words appearing as word stem completions in experimental (exposed to
orientation word lists) and control (only completing the word stems) participants. For all stems, more
orientation list words appeared for experimental rather than random completions suggesting that
participants in the implicit task did implicitly learn (p<.001).
stem set
Finally, in order to check that the words appearing as implicit completions were not the
result of explicit recall of the orientation list words, the data were subjected to further
analysis. If similar cognitive processes are going on in both the implicit and recognition
stages of the task (i.e. if participants are using explicit recall in the implicit phase of the
test) then we should expect a similar amount of orientation list words to appear in the
two phases of the task. To explore this idea further, the number of list words that
appeared as implicit completions and those that were recognised were converted into
proportions (out of 10 in the implicit stage and out of 20 in the recognition stage), and
then into percentages. The results of a paired t-test suggested that there were significant
differences in the number of words reproduced as a result of implicit and explicit
instructions (t ( 142)=-3.81, p<.01). A bar chart of the mean percentage of orientation list
words that appeared in the implicit and explicit components of the task is shown in
Fig.4.6.
-explicit imp icit
condition
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Figure 4.6: The percentage of orientation list words appearing both as implicit completions and as
recognitions at the recognition stage (t (142)-31.84, p<.001).
m recognitions
1=I implicit completions
As there was a significant difference in the amount of orientation list words appearing
implicitly as opposed to being explicitly recognised, it may be reasonable to conclude
that there were different cognitive processes going on in the implicit and recognition
stages of the test. This may be used as evidence to support the argument that the
implicit learning stage of the test does actually elicit implicit rather than explicit
memory responses.
4.6.	 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the present task seemed to be reliable and valid. Both sets of orientation
word lists and all four set of stems produced similar implicit memory results as seen in
study 2. In addition, the amount of implicit memory elicited, albeit fairly limited, did
differ significantly from those levels of response one would expect by chance as well as
those levels seen in explicit recall (Study 3). Likewise, the present task appeared to be
producing similar levels of processing effects to those seen in published implicit tasks.
Obviously, additional and more extensive testing is required which however is beyond
the purpose of this thesis. For the present research purposes, it is suggested that the task
developed here is quick and easy to use with easy to understand and follow instructions,
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and in general terms also reliable and valid. In that sense it was decided to use the task
in subsequent studies with diabetic and healthy older participants.
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Chapter 5
Is there a relationship between cognitive function
and self management in Type 2 diabetes ?
5.0. Summary
The question as to whether there is a relationship between cognitive functioning and self
management in Type 2 diabetes is examined in the present chapter. Correlational analyses
are performed on data obtained from the testing of a sample of 51 people with Type 2
diabetes on battery of neuropsychological and self management measures. The extent to
which performance at standard and diabetes — specific cognitive tests predicts self care of
the illness is also evaluated. The results are discussed in the light of the weaknesses
inherent in cross- sectional correlational research and suggestions for future research are
made.
5.1.	 Introduction
The literature review of Chapter 3 identified two areas of research that provide useful ideas
as to the extent that diabetic peoples' cognitive systems may be impaired as well as
possible explanations as to why Type 2 diabetic people find managing the illness a
challenge.
In summary, it was argued that a substantive portion of the cognitive literature suggests
some identifiable cognitive impairment in Type 2 diabetes which is more likely to be seen
in complex rather than simple cognitive tasks. Difficulties with the methodology seen in
some of these studies were also discussed.
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In terms of self management the review of the literature suggested that, overall, people with
Type 2 diabetes find complex diabetes self management plans difficult to follow through
(Sullivan and Joseph, 1998). Among the factors that were proposed to be explanatory of
the reported difficulties social support and social and environmental barriers to change'
(Glasgow et al., 1997), patient personal models of diabetes (Hampson et al., 1995), patient
- physician relationships and interaction patterns (Polonsky et al., 1994; Hampson et al.,
1996) as well as other personality and environmental variables were noted.
None of the above however considered in any systematic way or depth the warnings of the
cognitive literature on Type 2 diabetes that cognitive factors might be impinging upon
successful diabetes self management. Although, several studies on self management of
Type 2 diabetes discuss the possibility that people's self management efforts may be
hindered by cognitive impairment, as well as the idea that cognitive skills such as problem
solving may be particularly relevant in self management of the condition (e.g., Glasgow,
1991; Sullivan and Joseph, 1998), no systematic research has examined carefully whether
there is a relationship between cognitive functioning and diabetes self management. The
single, recently published study by Sinclair et al., (2000) which attempted to look at the
relationship was criticised earlier in terms of methodological problems with, among other
variables, defining and measuring diabetes self management.
So for example, it could be that failure to adjust one's performance in response to feedback
(Helkala et al., 1995) might have implications for occasions where successful self
management involves adjusting one's behaviour in response to blood glucose tests; a
decline in the effective use of explicit memory retrieval mechanisms (Perlmuter et al., 1984)
might have implications for all aspects of diabetes self management especially medication,
diet and exercise taking; impaired complex cognitive processes and problem solving and
reasoning (Perlmuter et al., 1988; U'Ren et al., 1990) might have implications for virtually
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all self management behaviours from remembering to test one's blood glucose levels to
organising one's lifestyle so as to keep up with complex diet and exercise regimens and
physician appointments. On the other hand, it may well be that any cognitive impairment
seen in the cognitive literature in Type 2 diabetes is reserved for complex cognitive tasks of
the type assessed by neuropsychological tests and that self management behaviours are
habitual, over-learned and are hence performed independently of a well functioning
cognitive system. Finally, it could be that samples with Type 2 diabetes might be impaired
in explicit but not implicit cognitive processes. If that is the case, then the possible
existence of a relationship between implicit learning and diabetes self management may be
worthy of further investigation.
The present cross-sectional study set out to explore whether there is a relationship
between diabetes self management and cognitive function in people with Type 2 diabetes.
Given that diabetes self management requires patients to perform a range of both simple
and perhaps some more complex self care behaviours, the proposition that such behaviours
might be related to, and perhaps be predicted by patients' cognitive functioning, is
investigated. If indeed cognitive performance is a predictor of diabetes self management and
the cognitive literature is correct in suggesting a cognitive decline in Type 2 diabetes, then
cognition may be an area worthy of further exploration in answering the question of why
people with diabetes find managing the disease challenging.
5.2. Research design and method
5.2.1. Recruitment
A total of 57 volunteer participants with Type 2 diabetes were recruited from 5 medical
outpatient diabetes clinics in the Anglia region. The criteria for inclusion in this study were;
age over 39 years, diagnosis of Type 2 diabetes by a diabetes consultant, absence of a
documented history of head trauma, mental retardation, clinical depression, dementia or
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other major psychiatric disorder, absence of alcohol or alcohol-related problems and
fluency in English. On the basis of these criteria six participants were excluded upon
inspection of their medical records at the end of the study. Demographic details of the
eligible recruited sample are shown in Table 5.1:
Table 5.1: Demographic, health and medication characteristics of diabetic sample (N=51)
Mean (s.d.)
Demographics
Age (years) 61.51(10.38)
Male / female ratio 29/22
B MI 30.73 (6.41)
Depression (HAD) 4.08	 (3.02)
Premorbid IQ (NART errors) 17.84 (9.00)
Diabetes treatment
Diet 3
Tablets 37
Insulin 7
Tablets & Insulin 4
Other condition medication
No other medication 20
On heart / cerebrovasc. & hypertension med. 11
On hypertension medication 15
On heart / cerebrovasc. medication 3
Incomplete medication information 2
The eligible sample were older adults (age range: 39 - 78 years), on average overweight and
had a mean duration of diagnosed Type 2 diabetes of 8.94 (s.d. 6.84) years. None were
clinically depressed (as defined by a HAD depression cut off score of 13 or more.
Although the authors suggest a cut-off point of 11 for detection of definite clinical cases
the range of the 'definite depression case' scale is 11-21 and as the measure was used here
for research purposes rather than detection of clinical cases it was thought appropriate to
use the lower quartile of the scale as a cut-off rather than the absolute value of 11). The
majority of participants were controlling diabetes with oral hypoglycaemic agents while
some were receiving insulin. Almost 40% of the sample were free from hypertension or
heart / cerebrovascular conditions as signalled by inspection of their medication - taking
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profiles.
Participants were recruited in person and by posters on days that they had appointments
at the diabetes clinic with a consultant or nurse. They were given a short leaflet explaining
what the study involved and had the opportunity to ask questions about the cognitive
testing session. If they agreed to participate, they were offered an appointment for a later
date and were also given the self report measures used in this study, to complete at home.
Testing was undertaken individually and under controlled conditions in interview rooms
within the diabetes clinics. The testing session lasted approximately one hour and 10
minutes. On arrival participants' blood glucose levels were tested using a Medisense blood
glucose monitoring device. This was to ensure that participants were not hypoglycaemic at
the start of the cognitive testing (none were).
5.2.2 Cognitive function and other measures
5.2.2.1. Cognitive function measures
All cognitive function measures were selected on the basis of the principle that Type 2
diabetic cognitive performance deficits are more likely to emerge on cognitively demanding
tasks. Also tests were selected for their brevity and for having successfully been used
before with older diabetic participants (Ryan, 1994). To increase reliability, several
cognitive functions were measured by a battery of tests rather than a single instrument
(Meuter et al., 1980). The tests of cognitive function used in the present study as well as a
brief description of what they purport to measure follow in Table 5.2.
Digit Symbol, forward and backward digit span, logical memory a and b and the word stem
completion task were scored for number of correct responses, the greater the number the
better the performance at these tests. Trail Making A and B and SS7 were scored for speed
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where the longer the time taken to complete the test, the more impaired the performance.
WCST was scored for number of categories found (out of a maximum of 4) the more
categories found the stronger the participant's abstract reasoning skills (WCST catgs). The
same test was also scored for number of perseverative errors (WCST persv) where the
more such errors suggested greater reluctance to utilise feedback and hence less successful
problem solving.
Table 5.2: Table showing the cognitive tests used in the present study.
Test
	
Test characteristics
Digit Symbol
(Weschler, 1981)
Digit Span (DFW)
(Weschler, 1981)
Backward Digit Span (DBCK)
(Weschler, 1981)
Serial Subtraction of 7s (SS7)
(cited in Lezak, 1995)
Trail Making A & B (TMA, TMB)
(Army Individual Test Battery, 1944,
in Lezak, 1995)
Logical Memory Stories A and B
(Weschler, 1987)
Modified Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
(Berg, 1948; Hart, Kwentus,
Wade and Taylor, 1988)
Word Stem Completion task
(as described in Chapter 4)
sustained visual complex attention,
visuomotor coordination, response speed
verbal short term memory, attention
efficiency
verbal short term memory, double
mental tracking
complex auditory attention, mental	 .
tracking, response speed
sustained visual attention,
complex visual scanning, mental shift
verbal STM, logical sequence recall
abstract reasoning, ability to modify
behaviour in response to feedback
implicit memory
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With the exception of the word stem completion task which was developed specifically for
this study, all other measures have been used in diabetes research in the past and are well
validated (Ryan 1994). The word stem completion task was scored both for number of
implicit completions (out of 10 and with greater scores here representing better implicit
memory skills) and explicit recognition (out of 20 with, again, high scores suggesting good
explicit memory). In addition, as two word stem versions of the task were used
interchangeably, control data were collected from each participant for the word stem
version that they were not completing, as part of the implicit task. For example, a person
being exposed to orientation list a word stem version 1 would also complete a word stem
corresponding to orientation list b without being exposed to this orientation list and before
completing the implicit memory task itself. This was in order to collect control data i.e. the
number of orientation list words that would appear in any given word stem by chance
alone (without prior exposure to the orienting task).
5.2.2.2. Tests of subjective cognitive function
The Subjective Memory Questionnaire (SMQ), (Bennett-Levy and Powell, 1980) was used
to assess self reported memory problems. This is a brief self report measure of everyday
memory which asks participants to report how often they encounter memory difficulties
such as meeting someone and being unable to recall their name, forgetting to lock the door
before leaving the house etc. The test is scored by a standard Likert scale. Greater scores
here suggest a greater number of perceived memory problems.
5.2.2.3. Screening for confounding variables
To ensure that participants' cognitive functioning was not impaired due to dementia, and to
statistically control for the effects of depression and premorbid IQ on all responses, data
were collected on participants' dementia, depression and premorbid IQ levels. A brief
description of the measures used follows.
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The widely used and well validated Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE, Folstein,
Folstein, and McHigh, 1975) was used to check that participants' cognitive performance
was not confounded by the presence of dementia. This test was scored for errors as
suggested by Lezak, 1995, using a cut off score of 24 / 30 where scores lower than 24 were
treated as suggestive of the presence of dementia.
Self report depression levels were screened using participants' responses on the depression
items from the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scales (HADS) and scored using an
ordinal Likert scale as suggested by the authors. This scale has the advantage of being
developed specifically for people with medical illness and does not confound physical and
psychological symptoms (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983). Cut - off scores of 13 or more
signalled participants with clinical depression symptomatology.
The widely used in Type 2 diabetes research National Adult Reading Test (NART,
Nelson, 1982) was administered as a measure of premorbid IQ. Errors, as suggested by the
author were recorded where the greater the number of reported errors the more impaired the
participant's premorbid IQ.
Finally, a demographic information questionnaire was developed asking for participants'
sex, age, height, weight, duration of diabetes and age at diagnosis, medication details,
information on other conditions such as hypertension, cardiac and cerebrovascular
problems, years of formal education and current job. It also asked participants' permission
to inspect their medical records for conditions that may interfere with cognition.
In addition to the cognitive and confound- screening measures, additional diabetes-specific
measures were administered. There are described below.
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5.2.2.4. Diabetes self management measures
The Summary of Self-Care (Toobert and Glasgow, 1994) was used. This is a self-report
assessment of levels of self-management over the preceding week and includes separate
items to assess diet, exercise, medication taking, and blood-glucose testing. It has been used
widely in research on Type 2 diabetes and has been validated against more objective
measures such as food diaries and activity monitors. This was completed by participants at
home and scored separately for each area of four core areas of diabetes self care, namely
diet, exercise, blood glucose testing and medication taking. Here the greater the obtained
score for each area of self care the better the participant's self care for that particular area.
In addition, percent haemoglobin A i c (HbA lc) was collected by inspection of participants'
medical records. This assay is an indication of blood glucose control over the past 8-12
weeks and as such could provide more objective self care information. However, it can also
be misleading as such assays are bound to vary as a function of factors other than actual
self care; for example things like treatment aggressiveness and consultant and clinic practice
variations may interact with self care attempts and subsequently affect HbAl c readings
(Glasgow et al., 1999).
5.2.2.5. Diabetes - specific problem solving
The Diabetes Problem-Solving Interview (Toobert and Glasgow, 1991) was administered.
Developed specifically for Type 2 patients, the interview consists of a series of problem
scenarios for each aspect of the diabetes regimen which are presented to participants who
are then asked what they would do to deal with the problem. The scenarios are
administered in a stepped and structured way, firstly asking the participant to think about
strategies s/he would engage in for a hypothetical yet well defined specific diabetes
problem, then moving on to reflect on less specific, self-generated, similar hypothetical
scenarios. Number and quality of diabetes specific problem solving strategies are recorded
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on the basis of a coding scheme provided by Toobert and Glasgow (1991).
This measure has been shown to predict self care at six months follow-up. However, as the
response variables rely on standardised, nevertheless subjective analysis of semi -
structured interview data, inter - rater reliability ratings need to be obtained before any
reliable conclusions are reached. These ratings are described in the results section of the
present chapter.
5.3.	 Test administration
The lab - administered tests were completed in the following order:
Control word stem completion, Demographic Information Questionnaire, NART, Logical
Memory, Stories A and B, Diabetes Problem Solving Interview, Mini Mental State
Examination, Implicit memory task, Serial Subtraction of 7s, Trail Making A , Trail Making
B, Digits Forward, Digits Backward, Digit Symbol, Modified WCST. The Subjective
Memory Questionnaire, Diabetes Self Care Questionnaire and Hospital Anxiety and
Depression Scales were completed by the participant at home however any questions
arising from the completion of these measures were dealt with at the beginning of the
session that took place at the clinic. This was done in order to reduce the length of the
psychometric test session at the clinic.
5.4.	 Results
The data were screened for outliers and analysed using correlations and partial correlations
to explore the relationship between diabetes self management, cognitive performance and
the influence of age, IQ and depression an all measures. Premorbid IQ was thought of as a
variable that needed to be statistically partialled out as we were interested in the pure
relationship between performance at specific cognitive tests and self care, rather than
relationships that may have been enhanced by premorbid intelligence levels. Additionally,
Number of problem
solving strategies (N=6)
Quality of problem
solving strategies (N--=6)
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factor analysis was used to examine whether cognitive variables that the
neuropsychological literature suggests ought to correlate with one another, would appear to
do so. In addition, the existence of relationships between cognitive, self care and diabetes -
specific cognitive measures was explored. Finally, the data were further analysed using
stepwise multiple regressions in order to predict diabetes self management and diabetes
related problem solving from cognitive function measures. These analyses follow inter -
rater reliability analyses performed on the diabetes - related problem solving measure as
introduced earlier.
5.4.1. Inter - rater reliability results for diabetes - specific problem solving
interview
As the diabetes problem solving interview relied on subjective analysis of semi - structured
interview data, a random sample of participants' responses were coded by a second rater
trained in the use of the above measure but blind as to the purpose of the ratings.
Descriptive statistics for this analysis are shown in the following table.
Table 5.3: Mean (s.d) ratings for the diabetes related problem solving measure across two raters obtained
from the rating of a random sample of data sets
Rater 1
Mean (s.d)
Rater 2
Mean (s.d)
8.67
2.71
(2.25)
(.44)
8.33
2.66
(1.63)
(.42)
It seems that there was close agreement between the two raters in both number and quality
of diabetes problem solving strategies, with Rater 2 consistently giving slighter lower
ratings for both variables. The above were inferentially tested using Kendall's tau (t)
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coefficient. The inter-rater agreement results were high and, as would be expected,
statistically significant for both number and quality of strategies (t, - (number) =.85, p<.01,
(quality) = . 73, p<.03) suggesting that the obtained diabetes related problem solving ratings
were reliably coded.
5.4.2. Initial screening for extreme cases
As the great majority of required analyses would unavoidably be of a parametric nature
(e.g. multiple regressions, partial correlations) and as parametric multivariate analyses are
by nature adversely influenced by outliers thus increasing the probability of a Type 1
error, it was thought very important to screen the present data for the existence of both
univariate and multivariate outliers. This was achieved by inspecting bivariate correlation
scattergrams as well as Mahalanobis distances. Three cases consistently appeared as
extreme outliers using those techniques and were thus excluded from further analyses,
reducing the number of data eligible for further analysis to N=47. With the exception of age
(two of the participants were among the oldest of the sample aged 72 and 78 respectively)
there were no readily identifiable, obvious reasons why these particular subjects were
outliers other than their psychometric data consistently being different to those of the rest
of the sample.
5.4.3. Correlations between cognitive, diabetes - specific cognitive and self care
measures
Pearson's correlations were performed (N range 31-47). Unsurprisingly, most cognitive
variables correlated with each other while diabetes self care measures did not correlate with
each other, as expected. The full correlation matrix can be seen in Appendix A. Some
representative correlations however are described here.
Among the correlations that one would expect to see, digits forward positively correlated
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with digits backward (r=.61, p<.01). Logical Memory A positively correlated with Logical
Memory B (1—.58, p<.01), Trail Making A, positively correlated with Trail Making B
(r=.61, p<.01), WCST categories negatively correlated with WCST perseverative errors (r=
-.48, p<.01) and so on.
There were also correlations across cognitive measures e.g. Digit Symbol (visuomotor
attention efficiency) correlated positively with both digits forward (simple auditory
attention, r=.31, p<.04) digits backward (complex auditory attention efficiency, r=.55,
p<.01) as well as with Logical Memory B (r=.48, p<.01). To the extent that backward digit
span involves working memory, both Logical Memory A and B correlated positively with
backward digit span (Log.Mem.A r=.33, p<.03, Log.Mem.B r=.42, p<.01). Additionally,
to the extent that the time taken to complete the Trail Making tests is a measure of
visuomotor attention, both tests negatively correlated with performance at Digit Symbol,
another measure of visuomotor attention (Trail A r=-.68, p<.01, Trail B r=-.63, p<.01).
A similar pattern was seen in the diabetes - specific cognitive measures where for example,
number of diabetes related problem solving strategies positively correlated with quality of
such strategies (r=.32, p<03).
Self care measures however did not correlate with one another as has already been
suggested should be the case in the diabetes self care literature (e.g. Jenny, 1984; Glasgow,
1989; Kravitz, Hays, Sherbourne, DiMatteo, Rogers, Ordway and Greenfield, 1993). So,
for example, there was no relationship between self reported dietary self care and exercise
(r=.04, p>.05), glucose testing (r---. .11, p>.05) or medication taking (r=.20, p>.05).
Similarly, there was no relationship between testing and exercise (r=-.06, p>.05), testing
and medication taking (r=.26, p>.05) or medication taking and exercise (r=.13, p>.05).
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A small number of significant correlations were seen between self care measures and
cognitive tests. For example, exercise self care correlated positively with digit span forward
(r=.33, p<.03) and dietary self care correlated positively with both number (r=.40, p<.01)
and quality (r=.39, p<.01) of diabetes specific problem solving strategies.
Finally, there were correlations between duration of diabetes and cognitive tests e.g. Trail
Making A and B time were positively correlated with diabetes duration (r= .29, p=.05 and
r=.30, p<.05 respectively), suggesting that the longer the participants had been diagnosed
with the condition the poorer their visuomotor coordination.
These correlations however can not reliably be interpreted at this stage as no statistical
control has taken place to partial out the effects of confounds such as age, depression and
premorbid IQ on all of these variables. The results of such partial correlations are reported
next.
5.4.3.1.	 Correlations between confounds and cognitive, diabetes - specific
cognitive and self care variables
Inspection of the correlation matrix seen in Appendix A revealed that some explanatory
variables correlated significantly with confounding variables such as age, premorbid IQ and
depression levels. Not all cognitive variables correlated with such confounds, which led to
the decision to only control for confounds where in fact there was an apparent relationship
with a given cognitive, self care or diabetes - specific cognitive variable.
Such significant relationships appeared between age and Trail Making A (r=.56, p<.01) and
B (r--.38,p<.02) where the older the participants the longer the tasks took to complete, and
age and Logical Memory A (r=-.37, p<.02) where the older the participants the fewer items
they remembered. Age also negatively correlated with Digit Symbol (r =-.51, p<.01) and,
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surprisingly, with BMI (r=-.35, p<.02).
Errors in the premorbid IQ test (NART) correlated negatively, as would be expected, with
the digit span tests (Digits Back r=-.45, p<.01, Digits Forward r= -.40, p<.01) as well as
with Logical Memory B (r=-.36, p<.02) and Digit Symbol (r= -.33, p<.03). Premorbid IQ
errors were positively correlated with time taken to complete Trail Making B (r=.29, p =
.05).
Finally, depression correlated with only two variables, the Subjective Memory
Questionnaire responses (SMQ, r= .38, p<.01) where the higher the depression score the
more subjective memory problems were reported, and dietary self care (r=-.43, p<.01)
where poorer self care was associated with higher depression scores. No other self care
variables were associated with any of the three major confounds (age, depression and IQ)
although both exercise (r=-.41, p<.01) and testing (r=.33, p<.03) were associated with
participants' BMI.
5.4.3.2. Partial and zero - order correlations between cognitive, diabetes - specific
cognitive and self care variables, controlling where appropriate for the
influence of confounds
Given the correlations reported in the previous sections, partial correlations were
performed to examine the relationship between cognition and self care in Type 2 diabetes
while adjusting for the effects of confounding factors such as age, depression levels and
premorbid IQ where appropriate. Initial descriptives, as well as the corrected correlational
data are seen in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 that follow.
It is evident that most participants gave full data sets for most of the administered
cognitive and self care measurements. The only exception to this was the WCST where
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approximately 28% of the sample failed to either start or complete it, possibly due to the
fact that the particular test was administered last, and that, as it turned out, was rather
challenging for older adults. All other data do not show anything out of the ordinary,
although the implicit memory test results would tend to suggest that implicit memory in
this group of subjects was somewhat minimal. Nevertheless, when the word stem
completions obtained in the implicit memory task were compared with control word stem
completions, the results suggested statistically significant evidence for implicit learning in
the tested sample (t(46) = 3.99, p<.001).
Table 5.4: Descriptives for cognitive and self care variables
Variable N Mean (s.d)
Digit Symbol 47 44.98 (10.06)
Digits Bck. 46 6.17 (2.07)
Digits Frw. 46 7.78 (2.14)
Log.Mem.A 47 11.17 (4.40)
Log.Mem.B 47 11.36 (4.23)
SMQ 47 112.57 (20.43)
SS7 time 40 47.66 (20.24)
Trail Making A 47 39.60 (11.33)
Trail Making B (sec) 46 88.96 (36.70)
Implicit completions 47 .51 (.78)
Explict recogn. 47 10.43 (4.24)
WCST categs. 34 3.44 (1.63)
WCST persev. 34 8.62 (9.26)
Prob.Solv. strategies 46 9.02 (1.86)
Prob. Solv. quality 46 2.85 (.45)
Dietary self care 47 13.79 (2.84)
Exercise self care 47 6.13 (4.95)
BG Testing 47 5.00 (2.93)
Medication taking 43 3.84 (.38)
The above data were subjected to partial correlational analysis, controlling for confounds
where appropriate. As the correlations are performed on numerous cognitive, diabetes-
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specific cognitive and self care variables, the table has been broken down into smaller and,
hopefully easier to read, sub-tables.
Table 5.5: Pearson's correlations for cognitive, diabetes -specific cognitive and self care variables adjusted for
the influence of confounds where appropriate
Cognitive - cognitive variables
DF DB DS LMA LMB SS7 SMQ TMA TMB IMP REC CAT PRS
DF
DB
DS
LMA
LMB
SS7
SMQ
TMA
TMB
IMP
REC
CAT
.53** .06
•44**
.03
.31*
.31*
.19
.31*
.29
.54**
-.27
-.26
.06
.10
-.06
-.24
.12
-.29
-.22
-.08
.12
-.06
-.29
-.51**
-.23
-.14
.12
.08
-.09
-.14
-.45**
-.07
-.18
.17
-.02
.18**
.07
.10
.01
-.04
-.16
.16
.21
-.20
-.07
.16
.13
•34*
.24
.44**
-.14
-.01
-.28*
-.31*
-.19
.07	 -.12
.06	 -.11
.18	 .05
-.16	 .48**
-.14	 .33
.09	 .02
-.21	 -.14
-.22	 .03
-.03	 .13
.42** -.20
-.18	 .32
-.48**
Key: * p<.05, **p<•01
DF: Digits Forward
DB: Digits Backward
DS: Digit Symbol
LMA: Logical memory story A
LMB: Logical memory story B
SS7: Serial subtraction of 7s
SMQ: Subjective memory Questionnaire
TMA: Trail Making A
TMB: Trail Making B
IMP : Implicit memory test
REC: Recognition memory (part of implicit test)
CAT: Wisconsin categories
PRS: Wisconsin perseverative errors
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Cognitive - diabetes-specific cognitive variables
DF DB DS LMA LMB SS7 SMQ TMA TMB IMP REC CAT PRS
STR	 -.01	 .14 .23 .26 .27 .23 -.33* .02 .03 -.09 .17 -.16 .22
QLT -.26 -.22 .28 .22 .38* .23 .05 -.15 -.13 -.25 .23 -.17 .17
Key: * p<.05, **p<.01
STR: Number of diabetes problem solving strategies 	 SMQ: Subjective mem. Quest/re
QLT: Quality of diabetes problem solving strategies	 SS7: Serial subtraction of 7s
DF: Digits Forward	 TMA: Trail Making A	 IMP: Implicit memory test
DB: Digits Backward	 TMB: Trail Making B	 REC: Recognition memory
DS: Digit Symbol	 LMA: Logical mem. story A LMB: Logical mem. story B
CAT: Wisconsin categories PRS: Wisconsin perseverative errors
Cognitive - self care variables
DF DB DS LMA LMB SS7 SMQ TMA TMB IMP REC CAT PRS
DIET .13 .05 .22 .16 .04 .13 -.01 -.07 -.03 -.25 .21 -.45** .20
EXR .28 .14 .15 -.15 .07 -.33* -.18 -.02 -.21 .07 .04 .31 -.19
TST -.10 -.14 .02 .10 .15 .04 -.13 .14 -.23 -.23 .11 -.14 -.03
MED .05 .01 -.11 -.11 -.06 .15 .17 .37 .02 -.10 -.16 -.33 .22
Key: * p<.05, **p<.01
DIET: Dietary self care
EXR: Physical activity self care
SS7: Serial subtraction of 7s
DF: Digits Forward
DB: Digits Backward
IMP: Implicit memory test
REC: Recognition memory
CAT: Wisconsin categories
PRS: Wisconsin perseverative errors
MED: medication taking
TST: BG testing
SMQ: Subject. Memory Q're
DS: Digit Symbol
TMA: Trail Making A
TMB: Trail Making B
LMA: Logical mem. story A
LMB: Logical mem. story B
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Self care — diabetes-specific cognitive variables
DIET EXR TST MED	 QLT
DIET .09 .12 .27
EXR -.07 .13
TST .26
STR •33* .14 .21 .17 .32*
QLT .40** .12 .19 .11
Key: * p<.05, **p<.01
EXR: Physical activity self care	 DIET: Dietary self care
MED: medication taking	 TST: BG testing
SIR: Number of diabetes problem solving strategies
QLT: Quality of diabetes problem solving strategies
There are several interesting results seen in the above corrected matrices. Firstly, as would
be expected, most cognitive variables that would normally be expected to be correlated, are
related to one another. So in the first matrix, digits forward and digits backward still
correlate positively (r=.53, p<.01), time taken to complete the Trail Making A is related to
time taken to complete Trail Making B (r=.18, p<.05), and Logical Memory story A
performance is related to that on story B (r=.55, p<.01).
In the second matrix however, pure cognitive variables do not extensively correlate with
diabetes — specific cognitive variables. So for example, the number of diabetes specific
problem solving strategies is (negatively) related only to people's subjective memory
questionnaire responses suggesting that the fewer perceived memory problems people
think they have, the greater the number of ways they produce to deal with diabetes-
specific problems (r= -.33, p<.05). At the same time, the quality of such diabetes — specific
problem solving strategies appears to be related to better performance at remembering
logical sequences as measured by Logical Memory Story B (r=.38, p<.05), and not
anything else.
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Looking at the correlations between self care and cognitive variables in the third matrix, a
similar pattern of results is seen with only very few self care variables correlating with
cognitive measures. So dietary self care appears to be related to ability to modify behaviour
in response to feedback as measured by the WCST (r=-.45, p<.01) suggesting that those
who were pretty competent at abstract reasoning tasks tended to be poorly adherent to
dietary recommendations. In addition, physical activity is related to good mental flexibility
(SS7 and exercise r=-.33, p<.01) but no other self care variable (e.g. medication taking or
BG testing) are related to any other cognitive measure.
Finally, there does not seem to be any relationship between measures of different self care
aspects. For example, there is no relationship between dietary care and exercise (r=.09,
p>.05), glucose testing (r=.12, p>.05) or medication taking (r=.27, p>.05). However,
dietary self care is well related to both number (r=.33, p<.05) and quality (r-=.40, p<.01) of
diabetes- specific problem solving.
A further observation worth making is that some of the earlier, non - corrected correlations
now ceased to be significant. For instance, where Logical Memory B and Digit Symbol
were previously correlated (r=.48, p<.01) when the influence of age and IQ on these
variables was partialled out the relationship was no longer significant (r=.29, p>.05). The
same would apply to, for example, Digit Symbol and SMQ where before correction a
significant negative relationship was seen between the two (r=-.40, p<.01) which
subsequently disappeared after the effects of age and IQ were partialled out (r=-.29,
p=.06). On the other hand, where initially there was not a significant correlation between,
for example, WCST categories and dietary self care (r=-.26, p>.05) such a relationship
became statistically significant when the effects of depression were partialled out (r= -.45,
p<.01).
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It seems that statistical control of potential confounds may have one of two consequences.
Firstly, it may reduce correlation (and in some cases, sample) sizes thus yielding the
relationship non significant from a statistical point of view. Secondly it may unmask
relationships which, but for partialling out confounding effects, would not be identified. As
the purpose of this study was to look for relationships between cognition and self care
measures irrespective of participants' age, premorbid IQ and depression levels, it was
thought appropriate to engage in such statistical control with the inevitable cost and
drawback being that some relationships between variables that were heavily dependent on
age, IQ an depression would disappear.
5.4.4. Factor analysis results
In order to explore the structure of the data in more depth and confirm that we were not
dealing with an unrepresentative, odd sample of results here i.e. one which is confounded
by spurious correlations, it was decided to use factor analysis to identify patterns of
correlations between cognitive and self care variables that may predict relationships
between the two (listwise N=19). There were three aims behind this analysis; firstly to
ensure that cognitive variables that 'ought to' correlate together did in fact do so, secondly
to reduce the number of correlated variables to smaller chunks and thirdly to explore what
cognitive variables, if any, were related to self care measures meaningfully, if indeed at all.
As a result, using Eigenvalues over 1 and a Varimax orthogonal rotation method where
factors were not allowed to correlate with one another, both cognitive and self care
variables were subjected to factor analysis. The technique yielded three factors which in
total explained 47% of the total variance seen in the current data set. The results are shown
in Table 5.6.
Factor 1	 Factor 2	 Factor 3
.88
-.80
-.69
.66
.63
.51
-.37
.27
.01
.04
.23
.18
-.02
-.43
.07
-.12
.27
.51
-.00
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Table 5.6: Rotated factor solution showing factor loadings between cognitive and self care variables and the
three emerging factors in order of magnitude of explaining variance
Variable
DS
TMA
TMB
LMB
LMA
REC
SMQ
CAT
PRS
DIET
STR
QLT
IMP
MED
TST
EXR
DF
DB
SS7
Total variance explained 20%
.01	 .16
.21	 .06
.08	 -.18
.38	 .03
.35	 -.16
.34	
.08
-.11	
-.28
-.66	
.22
.64	
-.21
.59	
.19
.58	
.16
.56	
-.14
-.53	
.02
.49	
.16
.38	
-.10
-.02	 .77
-.05	 .75
-.02	
.60
.10	
-.49
Key:
DF: Digits Forward
DB: Digits Backward
DS: Digit Symbol
LMA: Logical memory story A
LMB: Logical memory story -B
SS7: Serial subtraction of 7s
TMA: Trail Making A
TMB: Trail Making B
IMP : Implicit memory test
REC: Recognition memory
CAT: Wisconsin categories
PRS: Wisconsin perseverative errors
SMQ: Subjective memory Questionnaire
STR: Number of diabetes problem solving strategies
QLT: Quality of diabetes problem solving strategies
DIET: Dietary self care
	 TST: BG testing
EXR: Physical activity self care
	 MED: medication taking
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Inspection of the above table reveals three meaningful factors. Factor 1 comprises purely
cognitive variables and no diabetes - related cognitive or self care variables. Variables that
load highly on this factor are all to do with visuo - motor attention (Digit Symbol, Trail
Making A and B), explicit memory processes (Logical Memory A and B, recognition
component of implicit tests) and subjective perceptions of one's memory difficulties
(Subjective Memory Questionnaire).
The second factor contains most self care variables (diet, testing and medication taking)
alongside problem solving and ability to modify behaviour in response to feedback (WCST
categories and perseverative errors) as well as diabetes - specific problem solving (number
and quality of diabetes - specific problem solving strategies) and finally implicit memory
(implicit test completions).
The third factor mainly comprises auditory mental flexibility tests (Digit span, Serial
Subtraction of 7s) as well as physical activity self care.
It appears that factor 1 suggests a complex visuo - motor attention / explicit memory
component, factor 2 a problem solving / implicit memory and self care component and
factor 3 an auditory mental flexibility component with most self care activities (with the
exception of exercise which seems to be related to auditory mental flexibility) related to
problem solving (factor 2) rather than anything else.
5.4.5. Multiple regression results
Stepwise multiple regressions were performed to predict self care and diabetes problem
solving from cognitive measures. Given the significant influence of IQ, depression and age
on some measures described previously, these variables were entered in all stepwise
regression models regardless of whether they were strongly related to predictor variables.
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Stepwise rather than hierarchical multiple regressions were chosen as the purpose of the
analysis was to explore the set of predictors that would best explain self care rather than to
test a pre - existing model of cognitive factors. Given the relatively small sample size of the
present study, only those predictors that were significantly correlated with predicted
measures were entered into the regression models.
Two variables, WCST categories and implicit completions, turned out to be of nominal
nature which led to dummy variables being used in order for these variables to be entered
into the regression models. There were 5 dummy variables for WCST categories and 3
dummy variables for the implicit test, in both cases lower numbered dummies reflecting
poorer performance on the given variable i.e. WCST1categs. would mean that no WCST
categories were found, while IMPL3 would mean fairly good implicit memory
performance. To create these dummy variables the guidelines suggested by Tabachnick and
Fiddel, (1995) were followed. The results are given in Table 5.7 below.
Table 5.7 : Results of stepwise multiple regressions using cognitive and confounding variables to predict
diabetes self care behaviours, Given the small sample size, adjusted multiple r values are reported.
Dependent	 Step /	 Multiple	 Sign.	 Beta	 T Sign. T
Variable	 Predictor	 R (Adjusted) R2
Dietary Self Care (N=32)
1 / Depression	 .43	 .01	 -.43	 1.01	 .01
2 / Problem Solving
Quality	 .57	 .00	 .36	 2.42 .02
3 / WCST 1 categs	 .67	 .00	 .38	 2.54 .00
Exercise (N=37)
1 / BMI
	
.42
	 .00	 -.42	 -.79	 .00
2 / SS7 time	 .55	 .00	 -.35	 -2.57 .02
Testing (N=44)
1 / Implicit 3	 .41	 .00 -	 -.41	 -2.94 .00
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It is evident that few cognitive and diabetes — specific cognitive variables explain diabetes
self management activities. So, approximately 45% of variance in dietary self care is
predicted by depression along with quality of diabetes - specific problem solving strategies
and, surprisingly, poor rather than successful problem solving.
BMI on the other hand seems to, not unexpectedly, predict whether people will engage in
physical activity or not with greater BMI predicting less activity. Speed of mental
manipulation of logical numerical sequences (SS7) also seems to predict exercise. Overall
30.25% of variance in physical activity is predicted by participants' BMI and mental
flexibility as measured by the SS7.
Finally, better implicit memory is a predictor of, surprisingly, poor adherence to glucose
testing instructions with approximately 17% of variability in BG testing being explained by
implicit memory processes.
As medication testing turned out to be a bimodal categorical variable it was not possible to
perform a multiple regression on this variable.
Further stepwise multiple regressions were performed to predict diabetes - specific
problem solving. This analysis was done to examine whether performance at cognitive
tests might be predictive of diabetes-specific cognitive performance. The results of these
analyses are shown in Table 5.8 that follows.
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Table 5.8 : Results of stepwise multiple regressions using cognitive and confounding variables to predict
diabetes problem solving
Dependent	 Step /
Variable	 Predictor
Multiple	 Sign.
R (Adjusted)	 R2
Beta T Sign.
Number of
diabetes problem
solving strategies (N=43)
1 / Subj.Memory
Problems .39 .00 -.39 -.78 .00
2 / Diabetes
duration .52 .00 .34 2.56 .01
3 / Quality of
diabetes prob.
solving stratg. .59 .00 .28 2.22 .03
Quality of
diabetes problem
solving strategies (N=43)
1 /Logical Mem.B .40 .01 .40 2.85 .01
It is evident that a modest amount of variance (35%) in number of diabetes problem solving
strategies is predicted by a combination of cognitive factors (memory, problem solving) and
duration of illness. So, the greater the number of memory problems people with diabetes
perceive they have the fewer their problem solving strategies. Duration of diabetes also
seems to be predicting diabetes problem solving strategies with longer diagnoses predicting
more problem solving strategies. Finally a small but significant percentage of variability is
predicted by quality of such strategies suggesting that those people with overall better
strategies were more likely to also have more such strategies.
This last effect is not seen in reverse though i.e. greater number of strategies predicting
better quality of such strategies. A small percentage (16%) of variance in people's quality
of problem solving strategies is predicted only by performance at the logical memory test
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where better performance there predicted higher problem solving quality.
5.5.	 Summary
Several analyses were performed on the data in an attempt to establish whether diabetes
self management was related to and / or could be predicted by cognitive factors. In order to
do so, relationships between cognitive and self care variables were explored in both zero
order and partial correlations, adjusting for the effects of confounding factors such as age,
depression and premorbid IQ where appropriate. In addition, factor analysis was
performed on cognitive and self care variables in order to investigate any interesting
patterns of relationships between such variables. The reason behind the use of multivariate
statistics to explore relationships between cognition and self care was to ensure that the
current findings were not the results of spurious associations between variables but were
findings that could emerge from statistically treating the data in several related yet
distinctive ways.
The results of all the above analyses suggested that a small but significant amount of
variance in both self care and diabetes - specific problem solving can be reliably predicted
by cognitive factors.
5.6.	 Discussion
The correlational results supported the idea that both implicit and explicit cognitive
functioning processes are related to diabetes self management and diabetes - specific
problem solving in Type 2 diabetes, partialling out the effects of the confounding effects of
age, depression and premorbid IQ. The results of factor analysis suggested that overall, self
care may be better related to implicit memory and problem solving rather than anything
else, with the exception of exercise which appeared to be related to auditory mental
flexibility. Finally, stepwise multiple regressions yielded similar findings for both response
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variables which suggested that a small but significant amount of variability in both self care
and diabetes problem solving can be attributed to cognitive functioning processes.
Correlational, factor analytic and regression results are discussed in turn.
Firstly the question of whether there is a relationship between diabetes self management
and cognitive performance as measured by partial correlations and factor analysis needs to
be answered.
In order to confirm the reliability of the present data set and check that cognitive variables
indeed followed patterns that would seem plausible from a neuropsychological perspective,
factor analysis was performed. The analysis identified three factors which seem plausible;
an explicit memory / visual and motor attention factor, a problem solving and implicit
memory factor and finally an auditory attention factor. It is interesting that the view that
some researchers have expressed about the dissociation of implicit and explicit memory
systems (e.g. Schacter, 1987) may be supported here. The underlying structure of the
present data set thus seems to be making sense from a psychometric / neuropsychological
perspective.
In addition to cognitive variables forming sensible - looking patterns, self care variables
were found to be attaching themselves to specific cognitive factor clusters. So the majority
of self care behaviours (diet, testing and medication taking) seemed to be generally related
to both diabetes - specific problem solving and traditional abstract reasoning / problem
solving variables, a finding consistent with previous findings in the literature which have
highlighted the importance of problem solving for successful diabetes self management
(Glasgow, Toobert, Hampson, Brown, Lewisohn, Donnelly, 1992; Wierenga, Beauchamp,
Hewitt, 1994; Sullivan and Joseph, 1998).
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What has not been seen in the literature but has appeared here however is the importance
of implicit memory / learning for these areas of self care. The factor analysis suggested that
to the extent that diet, exercise and medication taking are related to explicit problem solving
they are also related to implicit cognitive processes. This is a preliminary finding which
would need to be researched further.
Physical activity on the other hand was related to neither implicit memory nor abstract /
diabetes - specific problem solving. In fact, exercise made up a third factor in factor
analysis along with cognitive variables that seem to tap auditory attention and mental
flexibility such as digit span and serial subtraction of 7s. It would seem that while dietary
behaviours, testing as well as medication taking are behaviours that require problem solving
and perhaps implicit memory processes, exercise is an independent self care area that
would require overall fair mental flexibility rather than the specific ability to solve abstract
problems.
The results of factor analysis were based on zero - order correlations between variables.
The correlational analysis results seemed to partially confirm the above suggestions
proposed by the factor analysis but in addition, correlational analyses benefited from the
partialling out of the influence of confounds such as age, depression and premorbid IQ. The
difficulties with partialling out the effects of confounds from self care and cognitive
variables were identified earlier and have to do with the fact that controlling for the effects
of confounds sometimes improved relationships between variables, but some other times
correlations that initially appeared reliable were lost after statistical correction of
confounds. This observation may point towards a Type 2 error problem because it is
unclear whether corrected and subsequently nonsignificant relationships are nonsignificant
because of successful partialling out processes, or because partialling out also led to a
reduced sample size. If the first is true, one could argue that nonsignificance after control of
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confounds is not surprising; as most cognitive function tests are subject to participants'
age, mood and IQ levels it is expected that relationships between such variables may cease
to be as strong as initially seen, when the effects of such variables are partialled out. If
however such nonsignificant findings are due to the effects of a reduction in sample size
then the possibility of a Type 2 error need to be acknowledged; future work would benefit
from testing much larger samples so that when partialling out occurs, sample size reduction
problems are not a threat to the validity of conclusions made.
Nevertheless, the data confirmed findings seen in the literature that suggest that different
aspects of the self care regimen are unrelated, so for example, findings confirming
participants' dietary self care not being related to their physical activity or glucose testing
and medication taking were seen. These findings confirm suggestions seen in the literature
that there are substantial differences in the extent that people with Type 2 diabetes follow
self care recommendations and that no two self care regimes are treated similarly by people
with diabetes (e.g. Bloom - Kerkoney and Hart, 1980; Glasgow, Toobert, Riddle, Donnelly,
Mitchell and Calder, 1989).
Dietary self care was unrelated to any other aspect of the self care regimen. It was however
positively related to depression which, when partialled out, showed diet to be related to
both diabetes specific problem solving and abstract problem solving. The direction of the
relationship, however, differed between the two; better diabetes specific problem solving
was related to better dietary self care while better abstract problem solving as seen in
ability to modify behaviour in response to feedback (modified WCST), was related to poor
dietary self care ! It seems that the cognitive determinants of dietary care are far from
straightforward. The current results would suggest that diabetic people with a wider and
qualitatively better repertoire of diabetes - specific solutions to everyday life diabetes
problems are also better at keeping up with dietary recommendations. Those, however,
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who are overall good at solving abstract, non diabetes - specific problems by successfully
modifying their behaviour in response to feedback are less likely to follow through dietary
recommendations. Obviously, as the results are of a correlational nature their interpretation
is only tentative and replication, preferably by longitudinal work, is essential before any
firm conclusions are reached.
Exercise was reliably related to performance at the SS7 test, a measure of speed of auditory
attention and mental flexibility. Interestingly, people who reported following through
exercise regimens were seen to be more mentally flexible. An explanation of this finding
may lie in the fact that the decision to follow exercise plans through (bearing in mind the
possible risks of a hypoglycaemic episode and ways round it) might be positively related
to more complex cognitive processing. In other words, people who are less competent at
complex cognitive processing seem to find following exercise plans more challenging.
Neither glucose testing nor medication taking was related to cognitive variables in any
reliable manner. This finding may suggest that these areas of self care are more automatic
and routine - based and perhaps do not impinge upon peoples' cognitive systems as much
as the other two areas. As, however, both of these areas of self care appeared in the
problem solving / implicit memory cluster reported above, it may be worthwhile to explore
whether they can be predicted by problem solving / implicit memory variables in multiple
regression.
Finally, both number and quality of diabetes problem solving strategies were related to
some cognitive variables. Quality of problem solving was related to performance at the
Logical Memory B test suggesting that peoples' ability to remember logical sequences is a
cognitive ability related to the quality of diabetes-specific problem solving.
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The number of strategies people had available to them seemed to follow an inverse pattern
to the number of memory problems they subjectively reported experiencing; the more
memory problems they thought they experienced the fewer their diabetes problem solving
strategies. Number of strategies was also related to diabetes duration with people having a
longer diagnosis possessing a wider problem solving repertoire than those with shorter
diabetes duration. These findings suggest that an assessment of peoples' perceptions of
their cognitive systems may tell us something about the extent to which they may develop
a wide system of dealing with diabetes related problems. Also, to the extent that the longer
duration of the condition is related to more strategies, this may suggest that dealing with
diabetes problems is something that develops as a result of trial and error, and as such,
over time.
The difficulty with making sensible interpretations of the above lies in the correlational
nature of the data. Before any more reliable conclusions are drawn multiple regression
analyses are necessary to confirm the above suggestions.
The results of stepwise multiple regressions suggested that cognitive variables could indeed
predict self care, controlling for the effects of age, depression and premorbid IQ. This of
course is not to be confused with any suggestion that such cognitive variables may be
causing an effect to be seen in diabetes self care variables. Given the cross sectional and
correlational nature of the data such conclusions about effects are improper to make.
Nevertheless, variability in a predicted variable explained by a set of predictors is in itself
interesting so the regression data will now be discussed.
Dietary self care was predicted by participants' depression levels as well as diabetes
specific problem solving quality and abstract problem solving / modification of behaviour in
response to feedback. So 45% of variability in respondents' self care was predicted by the
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combination of these three factors, confirming the results of factor analysis as well as those
of the partial correlations. The direction of the findings was also confirmed. People good at
diabetes - specific problem solving as seen in the high quality of their strategies were better
at dietary self care than those with poorer strategies. This finding suggests that if people
with Type 2 diabetes are better equipped to deal with everyday life diabetes problems
they will be more likely to keep up with diet self care activities. On the other hand, poor
overall abstract reasoning as seen in WCST predicted better dietary self care. This is very
interesting in that it suggests that good ability to deal with overall difficult abstract
problems may be related to not choosing to follow through a healthy diet. A plausible
post-hoc explanation would be that those people who can anyway deal with problems
well, are likely to feel more confident to deviate from dietary recommendations knowing
that in the event of complications they will be able to rectify the problem. On the other
hand, those with an enhanced quality repertoire of behaviours at hand when real life
diabetes problem appear, may use this skill to make a dietary regimen likely to impinge
upon their lifestyle more manageable and thus, appear to be keeping with this aspect of self
care better. The implications of these findings for practical self care are that perhaps
education and problem solving sessions targeting everyday life diabetes problems may be
related to better dietary self care in the future and should be designed in the light of such a
relationship. At the same time however, given that no causation may be assumed here,
longitudinal work would be necessary in order to take these preliminary findings further.
Self reported physical activity ((30% of variance) was predicted by participants' BMI (the
heavier, the less likely to take up exercise) and speed of performance at the SS7 (the
slower, the less likely to take up exercise), the latter predictor confirming the results of the
correlational analysis and partly confirming the factor analysis results. The first finding
seems to be making good sense in that heavier people are likely to fmd exercise more
difficult and would thus be expected to be more likely to avoid it. This finding confirms
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findings seen in the obesity literature that suggest that the more overweight people are the
less likely to engage in physical activity (e.g. Dishman and Gettman, 1980).
The second finding confirms these seen earlier which suggested that mental flexibility may
be related and indeed predict physical activity. This is very interesting. Perhaps, people
who follow through exercise recommendations are happier engaging in complex cognitive
processing than those who don't. So it could be that e.g. before embarking on an exercise
session, mental flexibility is a prerequisite to ensure that a sensible amount of exercise will
be taken and that adverse reactions to it will be successfully dealt with, thus ensuring that
the exercise session will be repeated in the future as a behaviour unlikely to cause
unpleasant reactions. These findings might be important in situations where exercise
prescriptions are given out and patients are expected to follow them through. If the results
from this sample are generalisable, the chances of exercise prescriptions being followed
through increase as the diabetic participant's mental flexibility in terms of complex
cognitive processing increases and as their BMI decreases, a finding with implications for
the importance of weight loss in overweight people with Type 2 diabetes. At the same
time, it may be argued that the correlational nature of the present findings precludes such
suggestions. Further research would be necessary in order to establish the direction of
causality in the relationship between exercise and mental flexibility also exploring the
possibility that taking up exercise makes people more mentally flexible.
Seventeen percent of variability in glucose testing was predicted by the implicit memory
measure only, hence partly confirming the results of factor analysis. The direction of the
prediction however was surprising in that it was found that those participants who were
competent at the implicit memory task were less likely to test their glucose as and when
prescribed. There was thus a negative relationship between testing and implicit memory
where better implicit memory predicted less testing. This is a surprising finding but it may
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be suggestive of the idea that those people who are pretty good at detecting implicit signs
of a hypo / hyperglycaemic event will be less likely to test their glucose levels. So, being
good at 'memory without awareness' may predict poor testing simply because reliance in
implicit signals of glucose levels may make the need to explicitly test redundant. If this is
true then, in practice, the dangers of relying on implicit signals to one's glucose levels might
need to be pointed out to people who report not testing as asked to. Obviously systematic
research in the relationship and direction of causality if indeed any, between BG testing and
implicit memory is called for before any firm conclusions are drawn.
As far as diabetes — specific cognitive variables are concerned, both number and quality of
diabetes problem solving strategies were predicted by cognitive and other variables.
Number of strategies was inversely predicted by the number of subjective memory
problems participants reported and was positively predicted by duration of the condition
as well as the quality of those strategies. So 35% of variability in number of diabetes
strategies was predicted by peoples' reported memory problems (the more problems the
fewer strategies), diabetes duration (the longer duration, the more strategies) and strategies'
quality (the higher quality, the more strategies). These results support both earlier reported
factor analytic and correlational findings.
It is interesting that the number of memory problems diabetic people perceive they have,
rather than an objective measure of such problems, predicts the number of their diabetes -
specific problem solving strategies. It would appear that people who do not have many
problem solving skills tend to also see themselves as having poor cognitive abilities. It
would be interesting to explore this finding further in an attempt to find out whether there
is one (or more) other variables (e.g. self esteem or personal models of illness) that may be
causing both poor problem solving and perception of poor memory skills.
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The same is not true however in a vice versa mode; it seems that quality of diabetes -
specific strategies does not increase as a function of the number of such strategies. In fact,
the only cognitive variable that predicted diabetes problem solving quality (16% of
variance) was Logical Memory B suggesting that there is something about verbal memory
and ability to remember logical sequences that predicts quality of problem solving ability.
This is not surprising; to the extent that high quality problem solving rests on one's ability
to assess a situation and logically and systematically work through possible problem
solving alternatives, it seems plausible that those with better ability to do exactly that will
also show a higher quality of dealing with diabetes related problems.
In conclusion, the present study has demonstrated that diabetes self management is related
to and can be predicted by both explicit and implicit cognitive functioning in people with
Type 2 diabetes. Different areas of self care are predicted by different cognitive variables,
with problem solving and implicit memory predicting dietary self care, medication taking
and glucose testing while auditory mental flexibility seemingly related to physical activity.
Given the cross - sectional and correlational nature of the present data, establishing causal
links between the variables of interest here is impossible and as such, beyond the scope of
the present study. What has been shown however is that while self care is related to and
may well be predicted by cognitive functioning, the amounts of variance in self care
explained by cognitive functioning variables are only modest and limited to a small subset
of psychometric tests. In fact, a fairly substantial amount of variability in people's self
care activities (55% in dietary self care, 70% in physical activity and 83% in BG testing) is
arguably predicted by variables other than those measuring cognitive functioning and as
such, the extent to which cognitive functioning (and indeed any impairment seen in this
area) is explanatory of poor self care might in fact be limited.
A question that the present study has not attempted to answer, but given the relationships
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between cognition and self care seems appropriate to ask with the suggestion that it is
researched further, is what the direction of causality is between self care and cognitive
functioning ? Is it that poor self care as seen in poor diabetes control leads to decline in
cognitive functioning, or is it that poor cognitive functioning is responsible for poor self
care which in turn might lead to poor control and further decline in cognitive functioning ? if
so at what stage is it worth intervening and aiding diabetic people in their cognitive efforts
to manage the illness ?
Large, well controlled, prospective studies are necessary in order to establish what, if
indeed any, the direction of cause and effect between cognition and self care might be as
well as the extent to which intervening in improving people's diabetes — specific cognitive
skills may lead to better diabetes self care.
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Chapter 6
Cognitive dysfunction in Type 2 diabetes:
fact or methodological artefact ?
6.0. Summary
The present chapter examines the question of whether people with type 2 diabetes are
cognitively impaired compared to non diabetic controls. Given the disagreement in the
current literature as to the existence and the extent of cognitive dysfunction in samples of
people with Type 2 diabetes, an approach that emphasises the importance of
methodological and statistical control is adopted. It is shown that the less well controlled a
study design the more widespread the apparent diabetic cognitive impairment. The chapter
emphasises the importance of establishing a widely adopted battery of tests for use with
diabetic samples as well as developing guidelines on what variables ought to be controlled
for before any suggestions of cognitive impairment in Type 2 diabetes are made.
6.1.	 Introduction 
Chapter 2 showed that diabetes is a complex illness which may be associated with other
conditions such as obesity, hypertension as well as cardiovascular problems. The review of
the cognitive literature in Type 2 diabetes in Chapter 3 suggested that the results reported
so far are inconclusive. So, although some studies have failed to find any cognitive
impairment in diabetic samples when compared with controls (e.g. Mattlar et al., 1985;
Atiea at al., 1995), the majority of the case control studies published in the literature seem
to indicate that Type 2 diabetes is associated with cognitive impairment in tests involving
complex cognitive processing such as verbal memory and perhaps to a lesser extent
psychomotor speed (Strachan et al., 1997).
However, these studies have been plagued with methodological problems. In a recent
review Stewart and Liolitsa (1999, p.94) noted that although age was fairly well matched
in case control studies, 'sex ratios were unequal in nearly half of the studies'. What is
more, other conditions that may interfere with cognition have usually not been addressed
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such as absence of alcoholism or alcohol - related problems, or medication taking that may
interfere with cognitive performance such as hypertension medication or medication for
heart / cerebrovascular conditions. Some, but certainly not most, studies have controlled
for some of these variables (e.g. Lowe et al., 1994). In fact, as Strachan et al. noted in a
review of the cognitive literature in Type 2 diabetes, only 4 or 5 published studies have
been well controlled and 'overall a mean of 4.7 potentially confounding factors had not
been controlled for in studies that identified no difference in cognitive performance
between diabetic and control subjects, while a mean number of 4.2 possible confounding
factors had not been considered in studies that showed impaired cognitive performance in
the diabetic subjects' (1997, pp. 441 - 442).
Additionally, as discussed in the same review, studies vastly differed in what
psychological tests of cognitive function they used, 'with no two studies using the same
battery of tests' (p.438) making meta - analytic checks or even simpler direct comparisons
across studies impossible.
Finally, although explicit cognitive processes have been investigated, no research has been
undertaken to investigate implicit learning in people with Type 2 diabetes. Chapter 4
discussed the development of a novel implicit learning task to be administered to diabetic
samples. Given the research described in Chapter 5 which suggested that explicit and
implicit cognitive performance may, to some extent, be related to people's self care
attempts, it is of interest to examine whether people with Type 2 diabetes are impaired in
cognitive functioning processes, especially those that were found to be predictive of
diabetes self management activities.
An attempt was made to design a study that would take into consideration most of the
methodological difficulties discussed above, in exploring whether there is a difference in
cognitive functioning between people with Type 2 diabetes and diabetes - free controls.
Accordingly, the question the present study aimed to address was whether a random,
representative sample of people with Type 2 diabetes, regardless of whether they exhibited
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conditions associated with the illness or not, would be cognitively impaired when
compared to a diabetes - free but appropriately matched sample of controls. The aim of the
current study was hence not to investigate the effects of pure Type 2 diabetes on cognitive
function but to evaluate cognitive function in what may be considered a typical sample, of
people with Type 2 diabetes.
Consequently, it was decided to match diabetic and control participants on key variables
such as age, sex, presence / absence of hypertension and presence / absence of heart /
cerebrovascular conditions. It was also thought important to ensure that participants were
free from other conditions that may interfere with cognition such as history of head trauma,
excessive alcohol intake, dementia or other major psychiatric conditions. Participants on
antidepressant medication or other medications for psychiatric conditions were excluded.
Impaired sensory and / or motor coordination were not formally assessed although data
from participants with difficulties in these domains that became apparent during testing
were excluded.
A universally accepted battery of neuropsychological tests for people with diabetes is yet
to be developed. The cognitive tests used here were selected to be comparable to those
used in past studies and have been described in some detail in Chapter 5. The aims of the
research presented in this chapter are:
• to investigate whether a typical sample of people with Type 2 diabetes differs in
cognitive function from people without diabetes,
• if impaired, to ascertain the extent of such cognitive impairment, and
• to examine whether part of the apparent impairment in the cognitive function of
samples with Type 2 diabetes may be attributable to poor methodological and
statistical control.
If indeed part of the alleged cognitive dysfunction seen in people with Type 2 diabetes
can be attributed to methodological factors then the need to establish clear guidelines to be
adhered to in researching this area would become of great importance.
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6.2. Research design and method 
A total of N=33 diabetes - free volunteer participants were recruited from a General
Practice in the Buckinghamshire region. Eligible participants were selected by inspection
of the surgery's computerised medical records and then by random sampling from a pool of
eligible participants.
The purpose of the recruitment process was to match participants with the sample of 51
diabetic participants recruited earlier so as to compare the two in terms of cognitive
function. The recruitment characteristics of the diabetic sample have been discussed in
Chapter 5 however important demographic and medication profile characteristics will be
summarised here.
The criteria for control participant selection were that the sample was free from diabetes,
had an absence of a documented history of head trauma, mental retardation, clinical
depression, dementia, major psychiatric disorder, alcoholism or alcohol related problems
and that they were fluent in English.
Once these requirements were satisfied an attempt was made to match the eligible control
sample to the already recruited diabetic sample. Matching for age, sex, presence / absence
of hypertension and presence / absence of heart / cerebrovascular conditions as revealed by
inspection of participants' medical records was undertaken.
Nondiabetic participants were recruited by an invitation letter sent to their home address
and signed by both the researcher and the Leader GP of the General Practice. The letter
explained the recruitment procedure, the study purpose and structure and offered assurance
as to the anonymity and confidentiality of the participants' responses. It was emphasised
that participation was voluntary and that participants had the right to withdraw from the
study at any point. The letter also offered an appointment for a later date which if
participants agreed to participate they were asked to confirm, by contacting the researcher.
124
Volunteers were encouraged to contact the researcher if they had questions about the
testing session or the research in general.
Diabetic participants were recruited in a similar manner as already described in Chapter 5,
although the invitation to participate was handed out to eligible patients at the diabetes
clinic by diabetes clinic nursing staff rather than sent to people's home addresses.
6.2.1. Cognitive and other measures
The same cognitive and control measures that were administered to the diabetic sample
and which were described in some detail in Chapter 5 were administered to the healthy
sample. Obviously, diabetes-specific measures were inappropriate here so these were not
administered. As a reminder, all lab based cognitive tests that were administered to the
diabetes-free sample are given in Table 6.1 that follows.
Table 6.1 :The neuropsychological tests used in the present study
Test	 Test characteristics
Digit Symbol
(Weschler, 1981)
Forward Digit Span (DFW)
(Weschler, 1981)
Backward Digit Span (DBCK)
(Weschler, 1981)
Serial Subtraction of 7s (SS7)
(cited in Lezak, 1995)
Trail Making A & B (TMA, TMB)
(Army Individual Test Battery, 1944)
Logical Memory Stories A and B
(Weschler, 1987)
Modified Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
(Berg, 1948, Hart et al., 1988)
Word Stem Completion task
sustained visual complex attention,
visuomotor coordination, response speed
verbal short term memory, attention
efficiency
verbal short term memory, double
mental tracking
complex auditory attention, mental
tracking, response speed
sustained visual attention,
complex visual scanning, mental shift
verbal STM, logical sequence recall
abstract reasoning, ability to modify
behaviour in response to feedback
implicit memory
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were not hypoglycaemic before cognitive testing commenced, as well as diabetes —
specific cognitive tests) details of which have been given in Chapter 5.
The order in which the tests were administered was as follows; Implicit task control word
stem completion, Demographic Information questionnaire, NART, Logical Memory A
then B, Mini Mental State Examination, Implicit memory completion task, Serial
Subtraction of 7s, Trail Making A then B, Digits Forward, Digits Backward, Digit Symbol,
Modified WCST, Subjective Memory Questionnaire, HADS.
6.3.	 Results 
The rationale for the analysis of the present data is based on the need to establish whether
the cognitive dysfunction findings reported in the literature might partly rest on poor
methodological and statistical control. If this is true, then the stricter the methodological
and statistical control applied the fewer the emergent differences in cognitive
performance between people with Type 2 diabetes and those without the illness ought to
be.
6.3.1. Analysis 1
Twenty-seven of the recruited 33 control volunteers were matched with people with Type
2 diabetes on all of the above factors. An additional participant was matched on age, sex,
and absence of hypertension only. A further participant was matched on age and sex only.
Finally, there were two matched pairs where there was perfect matching apart from one
factor. The imperfection, however, was in such a format that it could be cancelled out.
Thus in one pair the diabetic participant was matched on age, sex, and heart /
cerebrovascular condition, but not on hypertension (the diabetic participant had
hypertension, the control did not) and in a second matched pair a similar pattern in reverse
was observed i.e. matched on age, sex, and heart / cerebroyascular condition, but not on
hypertension (the participant with Type 2 diabetes did not have hypertension, but the
control person did).
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The second case of imperfect matching involved a pair matched on age, sex and
hypertension but not on cerebrovascular condition (the person with diabetes had a stroke,
the control participant did not) and a second pair exhibiting a similar matching pattern i.e.
perfect matching on age, sex and hypertension but not cerebrovascular condition (the
control person had a stroke but the diabetic participant did not). These matching
imperfections were due to computerised medical record errors. The matched sample
characteristics are shown in Table 6.2. Asterisks denote the cases where imperfect
matching which cancelled out was involved.
Table 6.2: Matching characteristics of the samples recruited in this study. V denotes perfect matching took
place for the ticked factor.
N pairs Age Sex Hypertension Hypertension Heart /
(control /
diabetic)
and heart /
cerebrovascular cond.
only cerebrovascular
cond.
27 v v V
1
1
v
v
v
v
v
*2 v v V
*2 v v V
The recruited diabetes-free sample had a mean age of 62.4 years (range 43 - 78 years),
were on average of normal weight (mean BMI = 26.9) and free from clinical depression
(mean Hospital Anxiety and Depression, depression score = 3.7). Sixteen participants
were free from both hypertension and heart / cerebrovascular conditions, 10 were receiving
hypertension medication, 2 were receiving medication for heart / cerebrovascular
conditions and 5 had both heart / cerebrovascular and hypertension problems.
The diabetic sample was identical to the control sample in age and sex ratio as well as
medication taking profile for those people with both heart / cerebrovascular and
hypertension conditions. Although not identical, the two samples were extremely similar
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(and certainly not statistically different) in depression levels, premorbid IQ as well as
conditions such as hypertension and heart / cerebrovascular problems. Although BMI was
a factor planned to be matched across samples, the recruited samples did differ
significantly in body mass index. The demographic characteristics of the recruited sample
as compared to the earlier-recruited diabetic group are shown in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Demographic and medical history characteristics of the diabetic and control samples used in
analysis I.
Diabetes-free group Diabetic group
N 33 33
Mean age in yrs (s.d) 62.40 (9.62) 62.40 (9.62)
Male / Female ratio 19 / 14 19 / 14
Mean BMI (s.d) 27.00 (2.86) 30.67 (7.23)*
Mean depression /HAD (s.d) 3.70 (2.10) 3.94	 (2.96)
Mean NART errors (s.d) 15.30 (7.02) 16.53 (8.14)
On no medication (N) 16 16
On heart & hypertension med. (N) 5 5
On hypertension medication (N) 10 11
On heart condition medication (N) 2 1
Incomplete medication information 0 0
Key:- * p<.05
The data were initially screened for multivariate outliers. Both parametric and non
parametric correlations were then run to screen for high correlations between cognitive
factors and confounding variables such as age, IQ and depression. The reason for using
both parametric and non parametric correlational techniques was to ensure that all possible
confounding effects were detected regardless of each technique's shortcomings (e.g.
Pearson's r is affected by outliers, Spearman's rho is not particularly powerful).
Descriptive statistics were then obtained on each group's performance on the cognitive
tests followed by parametric analyses which controlled for the influence of the highly
correlating confounding factors on the measured variables.
 and excluded extreme cases.
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It was thought appropriate to both match groups and statistically control for the presence of
confounds. The reason for this decision lies on the effects that each procedure has on the
data. Matching samples on confounding factors has the effect of the groups being identical
in terms of these confounding variables. As such, any difference in performance between
the two groups is quite likely to be due to the independent variable rather than confounding
factors. At the same time however, differences within groups still exist. So, taking age as
an example of a confounding variable, if age correlates negatively with performance at a
memory test, then the older people within the diabetic sample will do more poorly than the
younger people with diabetes. The same would apply to the control people, the younger
controls' performance will be somewhat better than that of the older ones. This will be
evident in the variance seen 'within groups'. Statistically controlling for age however
removes this within- group effect and treats the data as if they came from people of a
similar age within each one group. So the net result is that although the between group
variance will remain unaffected by this manipulation, the within group variance will be
adjusted for differences due to confounds, within groups.
6.3.1.1.	 Screening correlations for effects of age, depression and IQ on cognitive
variables
Correlations between all measures revealed the influence of age, IQ and self reported
depression on most cognitive function measures. BMI also correlated with cognitive
factors.
Age correlated negatively with Digit symbol (r= -.55, p<.01), Logical Memory A
(r = -.29, p<.02) and B (r= -.28, p<.02) and WCST categories (r= -.31, p<.04) where the
older the participant the poorer their performance one each one of these tests. It positively
correlated with time to complete the Trail Making tests A (r= .37, p<.01) and B (r= .39,
p<.01) suggesting that older participants took longer to complete these tests.
Depression (HADS) correlated positively with the Subjective Memory Questionnaire
scores where the greater the score the higher the number of perceived memory problems
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(r= .29, p<.02) and with time taken to complete the SS7 test (r = .26, p<.04). Depression
negatively correlated with abstract problem solving (i.e. number of WCST categories
found), (r=-.36, p<.02).
Number of errors in the NART as a measure of premorbid IQ was correlated positively
with SS7 time (r= .28, p<.04) and negatively with Digits Backward (r=-.27, p<.04), Digits
Forward (r=-.29, p<.04) and Logical Memory B (r=-.39, p<.01) so that lower IQ scores
were associated with poorer complex attention, short term memory and verbal memory.
Finally, BMI was found to be correlated with some cognitive variables. As the two
samples of participants were not matched on BMI (the diabetic sample was heavier) it was
decided to identify correlations of BMI with cognitive variables and partial out this effect.
BMI was negatively related to Digits Forward (r= -.25, p<.05) and positively related to
Trail Making A time (r=.29, p<.03), B time (r=.27, p<.03) and performance at the
recognition component score of the implicit memory task (r=.28, p<.03).
As a result of the above analyses, where appropriate, the effects of the above confounds
were partialled out from inferential analyses in Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA)
analyses to statistically remove the influence of statistically significant confounds from the
variance models.
6.3.1.2.	 Descriptive analyses
In addition to the correlations reported above descriptives were obtained to examine the
presence of differences between the two groups in measures of cognitive functioning. The
results are shown below and have been screened for the presence of outliers and adjusted
for the effects of confounding covariates where appropriate (Table 6.4).
With the exception of digit span (Forward and Backward) where the diabetic group
appears to have performed slightly better than the control group, there is a trend for the
diabetic group to show a somewhat impaired performance in all other cognitive measures.
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Table 6.4: Means (and standard errors) of cognitive measures in each of the two groups
Measure Diabetic group
Mean	 (s.err.)
Control group
Mean	 (s.err.)
Digit Symbol 45.91 (1.37) 46.96 (1.33)
Digits Bck. 5.99 (.26) 5.95 (.24)
Digits Frw. 8.05 (.36) 7.32 (.35)
Log. Mem. A 9.63 (.56) 13.13 (.51)
Log. Mem. B 11.83 (.54) 12.12 (.52)
SMQ 111.55 (2.92) 110.20 (2.92)
SS7 time 45.02 (2.79) 36.83 (2.65)
Trail Making A 37.04 (1.63) 36.85 (1.61)
Trail Making B 86.32 (4.76) 83.01 (4.68)
Implicit completions .47 (.13) .69 (.13)
Explicit recogn.	 . 10.40 (.66) 12.03 (.66)
WCST categs. 3.62 (.33) 3.94 (.34)
WCST persev. 10.04 (2.19) 7.48 (.98)
6.3.1.3.	 Inferential analyses
The data were subjected to further analysis (ANCOVAs, independent samples t- tests and
chi squares) to examine whether the trends reported above were statistically significant
having controlled for the influence of age, IQ, BMI and depression where appropriate.
• Digit span and complex auditory attention tests 
Although IQ did not significantly co-vary with Digits backward (F (1,58) = 2.05, p>.05)
there was not a significant effect of diabetes on this variable (F (1 ,58) = .00, p>.05). A non
significant effect was also seen in Forward digit span (F (1 ,59) =2.05, p>.05) controlling for
the significant effects of IQ (F (1 ,59) =4.10, p<.05) and non significant effects of BMI (F
(1 ,59) =3.16, p>.05). There was however a significant difference in time taken to complete
Serial Subtractions of 7s (SS7) between the two groups (F (1,53) =4.52, p<.04) controlling
for the effects of IQ (F (1,53) =7.10, p<.01) and depression (F (1,53) = 2.98, p>.05).
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• Explicit memory measures and self reported memory questionnaire (SMQ) 
A significant difference was found in the number of items participants recalled from the
first story (story A) of the Logical Memory test. Controlling for age (F(l,57) =5.32 p<.03)
the diabetic sample was seen to be impaired in logical memory compared to matched .
controls (F (1,57) =21.26, p<.01). These differences however ceased to be significant in story
B (F= (1,61) .15, p>.05) controlling for IQ (F ( 1 ,61) = 8.21, p<.01). The explicit memory
component of the word stem completion task too yielded non significant differences (F
( 1.63) = 2.88, p>.05) controlling for BMI (F (1 ,63) =5.45, p<.03). When depression was
partialled out from the subjective memory questionnaire responses (F ( 1 ,61) = 6.93, p<.01)
there were no significant differences between the two groups (F (1,61) =28.87, p>.05).
• Visuomotor tests
Controlling for the effects of age (F (1,61) =27.04, p<.01) no differences were found in Digit
symbol (F (1,61) =.30, p>.05). Differences were found in neither Trail Making A (F (1,61)
=.00, p>.05) nor Trail Making B (F (1,61) =.23, p>.05) controlling for age (Trail Making A F
(1,61) = 1 6.56, p<.01 and Trail Making B F (1,61) =12.98, p<.01) and BMI (Trail Making A F
( 1.61) =1.15, p.<05, and Trail Making B F (1,61) =4.94, p<.04).
• Abstract reasoning
Differences were found neither in the number of perseverative errors seen in the WCST of
the two groups (t (43) = 1.07, p>.05) nor in the number of WCST categories identified by
each group. As the data were categorical a chi square test was applied (x2 =.09, d.f. = 1,
p>.05). However in both cases several subjects failed to complete the test; for example of
the 33 diabetic people, 9 failed to complete while of the 33 controls 11 failed to complete
the particular test.
• Implicit learning
Implicit leaning was demonstrated in both diabetic and control groups. In the diabetic
group the mean number of word stem completions was 0.54 (s.d = .83) while no list words
appeared in the stem completions of control data. This was evidence for implicit learning
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in the diabetic sample (t (32)= 3.76 p<.01). Similar results were obtained for the healthy
group (t (38) = 3.13, p<.01). Diabetes and control samples did not differ in the amount of
implicit memory they demonstrated(t (62) = 1.20, p>.05).
• Power matters
In general, for a multiple regression with two independent variables (i.e. a test resembling
in nature an ANCOVA with one IV and one covariate) 30 subjects would be needed per
condition for the test to detect a large effect, that is an effect where the difference between
conditions in 0.8 of one standard deviation. As the current samples consisted of N=33 each
they were judged to be sufficient to detect such an effect. Nevertheless, the statistical
program used (SPSS) gave power estimates for any one ANCOVA performed. These
values were, with the exception of the Digits Forward analysis where the model's power
was only 22%, very high ranging from 59.1% to 99.8%.
6.3.1.4.	 Summary
Overall there were no differences in cognitive performance between diabetic and healthy
participants in most tests of cognitive function with the exception of tests involving the
participants' ability to follow logical sequences in the short term, as seen in the Logical
Memory story A and serial Subtraction of 7s tests. Although there were small differences
in the cognitive performance of the two groups with the diabetic group showing a trend for
impaired performance compared to the healthy sample, these, were negligible.
6.3.2. Analysis 2
The purpose of the second analysis was to find out whether the effects seen in analysis 1
would be replicated with a larger sample which involved 33 healthy participants and 51
diabetic participants 33 of which had previously been matched with the healthy controls on
age, hypertension and existence of heart / cerebrovascular conditions.
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The rationale behind this second analysis is simple. It is proposed that the cognitive
difficulties identified in the diabetic literature may be, among other reasons, due to
methodological problems such as inappropriate or lack of control of confounding
variables. If strict control of confounds, as achieved by matching and statistical adjustment
in the present study, is responsible for the lack of significant effects then the use of a
nonmatched sample should lead to different conclusions and perhaps a greater number of
significant effects found between diabetic and healthy groups. If however the two samples
do not differ in terms of commorbidity, a replication of the previous results should be
possible, albeit with a larger sample.
This second analysis was performed on the same 33 control subjects and 51 diabetic
participants, 33 of which were matched with the control sample and 18 non matched.
Demographic and medical history characteristics of the samples used in this second
analysis are shown below. The 51 people with diabetes tested in the present analysis are
the same sample which was tested earlier (Chapter 5).
Table 6.5: Demographic and medical history characteristics of the diabetic and control samples tested in
analysis 2.
Diabetes - free group Diabetic group
N
Mean age in yrs (s.d)
33
62.40 (9.62)
51
61.51(10.38)
Male / Female ratio 19 / 14 29 / 22
Mean BMI (s.d) 27.00 (2.86) 30.73 (6.41)*
Mean depression /HAD (s.d) 3.70 (2.10) 4.08	 (3.02)
Mean NART errors (s.d) 15.3 (7.02) 17.84 (9.02)
On no medication (N) 16 20
On heart & hypertension med. (N) 5 11
On hypertension medication (N) 10 15
On heart condition medication (N) 2 3
Incomplete medication information 0 2
Key:- * p<.05
The incomplete medication information cases were diabetic patients with a heart condition who failed to
provide data as to the existence of hypertension or not. Knowledge of the fact that they had a heart condition
was included in the analysis of the above data.
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Although matching had not been intended it seems that there are no differences between
the two samples in terms of commorbidity. So, like the matched samples used in analysis
1, although not identical, the groups are very similar in age (t (82) = -.39, p>.05), depression
(too = .68, p>.05), IQ (too = 1.37, p>.05) as well as existence of heart! cerebrovascular
conditions (x2=1.04, d.f=1, p>.05) and hypertension (x 2=.25, d.f.= 1, p>.05). Like analysis
1 the diabetic sample was overall heavier than the control sample (BMI t(82) = 3.64, p<.01).
A replication of analysis 1 findings is thus expected.
6.3.2.1. Screening correlations for effects of age, depression and IQ on cognitive
variables
As before, confounds that correlated highly with cognitive variables were identified with
the intention to partial out their effects. Age, depression, IQ and BMI correlated with some
but not all cognitive variables.
Age correlated negatively with Logical Memory A (r-----.31, p<.01), Logical Memory B(r=-
22, p<.05) and Digit Symbol (r=-.53, p<.01). It was positively correlated with time taken
to complete Trail Making A (1—.42, p<.01) and B (r=.36, p<.01).
NART errors as a measure of IQ were negatively related to digit span both Forward (r = -
.34, p<.01) and Backward (r=-.33, p<.05), to Digit symbol completions (r=-.22, p<.05) and
Logical Memory B (r= -.38, p<.01). They were positively related to time taken to complete
the SS7 test (r=.27, p<.03).
Depression was positively related to number of reported subjective memory (SMQ)
problems (r=.27, p<.02) and negatively related to number of identified WCST categories
(r=-.33, p<.02).
Finally, BMI was related positively to Trail Making A time (r=.23, p<.04) and negatively
to Digits Forward although the significance level reached here was just over the
conventional 5% level (r=-.22, p=.051).
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As a result of the above analyses, where appropriate, the effects of the identified confounds
was partialled out from all inferential analyses.
6.3.2.2. Descriptive analyses
To examine any potential differences in the cognitive performance of the two groups,
controlling for confounds where appropriate and excluding outliers, means and standard
errors were computed. The findings are shown in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6: Means (and standard errors) of cognitive measures in each of the two groups
Measure Diabetic group
Mean	 (s.err.)
Control group
•	 Mean	 (s.err.)
Digit Symbol 44.86 (1.08) 46.75 (1.30)
Digits Bck. 6.25 (.25) 5.90 (.31)
Digits Frw. 8.02 (.28) 7.24 (.35)
Log. Mem. A 10.59 (.51) 13.19 (.63)
Log. Mem. B 11.37 (.48) 11.95 (.59)
SMQ 112.21 (2.51) 110.40 (3.14)
SS7 time 46.17 (2.40) 36.79 (2.81)
Trail Making A 39.47 (1.38) 36.82 (1.72)
Trail Making B 91.06 (4.36) 79.60 (5.37)
Implicit completions .42 (.13) .69 (.13)
Explicit recogn. 10.27 (.60) 11.67 (.57)
WCST categs. 3.54 (.27) 3.91 (.34)
WCST persev. 7.26 (2.19) 7.48 (.98)
Analysis 2 confirms that, with the exception of digits span where the diabetic group is still
seen to be performing slightly better than the controls, there is a trend for the diabetic
group to show a slightly impaired performance in all other cognitive measures.
6.3.2.3.	 Inferential analyses
Inferential testing (ANCOVAs, independent samples t- tests and chi squares) was carried
out to examine whether the trends reported above were statistically significant having
controlled for the influence of age, IQ , BMI and depression where appropriate.
137
The results of inferential testing confirmed the initial impression reported above that
although some differences do exist between the two groups, only very few are substantial
enough to be statistically significant. These results replicate exactly the findings of analysis
1, as expected, and are described in detail in the following subsections.
• Di..git span and complex auditory attention tests
Partialling out the effects of IQ which significantly co-varied with digits Backward (F (1,77)
= 9.24, p<.01) there were no significant differences between healthy and diabetic groups (F
(1,77) = . 78, p>.05). A non significant effect was also seen in Forward digit span (F (1,77)
=2.96, p>.05) controlling for the significant effects of IQ (F (1 ,77) =8.60, p<.01) and
nonsignificant effects of BMI (F(1,77) =2.08, p>.05). Like analysis 1, a significant difference
was found in time taken to complete Serial Subtractions of 7s (S S7) between the two
groups (F(1,68) =6.44, p<.02) controlling for the effects of IQ (F (1,68) =7.10, p<.01).
• Explicit memory measures and self reported memory questionnaire (SMQ) 
As before, a significant difference was found in the number of items participants recalled
from the first story (story A) of the Logical Memory test. Controlling for age (F (1 ,80) =7.79
p<.01) the diabetic sample was seen to be impaired in logical memory compared to
healthy, matched controls (F (1,80) = 1 0. 1 1 , p<.01). These differences again ceased to be
significant in story B (F (1 ,79) =6.63, p>.05), controlling for IQ (F (1 ,79) = 18.230, p<.01) and
age (F (1,79) = 9.68, p<.01). The explicit memory component of the word stem completion
task in this case too yielded non significant differences (482) = - 1.68, p>.05) as did the
Subjective Memory Questionnaire responses (F (1 ,79) =.20, p>.05) when depression (F (1,79)
= 7.07, p<.01) was partialled out.
• Visuomotor tests
Controlling for the effects of age (F (1,77) =49.82, p<.01) no differences were found in digit
symbol (F (1,77) =1 .2 1 , p>.05). Differences were not found in either Trail Making A (F(I,79)
=1.38, p>.05) nor Trail Making B (F (1,80 ) =2.74, p>.05) controlling for age (Trail Making
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A F(I,79) =27.11, p<.01 and Trail Making B F(1,80) =13.21, p<.01) and BMI (Trail Making A
F (1 ,79) =2.09, p.>.05).
• Abstract reasoning
Again, no differences were found in either the number of perseverative errors seen in the
WCST of the two groups (t (54) =- . 14, p>.05) or in the number of WCST categories
identified by each group (x2 =.71, d.f=1, p>.05)
• Implicit learning
Implicit learning was again demonstrated in both groups. In both diabetic and healthy
groups there was, again, evidence for more word stem completions in the implicit rather
than the control data (diabetic group t (50) = 3.89, p<.01, control group t (38) = 3.13, p<01).
As before, there was no significant difference in the mean implicit completions between
the diabetic and control groups (t (80) = - 1.69, p>.05) suggesting that both groups showed
similar amounts of implicit learning.
• Power matters
Like analysis 1, the statistical program used (SPSS) gave power estimates for any one
ANCOVA performed. These values were very high ranging from 66.8% to 100%.
6.3.2.4. Summary
The results of analysis 1 were perfectly replicated in analysis 2 using a larger sample of
similar commorbidity. Like findings of analysis 1, there were no differences in cognitive
performance between diabetic and healthy participants in most tests of cognitive function
with the exception of tests involving the participants' ability to mentally follow logical
sequences as seen in logical memory story A and serial subtraction of 7s.
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6.3.3. Analysis 3
The purpose of the third analysis was to further confirm that the results seen so far were
reliable and that previous studies that found numerous cognitive differences between
diabetic and healthy samples may have done so due to inappropriate or incomplete control
of confounds.
All previously recruited 33 healthy participants were compared with a group of N=18
nonmatched diabetic people. These 18 subjects had been previously tested on the same
cognitive tests as part of the study reported in Chapter 5 but had not been successfully
matched with control subjects recruited for the purposes of work presented in this chapter.
It is proposed that if participants were not matched on confounding factors and also if no
attempt was made to control for the influence of such confounds on cognitive performance,
a greater number of significant differences between diabetic and healthy samples would
emerge. It is also proposed that this may well be the case even in samples that could be
thought to be of insufficient sample size to detect a large effect. If on the other hand, no
differences are found in analysis where no strict control or matching has taken place, then
the findings seen in analysis 1 and replicated with a larger sample in analysis 2 may be
questionable. Demographic and medical history characteristics of the samples tested in
analysis 3 follow in Table 6.7.
Inspection of the demographic and medical history data appearing in Table 6.7 suggests
that here that no matching has taken place. This initial observation was confirmed by
inferential testing. Hence, some significant differences between the two samples in terms
of commorbidity were seen. For example, although the two groups are very similar in age
(t(49) = -.82, p>.05), depression (t(49) = .39, p>.05) and existence of hypertension (x2=.49,
d.f.=1, p>.05) they differ in IQ (t (49) = 2.01, p<.05) as well as existence of heart /
cerebrovascular conditions (x2 =6.18, d.f.=1, p<.01) and BMI (t (49) = 3.61, p<.01).
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Table 6.7: Demographic and medical history characteristics of the diabetic and control samples tested in
analysis 3.
Diabetes-free group Diabetic group
33 18
Mean age in yrs (s.d) 62.40 (9.62) 59.89 (11.76)
Male / Female ratio 19 / 14 10 / 8
Mean BMI (s.d) 27 (2.86) 30.82 (4.71)
Mean depression /HAD (s.d) 3.70 (2.10) 4.33 (3.18)
Mean NART errors (s.d) 15.3 (7.02) 20.17 (10.19)
On no medication (N) 16 4
On heart & hypertension med. (N) 5 6
On hypertension medication (N) 10 4
On heart condition medication (N) .	 2 2
Incomplete medication information 0 2
The incomplete medication information cases were diabetic patients with a heart condition who however
failed to provide data as to the existence of hypertension or not. Knowledge of the fact that they had a heart
condition was included in the analysis of the above data.
6.3.3.1.	 Descriptive analyses
Here, no attempt was made to control for the influence of any of confounds on cognitive
variables. The means and standard errors of the diabetic and healthy groups' cognitive
performance follow.
Table 6.8: Means (and standard errors) of cognitive measures in each of the two groups
Measure Diabetic group
Mean	 (s.err.)
Control group
Mean	 (s.err.)
Digit Symbol 43.39 (2.78) 46.88 (1.62)
Digits Bck. 6.22 (.62) 6.12 (.26)
Digits Frw. 7.83 (.51) 7.48 (.31)
Log. Mem. A 11.16 (1.15) 13.15 (.60)
Log. Mem. B 10.67 (1.24) 12.18 (.53)
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(continued)
SMQ 113.72	 (5.26) 111.30 (2.93)
SS7 time 51.62	 (6.39) 38.35 (3.27)
Trail Making A 43.72	 (3.07) 36.46 (1.77)
Trail Making B 99.63	 (9.98) 80.35 (4.19)
Implicit completions .33	 (.14) .89 (.21)
Explicit recogn. 9.39	 (1.01) 11.67 (.57)
WCST categs. 3.31	 (.43) 3.91 (.34)
WCST persev. 6.23	 (1.20) 8.27 (1.23)
The above data seem to suggest that with the exception of digit span where once more the
diabetic sample seem to be doing slightly better than the healthy control participants, there
is a strong trend for the diabetic group to show impaired performance in most cognitive
measures.
To confirm this apparent inflation in the differences in performance between the two
groups, difference scores (Diabetic means- Control means) were calculated for both
analysis 1 and analysis 3 responses. The change in difference scores between the two
analyses is given in the following graph.
It is evident that for the majority of cognitive measures the difference between diabetic and
healthy groups' mean responses is inflated in the analysis were no matching or control of
confounds took place (analysis 3).
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Graph 6.1: Mean diabetic - control differences in cognitive test results in analysis 1 (matched and controlled)
and analysis 3 (no matching or statistical control)
6.3.3.2.	 Inferential analyses
The above findings seem to suggest that several cognitive performance differences should
be expected to emerge in inferential testing. If indeed the diabetes-related cognitive
impairment seen in the literature is partly due to methodological reasons the results of this
current analysis where no attempt has been made to control or match participants on
confounding variables, should resemble past literature findings where cognitive test
performance of diabetic samples appears impaired compared to that of non diabetic
individuals.
• Digit span and complex auditory attention tests
In contrast to previous work, no significant differences were found in digit span (Digits
back. t (49) .15, p>.05, Digits Frw. t (49) = . 63, p>.05). A significant difference was found
however in time taken to complete Serial Subtractions of 7s (SS7) between the two groups
(t (43) = 2.05, p<.05).
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• Explicit memory measures and self reported memory questionnaire (SMQ1
No differences were seen in either of the Lo gical Memory tests (Log. Mem. A t (49) = 1.69,
p>.05, Log. Mem. B t (49) = 1.12, p>.05) or the Subjective Memory Questionnaire (SMQ t
(49) = . 44, p>.05). There were however significant differences in the explicit memory
component of the word stem completion task (t (49) = 2.12, p<.04).
• Visuomotor tests
No differences were found in digit symbol (t (49) = 1.08, p>.05). Differences were seen
however in both Trail Making A (t (43) = 2.05, p<.05) and Trail Making B (t (48) =2.09,
p<.05).
• Abstract reasoning
Like before, no differences were found in either the number of perseverative errors seen in
the WCST of the two groups (t (33) = 1.10, p>.05) or in the number of WCST categories
identified by each group (x 2 =1.86, d.f.=1 p>.05).
• Implicit learning
The mean implicit completion difference only just missed statistical significance (x2=
1.86, d.f.=1, p<.06).
• Power matters
A power analysis suggested that for the t-test analyses the power of the current study to
detect a large effect was 76.3%. If a medium effect was assumed then power of 38.72%
was calculated given the current sample sizes. If a small effect was expected then the
power of the current t-tests to detect an effect would be 10.27%. For the chi square tests, a
power of 57.24% was seen, assuming a moderate effect.
6.3.3.3. Summary
In analysis 3 no attempt was made to match participants on key confounding variables or
partial out their influence. The results of this analysis showed cognitive impairment of the
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diabetic group in SS7 (complex auditory attention and mental tracking), Trail Making A
and B (complex visuomotor attention), the recognition component of the implicit learning
test (explicit memory) and to a lesser and only just non statistically significant extent in the
implicit learning test (implicit memory). The cognitive difference findings of all three
analyses are summarised in Table 6.9 below.
Table 6.9: Summary of cognitive differences seen across three analyses
Group (N)
Diab.	 Control
Matching Confound control Sign. cog.differences
33 33 yes yes SS7, Log. Mem. A
33 51 yes yes SS7, Log. Mem. A
18 33 no no SS7, Trail A, Trail B,
Explicit recall,
Implicit completions
6.4. Discussion
6.4.1. The importance of control and matching
Three sets of analyses took place in an attempt to investigate whether there is cognitive
impairment in people with Type 2 diabetes as compared to diabetes -free matched controls
(analyses 1 and 2) and non matched controls (analysis 3).
The results of analyses 1 and 2 were identical. Analysis 1 involved both matching of
participants on age, male / female ratio and the existence / absence of hypertension and / or
heart / cerebrovascular conditions as well as controlling for the influence of confounds
such as IQ, depression and age. Analysis 2, using a larger sample of not intended to be
matched yet almost identical in commorbidity participants, and controlling for the above
mentioned confounds replicated the results seen in analysis 1 perfectly.
Thus, in both analyses, differences were found between diabetic and diabetes - free
participants in two tests of cognitive function, the Serial Subtraction of 7s test as a measure
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of complex auditory attention and mental tracking and the Logical Memory A test as a
measure of verbal memory and ability to remember logical sequences.
Analysis 3 findings, as expected, failed to replicate analyses 1 and 2 results. Here, no
serious control of confounds took place and participants were not matched on any of the
earlier identified key confounding variables. It is argued that as a result of these intended
methodological shortcomings a greater number of significant differences in the cognitive
performance of the two groups were found, replicating findings seen in the literature which
suggest an extensive cognitive impairment in Type 2 diabetes as compared to healthy
controls.
So in analysis 3, diabetic participants were seen to be impaired in several tests of cognitive
function suggesting more wide - spread cognitive impairment than the results of the first
two analyses. Hence, here there was cognitive impairment seen in the diabetic sample in a
series of tests, namely Serial Subtraction of 7s (auditory attention and mental tracking),
Trail Making A (sustained visual attention), Trail Making B (complex visual scanning and
mental shift), the explicit recognition component of the implicit learning test (recognition
memory) and finally implicit memory, though the statistical significance of this latter
finding was just over the conventional 5% level (p=.06).
The above findings are suggestive of the importance of methodological control in such
studies. There are two reasons for that. Firstly, it seems that control of confounds and
matching are essential in order to avoid unnecessary inflation of the differences seen
between the cognitive performance of diabetic and diabetes - free participants. Graph 6.1,
showed that when comparing the mean cognitive differences between diabetic and diabetes
- free samples in analyses 1 (matched and controlled) and 3 (nonmatched and no control of
confounds) such differences were massively inflated in the latter case. This suggests that
unless careful control of confounds is undertaken as suggested by Strachan et al., (1997)
superficially large and consequently statistically significant differences are likely to
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emerge between diabetic and control samples giving the wrongful impression of extensive
cognitive decline in Type 2 diabetes.
Secondly, when careful confound control and matching has taken place differences in
cognitive performance that would go undetected in a non Controlled study (e.g. in analysis
3, failure to find differences in Logical Memory due to the lack of control of the effects of
IQ, age and depression on this variable) are more likely to reveal themselves.
The first important finding arising from the analyses performed here is the importance of
appropriate statistical and methodological control of confounding factors.
6.4.2. The analyses 1 and 2 findings
Analysis 1 results suggested that people with Type 2 diabetes may be impaired in tests of
Logical Memory (i.e. ability to remember a verbal logical sequence in the short term) as
well as Serial Subtraction of 7s (i.e. ability to monitor and mentally manipulate a logical
numerical sequence). No other cognitive test yielded statistically significant findings
suggesting that other complex cognitive processes such as abstract reasoning and ability to
modify behaviour in response to feedback (WCST), simple and complex visuomotor
attention (Trail Making A and B), sustained complex visual attention (Digit Symbol),
attention efficiency (Digits forward), mental double tracking (Digits backward) and
implicit memory (implicit learning task) are unaffected by the illness.
These findings are very interesting for two reasons. Firstly, they to some extent support
and to some extent refute previous work. Secondly they have implications for diabetes self
management activities.
The finding that people with Type 2 diabetes may be impaired in verbal memory is not
new. In fact several researchers have discovered similar results using a variety of different
cognitive tests purporting to measure verbal memory in one way or another (Perlmuter et
al., 1984; Moorodian et al., 1988; Reaven et al., 1990; U'Ren et al., 1990; Gradman et al..
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1993; Helkala et al., 1995; Dey et al., 1997). Only very few have failed to trtitti41 §Lti&lii
differences (e.g. Jagusch et al., 1992; Lowe et al., 1994; Atiea et al, 1995) I/W*6\W tqbe ffigtt
and third of these studies didn't examine diabetic participants with hypertension Oir Ilimt
cerebrovascular conditions and could hence be considered to have looked at atypiicoll
samples, while the second study had age and sex ratio differences and did not =Ike wiry
attempt to achieve premorbid cognitive matching (Strachan et al., 1997).
Interestingly the difference in logical memory between diabetic and nondiabetic samp e5
ceased to exist when it came to recall of Logical Memory Story B. There is no evidence tto
suggest that Story B is any different to Story A and indeed, Lezak (1995) reports that there
is no reason to assume that there may be order effects in the administration of the two
stories (even if there were, one would expect order effects to appear equally in both
diabetic and diabetes - free samples so the initial difference in performance across orottps
should remain in Story B). An inspection of mean recall scores in the two stories shows
that the diabetic sample had a mean recall score of 9.63 items in Story A as compared to
11.83 in Story B, an improvement seen in a difference of + 2.2 items. The healthy sample
showed the reverse pattern where initially they recalled on average 13.13 items in Story A„
this mean recall score reducing slightly by 1 item in Story B. It is evident that while the
diabetic group improved in the task with practice the diabetes - free group's performance
slightly deteriorated in Story B yielding the difference between the two nonsignificant
This finding might be related to Helkala's (1995) findings where diabetic participants
seemed to be better than control subjects at utilising a 'second chance' to recall words
having been previously reminded them. In that study, although diabetic people were seen
to be impaired in a word list recall task, they were better than the control sample at
recalling words when a reminder procedure took place. In the present study, the diabetic
sample seemed to be showing a similar pattern where they were able to show a comparable
performance to the control sample's in Story B, having perhaps overcome the initial
difficulty of dealing with a completely unfamiliar task namely the recall of a novel short
story. To the extent that the two stories are comparable in measuring verbal memory it
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seems plausible to suggest that the difficulties people with Type 2 diabetes face in such
tasks may have more to do with the nature of the task rather than an organic inability to
remember logical sequences; given a second chance at a similar verbal memory task their
performance improved to be comparable to that of a diabetes - free sample.
Nevertheless the fact that there was an observable deterioration in their ability to initially
recall logical sequences has implications for diabetic peoples' self management attempts.
To the extent that remembering physicians' verbal instructions on self care regime
procedures, and especially changes (novel material), is part of diabetes self management
activities it may be argued that people with Type 2 diabetes may be less likely to recall and
hence follow such regime recommendations. Non adherence, or rather poor self care,
might in those cases then come about by a cognitive deficiency rather than other
psychosocial variables. Following this finding, it could also be that poor self care and
subsequent poor glycaemic control might in turn impair logical memory function, in a
manner suggested by Gradman et al's. (1993) research who found that improved glycaemic
control was related to verbal memory improvements.
Hence, if people with diabetes have problems remembering logical sequences in the short
term changes may be necessary in situations where they are given and are asked to
remember information relating to management of Type 2 diabetes. For example, patient-
physician consultations might benefit from repeated rather than single exposure of material
(e.g. medication prescriptions) that the diabetic patient is asked to remember. It may also
help if checks were performed at the end of the consultation to ensure that the diabetic
person can indeed recall what s/he is expected to recall. Obviously such suggestions are
only preliminary and need to be explored and evaluated by further research.
Significant differences were also found in the diabetic sample's performance in the Serial
Subtraction of 7s. Here diabetic participants seemed to find it more difficult than their
diabetes - free counterparts to mentally manipulate a logical numerical sequence under
timed conditions. So although there were no differences between healthy and diabetic
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samples in the amount of errors made in the task (SS7 errors diabetic mean = L18,
nondiabetic mean 1.06, p>.05) the diabetic sample took significantly longer to subtract 75
away from 100. This would suggest difficulty in the domain of auditory attention, mental
tracking and flexibility.
Interestingly, no differences were found in another task purporting to measure similar
cognitive processes namely the digits backward test. Thus, although both tests involve a
similar task i.e. the backward recall of numerical sequences and are said to measure similar
cognitive processes (verbal auditory short term recall, mental tracking and mental
flexibility) diabetic participants were seen to have difficulties with one test (the SS7) but
not the other. To the extent that an elementary comparison may be made it seems that
although both tests involve the backward recall of numerical sequences SS7 involves
mental tracking of a logical numerical sequence (100 -7 = 93 - 7 = 86 -7 = 79 etc.) as
opposed to a random numerical (e.g. 5 - 2 - 7 - 3 - 1) sequence seen in digit span
backward. If indeed this is an important difference between the two tasks the role of logical
sequences seems to play a major part in explaining the diabetic sample's cognitive
difficulties; just like in Logical Memory A where the recall of a logical verbal sequence
seems to be impaired, logical numerical mental tracking seen in SS7 also seems to be
plagued with difficulties as opposed to no difficulties seen in a random, non logically
flowing numerical sequence recall required in the backward digit span.
However, although both SS7 and backward digit span purport to measure the same
cognitive processes there are small differences between the two tasks which mainly lie in
the way they are administered and might perhaps prohibit a direct comparison of
performance in each. SS7 is scored in response time while in digits backward although the
reading out of the digits by the examiner is timed at a rate of 1 digit per second, recall of
the digit sequence per se is not timed. Instead in digit span the response variable is number
of correctly recalled sequences. As a result the above suggestion needs to be treated with
caution and further research into this area is necessary before firm conclusions are drawn.
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If, however, there are differences in mental tracking and mental flexibility between
diabetic and diabetes - free people as the SS7 test results suggest, this finding has
implications for diabetes self management. To the extent that diabetes may interfere with
peoples' ability to remember and indeed manipulate verbal material in the short term,
patient - physician consultations may be subject to difficulties with understanding and
indeed remembering to keep up with self care recommendations. Patients with diabetes
might then be more likely to keep up with self care recommendations if, in addition to a
verbal explanation that would target short term recall processes, they were also given
written instructions to take away which laid out clearly the content of the verbal
communication that took place with the diabetes consultant.
There are further implications for self care regimes. It can be argued that a certain amount
of mental flexibility is necessary to adjust to e.g. blood glucose readings fluctuations and
subsequent changes to the insulin taking regime for those treated by insulin. If diabetic
people have real difficulties with cognitive processes involved in short term mental
flexibility, then again they may be less likely to make the right self care decisions, hence
appearing to be 'non adherent'. This is an area worth exploring further in subsequent
research.
No other cognitive test yielded significant differences between diabetic and nondiabetic
samples, controlling for the effects of confounding factors. For example, no differences
were found in digit span, thus replicating the findings of many other researchers who have
used the particular test (e.g. Perlmuter et al., 1984; Mattlar et al., 1985; Moorodian et al.,
1988; Cerizza et al., 1990; Helkala eta!., 1995; Lowe et al., 1994; Atiea et al., 1995; Assisi
et al., 1996). In fact, only U'Ren et al. (1990) has ever found differences in forward digit
span and only Tim et al. (1987) has ever found differences in backward digit span. The
former study however did not provide any information on whether their sample included
people with conditions such as depression or ischaemic heart disease and if so whether the
researchers controlled for these. In the latter study this effect was no longer statistically
significant when the researchers partialled out effects of depression.
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No differences were found in tests of self reported memory problems (SMQ), explicit word
recognition (implicit learning test, recognition component) or implicit memory. The first
finding resembles that of Tun et al., (1987) who also found that the apparently inflated
subjective memory problems seen in a group of people with Type 2 diabetes failed to
remain statistically significant when the effects of depression were partialled out. As far as
the recognition as well as implicit memory test are concerned, to the best of the author's
knowledge no other study has used a similar recognition or implicit memory test so a direct
comparison can not be made.
Visuomotor attention tests also failed to yield any significant differences. So, like Helkala
et al., (1995), and Gradman et al., (1993) no differences were found between the two
groups in either Trail Making A or Trail Making B, having controlled for the confounding
effects of age and BMI. Reaven et al., (1990) however did find such differences in both
Trail Making A and B which suggested that people with Type 2 diabetes were impaired in
visuomotor tasks. Gregg et al., (2000) also found differences in Trail Making B. Reaven et
al., however, did not appear to have controlled for the confounds that have been identified
here and which when not controlled for (as in analysis 3) they result in statistically
significant differences between healthy and control participants. Gregg et al.'s study used a
somewhat liberal way of establishing whether the sample tested had in fact Type 2
diabetes, so findings from this study may be questionable.
In the same domain, the present study failed to find any differences in the digit symbol test
thus replicating the findings of others (e.g. Cerizza et al., 1990; Gradman et al., 1993;
Atiea et al., 1995). However some studies have found diabetic participants to be impaired
in this test (Perlmuter et al., 1987; Reaven et al., 1990; Gregg et al., 2000). In the first
study however the diabetic sample had a greater prevalence of depression and hence the
findings need to be interpreted with caution. In the latter study (abstract only available at
time of writing) no information was given as to exclusion criteria, demographic
characteristics of the samples (apart from the fact that they were all older females) or
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control of confounds undertaken. Methodological difficulties with Reaven's and Gregg's
work were identified earlier.
Finally, no differences were found in abstract reasoning as measured by the (Modified)
Wisconsin test. Apart from Reaven et al., no other study has used the particular test.
Reaven reported a difficulty seen in the abstract reasoning of people with diabetes in their
apparent failure to modify their behaviour in response to feedback. In the present study
there were no differences in either the number of WCST categories identified (abstract
reasoning) or ability to modify behaviour in response to feedback (perseverative errors)
suggesting that these cognitive abilities are intact in people with diabetes. Given however
the relatively large proportion of people who failed to give full data for this test - 27.3%
(N=9) of the diabetic sample and 33.3% (N=11) of the control sample- such findings may
be indicative of an underlying difficulty with the test per se. A firm conclusion about the
usefulness of the WCST in diabetes - related research with older adults can not be made at
this stage.
6.5.	 Summary
Overall some cognitive impairment was found in people with Type 2 diabetes as compared
to an age, sex and other condition - matched sample of diabetes - free participants, and
controlling for the effect of confounding variables. The identified cognitive difficulty
seems to lie in verbal memory and ability to recall (Logical Memory A) or manipulate
(SS7) logical sequences in the short term. These difficulties have implications for diabetes
self management activities which require auditory attention, verbal memory and mental
flexibility.
The widespread cognitive deficit in Type 2 diabetes reported in the literature has not been
replicated. This, it is argued, may be due to the strict methodological and statistical control
of confounds seen in the present study as suggested by recent literature reviews (e.g.
Strachan et al., 1997; Stewart and Loilitsa, 1999). It is hence argued that previous research
findings may have been prone to Type 1 errors where the apparent cognitive impairment
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found might have been due to methodological reasons. However, the current study might
also have suffered from methodological difficulties; the fairly small sample size of the
present work might have precluded the detection of additional confounding effects of age,
depression and IQ. If these were present, they may have masked true cognitive dysfunction
effects which the current study has failed to find. As such, the possibility of a Type 2 error
in the current findings is acknowledged.
The need to develop a set of widely accepted criteria for appropriate control of
confounding factors likely to impinge upon research in Type 2 diabetes is apparent. Until
researchers agree on what factors ought to be routinely controlled for in research with
people with diabetes, pathologising findings of supposedly widespread cognitive
impairment in this area may be too premature a conclusion to make. At the same time,
until a decision is reached on exactly what psychometric tests may and may not be
appropriate for use with people with Type 2 diabetes, direct comparisons across studies
will be unreliable if at all possible and hence a definitive answer as to whether people with
Type 2 diabetes are cognitively impaired may not be forthcoming.
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Chapter 7
The effects of time and category frame on reporting autobiographical
information about dietary and exercise habits: are self reports bias-free?
7.0. Summary
The present chapter examines the accuracy of self reports of the frequency of healthy and
unhealthy behaviours over the recent past. In doing so, the Summary of Diabetes Self Care
activities questionnaire is modified and used with diabetes-free undergraduates in two pilot
studies which examine the usefulness of two different research designs in eliciting accurate
self reports. The chapter starts with a literature review of work on inaccuracies in people's
self reports of autobiographical information, focusing in particular on the effects of time
and category frame of the question on participants' responses. The results of two pilot
studies with undergraduate volunteers are then reported and discussed. The findings serve
the basis upon which accuracy of self report of self care activities in people with Type 2
diabetes is examined, in the following chapter.
7.1.	 Introduction
Chapter 5 showed that there is a modest relationship between certain aspects of cognitive
function and self care activities in Type 2 diabetes, which suggested that cognitive factors
may be useful in predicting such self management activities. The results of the work
presented in Chapter 6 suggested that Type 2 diabetes may not be associated with
extensive cognitive dysfunction however complex auditory attention and verbal memory
may perhaps be impaired.
Throughout the work presented so far, diabetes self care was assessed using Toobert and
Glasgow's (1994) Summary of Diabetes Self Care Activities (SDSCA) questionnaire. The
SDSCA was used as a quick and easy to use self-report instrument, in order to assess
participants' self care activities in the past 7 days. The SDSCA asked participants to
estimate behavioural frequencies separately for each major area of diabetes self care (diet,
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exercise, glucose testing, medication taking) and at different levels of specificity; for
example, participants were asked about both their overall efforts to limit their calorific
intake as well as more specific questions pertaining to fat and fibre intake. Given the
authors' evidence for the reliability and validity of the SDSCA (Toobert and Glasgow,
1994), as well as the lack of any other widely accepted measure of diabetes self care, it was
thought appropriate to use the measure in this research.
The fact that self reports may not be the most reliable way to ascertain diabetes self care
however is well known (e.g. Johnson, 1992 for a review). The numerous problems with
self report methods in general are also well documented and may include cognitive factors
such as poor or biased recall of the behaviour in question, social desirability issues and
questionnaire-specific factors such as inappropriate phrasing of the question.
As a result, it was thought appropriate to have a more thorough look at the extent to which
the SDSCA might be a useful instrument to use in both clinical and research practice
taking into consideration cognitive and questionnaire - specific issues and problems
inherent in the use of such self reports.
7.1.1. An introduction to autobiographical memory research
People with Type 2 diabetes may be asked to give behavioural frequency estimates
concerning their past diabetes self care activities in, for example, consultations with their
diabetes physician or nurse. In doing so, it is normally assumed that they are able to
comprehend the question they are asked (e.g. are aware which foods may be high in fat and
therefore able to say whether they generally restricted their fat intake), that they have
encoded and can retrieve the events which they are asked about (e.g. can create and have
access to a 'mental note' of whether they took all prescribed medication and can
confidently retrieve such a note accurately) and that their responses will be free from bias
in terms of, among other factors, social desirability or misplacement in time. This section
introduces current findings on the systems and processes thought to be involved in
people's attempts to answer behavioural frequency questions about their health.
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In answering behavioural frequency questions the person with diabetes, like anyone else,
will normally rely on their autobiographical memory. Autobiographical memory is a term
used to describe a special type of episodic memory, namely the memory system
responsible for episodic events which are self- referent. As Brewer (1988, p.22) proposed,
autobiographical memory is simply 'memory for information related to the self.
Several types of autobiographical memory are said to exist (e.g. Conway, 1990 for a
review) and an extensive theoretical discussion of research in this area is beyond the scope
of this thesis. Cohen (1996) however provided a useful summary of autobiographical
memory features that are helpful in distinguishing it from episodic or semantic memory.
According to Cohen (1996) there are four main characteristics of autobiographical
memory.
Firstly, autobiographical memories are related to the self and in this sense may contain
biographical facts (e.g. a patient with diabetes remembering when they were diagnosed
with the illness). Secondly, and following Brewer's (1986) and Barclay and Wellman's
(1986) very influential work in the field, such memories will vary in the degree to which
they are accurate copies, modified reconstructions or complete misrepresentations of the
original event (e.g. remembering the exact details of the last visit to the diabetes clinic or
relying on schematic knowledge about diabetes clinic visits in general to aid recall of the
last visit). Thirdly, autobiographical memories may be specific (e.g. remembering the visit
to the diabetes clinic where it was decided to switch from tablets to insulin treatment
regimens) or generic (e.g. remembering visits to the diabetes clinic in general). Finally,
such memories are said to be experienced from either the actor's perspective or by viewing
the events that happened from the outside, like an observer looking onto someone else's
life episodes.
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7.1.2. When things go wrong... Sources of inaccuracy in autobiographical memory
With memory systems and processes arguably being diverse and complex, it follows that
there will be numerous sources of inaccuracy in autobiographical memory. For example,
there may be inaccuracies in how autobiographical memories are encoded, stored,
reconstructed and retrieved. In addition, there may be further problems with specific
autobiographical processes that are often required in answering health-related questions
such as being asked to date a particular health event or being asked to estimate the
frequency by which a health behaviour is performed. The sections that follow briefly
review findings that show how people answer behavioural frequency questions, and where
things can go wrong in answering such self-referent questions. In doing so, the focus will
be on four major areas of research: i) processes operating at the encoding, storage and
retrieval stages of estimates of behavioural frequencies ii) the effect of specific frequency
estimation strategies on successful recall of behavioural frequencies iii) the effect of time
frames on recall of such frequencies and finally iv) questionnaire — specific factors that
may affect estimates of behavioural frequencies.
7.1.2.1. Encoding, storage and retrieval processes
The first and most obvious problem affecting people's recall of autobiographical .
information might be that the information that is asked for is not originally encoded, hence
is simply not there to be retrieved. For example, in a recent study by Brittingham, Lee,
Tourangeau and Willis (1999) parents' self-reports about their children's vaccinations were
examined immediately after the parents' exit from the paediatrician's office. It was found
that even as the parents were leaving the doctor's office, their recall of what vaccinations
their child had received only minutes ago were no better than guessing rates. As
immunisations are a routine procedure for parents of young children in the US, where the
study was conducted, it was suggested that the parents had never actually encoded what
would later be classified as an autobiographical event. This finding suggests that just
because self-referent episodes may take place, people may not always encode them hence
making the recall of such events at a later stage rather improbable.
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Assuming that events are encoded, the next stages where accuracy of report may be
compromised are in storage and retrieval of such events. The main difficulty with storage
and retrieval processes seems to be that rather than storing individual episodes of one's life
in distinct stores which are easily accessed, the current widely accepted view (e.g.
Tourangeau, 2000, for a review) is that, whatever the specific organisation of long term
memory, similar events are likely to be clustered together and then a generic memory
about such similar events likely to be formed which, although retains the gist of the event,
normally excludes the event's details.
This idea is not new. Since the original work of Bartlett (1932), it has been established that
once an event is encoded it may not be stored in its intact form but may be .enriched by
schematic attributions or post hoc explanations to reflect what the person thinks 'ought to'
have happened. For example, Conway and Ross (1984) looked at how people evaluated
their skills before and after the administration of a self-help program. They found that
those who had been on a waiting list and had not yet received the program showed no
discrepancies between how they originally rated their skills and subsequent (3 weeks later)
recall of such original ratings. Those on the self help program, however, rated their pre -
self-help program skills after taking part in the program as lower than they had done before
they took part, thus subjectively inflating the amount of program-related skill improvement
they experienced. This finding suggests that subsequent actions can affect the accuracy of
autobiographical information stored.
Barclay and Wellman (1986) also provided evidence for storage of autobiographical
information being modified with time. They studied students' autobiographical memory
processes, as measured by daily records and ratings of memorable events, during a 4
month period and followed this initial observation period with memory tests over the
subsequent 2.5 years. They found that students' autobiographical recall was both accurate
and inaccurate. It was accurate in that 95% of recorded autobiographical events were
accurately recalled 1 year after they took place. This figure dropped slightly to 79% after a
2.5 year delay suggesting that overall, self-referent events are fairly well recognised after
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long time intervals. The suggestion that memory is also rather inaccurate however, comes
from the analysis of students' performance on 'foil items'. Foil items are events that the
participants did not actually experience during the data recording period, but that the
researchers created from information that participants had given the experimenter about the
data - collecting period, such that the event could have plausibly happened. It was found
that as retention interval increased subjects' accurate rejection of such foil events
decreased. Failure to reject a foil item as not having taken place in subjects' past was also
related to similarity of such foil items to actual records. So, if the foil item was quite
similar to what had actually taken place (and was thus a likely event), students were more
likely to say that it was an event from their autobiographical past.
The authors' explanation for this observation suggests that what people remember about
their past is a collection of what actually occurred along with schema-driven ideas as to
what is plausible to have occurred. Since the very first memory experiment carried out by
Ebbinghaus in 1885, it has been established that as retention interval lengthens detailed
information about the event decays. In this case, people rely more on generic knowledge to
guide them through recollections of past experiences therefore yielding their reports more
inaccurate. In Barclay and Wellman's words ' ... everyday recollections may be integrated
into personal knowledge structures that give meaning to seemingly isolated everyday
occurrences. People know in general the sorts of events that have occurred in their life,
even though most past episodes cannot be reproduced from memory in complete detail
....what one remembers then is, at least in part, what could have happened or should have
happened in one's life' (1986, pp. 100-101).
The above is also true for report of health related information. For example, Means and
Loftus (1991) examined strategies that people use to recall information about past health
events as well as the accuracy of recall of such events. They compared subjects' self
reports with actual medical records of experiences of such health events. They found that
similar health events were less likely to be recalled while one-off, atypical events were
much better recalled.
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Cohen and Java's (1995) work supported the same view. In a study looking at both
younger and older people's ability to recall a range of health events including symptoms,
illnesses, injuries, visits to health professionals, treatments and medication taking, they
found that the greater the number of health events experienced the fewer were recalled,
suggesting that they all blended in a generic representation of 'health problems'. Events that
had been rated as severe (and thus atypical and distinct) on the other hand, were recalled
more frequently than events rated as non-severe. It was also found that, surprisingly, older
(70+ years old) people's recollections of health events were in fact more accurate than
younger subjects', perhaps because the older people attached greater importance to their
health events and thus made them more likely to stand out from generic memories of
mundane events.
Such conclusions have also been drawn in and confirmed by diary case - studies of
autobiographical recall where distinctive, salient or particularly emotionally charged events
have been known to be recalled better than routine or recurring events (Linton, 1978;
Wagenaar, 1986) although the accuracy of such recall seems to decay with time.
The issue of time seems to be a fairly important factor in determining the extent to which
both typical and atypical information will be recalled. In a laboratory experiment using
scripts of typical and atypical actions, Graesser, Woll, Kowalski and Smith (1980) found
that subjects' recall of atypical, scripted (although not directly experienced and hence not
strictly autobiographical) actions was better but only for very short (1/2 hour after
presentation) periods of time. In longer recall periods (1 week) atypical activities were
quickly forgotten and script-relevant activities were fairly easily remembered. These
findings were explained by the authors using the 'script - pointer plus tag' idea. This
proposed that when an event is encoded the memory trace contains two pieces of
information; a pointer which points to the script that best matches the event (e.g. a visit to
the diabetes clinic) and a tag which signifies any unusual, atypical details relating to the
event (e.g. a visit to the clinic which was particularly stressful because the patient had to
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wait for a very long time before they were seen). While tags are fairly distinctive and thus
likely to be easily remembered in recall attempts in the short term, unless rehearsed, such
atypical 'tag detail will be lost in the long term and replaced by schema-typical 'script -
pointer' information instead.
In a more recent study also examining the effect of time on retrieving dietary information,
Smith, Jobe and Mingay (1991) concluded that when participants are reporting dietary
information they are relying on generic knowledge rather than a specific recollection of
unique dietary - specific events. In their study, they asked subjects to keep a diary of their
diet for either 2 or 4 weeks. Participants were then tested on their dietary recall for the
recording period immediately after it, 2, 4 or 6 weeks later. The results showed that there
were higher match rates and shorter intrusion rates (i.e. items from outside the recording
period intruding in the recall of dietary intake for that period) for shorter periods of recall
suggesting that for short periods 'specific memories contribute to reports' (p.282).
However, longer time periods were subject to large intrusion errors suggesting that for
such periods recall relies on schematic, generic ideas about one's diet rather than specific
item - search and recall. The authors argued that for long time frames (e.g. past month,
year) people's dietary reports are reliant solely on schematic generic information about
their diets, while in shorter time frames self reports may benefit from recollection of some
detail about their dietary behaviour, in addition to generic reports.
It may be argued that asking people to keep records (e.g. a diary) about autobiographical
events may actually give participants reporting for shorter periods an unfair advantage as
the act of recording events may make them more salient hence more likely to be recalled at
a future date. This, however, does not seem to be the case. In a study by Thompson
(1982), students kept a diary for self- referent events for 14 weeks for both themselves
and, unknown to their roommate, their roommate. At the onset of the study, the students
(but not the roommates) knew that their memory for such events would later be tested and
also knew that they would only be tested on material they recorded in their diary. Subjects
further rated recorded events for memorability. Like previous work, memorable events
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were better recalled than non memorable events. The most interesting finding was,
however, that when the subjects' and their roommates' recall for self referent events for that
period was tested, the diary keeping subjects' recall of their self- referent past was no
better than that of the unaware, non diary - keeping roommates', suggesting that neither the
knowledge of a forthcoming test of recall of previous events nor the act of keeping a
written record of such self referent events enhances subsequent recall. A similar finding
has also been reported in a study by Smith Jobe and Mingay, 1990 (in Smith, Jobe and
Mingay, 1991).
In summary, the main cognitive system that is involved in answering behavioural questions
about one's past is that of autobiographical memory. Like any other cognitive system,
autobiographical memory is sometimes prone to give rise to inaccurate recollections about
one's past. The research that has been briefly reviewed so far suggests that one of the
reasons why such inaccuracies occur may lie in the schematic organisation of
autobiographical memory. Recall of events that might have taken place in a given past
period is more accurate in shorter recall intervals but can be contaminated by post hoc,
schema — driven interpretations of the particular event, or generic ideas about it in longer
time frames. Also, although highly distinct events are quite likely to be recalled, ordinary,
recurring, mundane events are not normally preserved in detail in longer time frames.
7.1.2.2. The issue of frequency strategies
Numerous studies in the literature have shown that another source of error in estimating
how often people engage in a particular behaviour may lie in the, now widely accepted,
notion that people rely on a range of (rather than a single one) frequency estimation
strategies each of which are differentially successful in producing accurate estimates. The
idea that in answering questions about how often they engage in a particular behaviour,
people rely on a straight 'recall and count' strategy, which involves bringing into mind the
exact time frame they are asked about (e.g. past 7 days) and counting single episodes of
occurrence of a particular behaviour within that frame, has been shown to be falsifiable
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(Blair and Burton, 1987; Burton and Blair, 1991; Menon, 1994; Brown, 1995; McnorD,
Raghubir and Schwarz, 1995).
People rely on a range of recall and estimation strategies in making behavioural frequency
judgements and the strategies they choose (and subsequently the accuracy of their
estimates) depend on how frequent the behaviour to be estimated is, as well as how similar
or dissimilar instances of the particular behaviour are to one another (Menon, 1994). It has
been shown that when the recall of particular behavioural instances is limited to 5 or fewer
vivid, memorable events people tend to use episode enumeration strategies, i.e. recalling
specific episodes of the event they are asked about and counting how many of these
episodes have occurred in a given period. The probability of relying on such strategies
however declines with increasing frequency of events and for frequent events people rely
on direct estimates of frequency instead (Blair and Burton, 1987; Burton and Blair, 1991;
Menon and Sudman, 1989 in Means, Swan, Jobe and Esposito, 1994; Conrad, Brown and
Cashman, 1998). These estimates may take the form of 'rate estimation' i.e. simply
estimating the perceived frequency of a behaviour for a given recent period, 'rate and
adjustment' where rate information is adjusted up or down to account for exceptions in the
general rate and 'general impression estimates' where people think about the behavioural
event in question in terms of vague, non numerical quantifiers such as 'a lot', 'most of the
time' etc. Regularity and similarity of events also affects the choice of frequency strategy
with regular and similar events likely to be estimated while irregular and dissimilar more
likely to be enumerated (Menon, 1994; Brown 1995). Such processes however, are also
said to be affected by other factors such as the amount of accessible information in
memory at any one time (Smith, Jobe and Mingay, 1991; Menon and Yorkston, 2000) and
contextual cues (Menon, Raghubir and Schwarz, 1995). For example, the latter study
found that respondents were more likely to be influenced by questionnaire response
alternatives in reports of moderately regular and irregular behaviours for which rate base
information was perhaps unavailable, but not affected by questionnaire response options
for estimates of frequent behaviours.
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In choosing to adopt a particular frequency estimation strategy it is known that people will
be prone to specific estimation errors. This is a reasonable suggestion to make; if similar
frequent events are likely to blend together then it may be difficult for people to be exact
about the specific instances of occurrence of such similar events. On the other hand,
infrequent, distinctive events will be quite likely to be remembered as unique episodes and,
at least in short time periods, likely to be enumerated accurately. The widely accepted view
in the field seems to be that frequency estimation accuracy is a function of both regularity
and similarity of events as well as type of frequency strategy chosen. It has thus been
proposed that `... for low frequency events, people will tend to use an episodic recall
strategy that will lead to accurate results, just as rate — based estimation leads to more
accurate results for high frequency events' (Menon and Yorkston, 2000, p. 76). Obviously,
if that was true for all frequency judgements made, then people's frequency estimates
would be overall extremely accurate and reliable. This is not the case as instances of over /
under reporting of behavioural frequencies are widely published and will be discussed
shortly.
In summary, people will use different frequency estimation strategies for different types of
events. They will also be more or less accurate in their estimates as a function of whether
or not they used an appropriate-for-the-event strategy. Such strategies will differ with
event regularity, similarity and detail availability, with episode enumeration strategies
being used for relatively distinctive, infrequent events and rate estimation strategies used
for fairly frequent, similar events. Over or under estimation of frequencies will occur if the
strategy chosen is not compatible with the event-to-be-recalled characteristics.
7.1.2.3. The issue of time frames
One factor that seems to be implicated in under or over reporting is the time frame
participants are asked to consider in estimating frequencies of particular behaviours. It has
been found that longer time frames lead people to underestimate behavioural frequencies
while shorter frames tend to lead to overestimation.
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For example, Bachman and O'Malley (1987) asked high school students to report the
frequency of their past licit and illicit drug use over the past month and over the past year.
It was found that when subjects were asked about their monthly estimates these were four
times greater than would be estimated from their yearly estimates; so where the yearly
estimates should have equalled the monthly estimates x 12, they equalled the monthly
estimates x 4 suggesting that students over reported in shorter time periods but under
reported in longer ones. Unfortunately, no verification of such frequencies was available so
the authors do not provide an answer to the question as to which period provides the most
accurate data.
Loftus, Klinger, Smith and Fiedler (1990) found a similar effect in a study asking people to
report the frequency by which they had engaged in a series of health procedures such as
having their blood pressure read, or receiving a new prescription. The time frames used in
the questions were 6, 2 and 1 month(s) and participants were exposed to two time frames
each (in an attempt to see if asking two questions about the same thing may itnprove
accuracy ) e.g. in a 6-2 time frame they were asked a set of questions about the past 6
months followed by the same set of questions being asked with reference to the past 2
months. Loftus et al., then checked participants' medical records to establish the accuracy
of their reports. They found gross overreporting of preventive health behaviours for both
the 2 and 6 month time frames. They noted that (p.339) '... it was common for reported
procedures to be twice as great as actual procedures and in at least one instance, the
reported procedure was almost four times as great as actual'. This effect was even more
pronounced in the 6 month condition with overreporting rates ranging from 7 to 20%
above that of the actual frequencies of events.
More recently, Hoorens and Harris (1998) examined the issue of over / under reporting in
students' self reports of a range of healthy and unhealthy behaviours e.g. eating red meat
rather than chicken and fish, not eating fresh fruit, doing sports etc. They asked students to
estimate behavioural frequencies in number of days / times a particular behaviour had
taken place, for a month and a year. They found that frequency estimations for a month
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were significantly higher than monthly rates calculated from frequency estimations for a
year and that was true for both healthy and unhealthy behaviours, although, in this case no
verification data were available.
These findings tend to suggest that regardless of whether the behaviour to be estimated is
healthy or not, people will overestimate behaviours in the short term and underestimate in
the long term. Although most studies have not actually established which of the two
estimates (shorter vs. longer time frame) is the most accurate of the two (by e.g.
comparison to verifiable record of frequencies) it follows that at least one of such
estimates will be unreliable. The cognitive literature on survey responding has identified
several reasons why people's estimates vary as a function of time frame and in doing so
has suggested that reports in the shorter and more recent period may be more accurate
(Sudman and Bradbum, 1973).
The first and most obvious explanation for the phenomena reported above is that with
longer time intervals people's memory of specific events decays (Ebbinghaus, 1885). As a
result, it is reasonable to propose that more events may have been forgotten in longer time
frames hence the observed underreporting of such events in such longer time frames.
A second explanation lies in a phenomenon known as 'telescoping'. Telescoping refers to
people's tendency to report events as having happened more recently than they actually
did. For example, if a person with diabetes is asked whether they visited their diabetes
physician in the past 6 months and they answer 'yes', yet records show that they visited 7
months ago, then the visit is said to be forwardly telescoped.
It is known that telescoping is more pronounced in longer than shorter time frames. In four
diary — keeping experiments Thompson, Skowronski and Lee (1988) found substantial
telescoping for events that were only two months old and the amount of telescoping was
greater for greater time frames. Huttenlocher, Hedges and Prohaska (1988) confirmed this
finding. They showed that students' reports of the number of films they had seen in i) the
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entire academic year and ii) the recent academic quarter, varied with a tendency to over
report frequencies for the present quarter when asked about the quarter rather than when
asked about the whole year. When compared with actual recorded frequencies of film
watching for the given period, it was found that students in both the quarter and yearly
estimates had forwardly telescoped. However, only those reporting for the shorter time
frame had, in addition, enriched their reports about the shorter time frame with more actual
occurrences of film watching thus producing a more accurate (yet inflated) behavioural
frequency record.
Thirdly, it has been suggested that the more detail people can recall about an event the
more recent they will think it is. In this case, in having to date the event, people are likely
to date it as having happened more recently hence inflating reports about behavioural
frequencies taking place in shorter (recent) time frames. Brown, Rips and Shevell (1985)
asked subjects to date explicitly news stories of the past two decades. They gave people
lists of headlines that were published within a period of 20 years and asked them to say
both when the events had happened as well as how much they knew about the events. They
found that events that subjects rated as being more knowledgeable about were dated as
being more recent than events they rated as knowing fairly little about. This finding is in
parallel to Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) availability heuristic which proposed that
people base estimates of the probability, or frequency, of an event on ease upon which
information about the event can be brought to mind; events that are fairly easy to bring to
mind hence accessible are rated as more frequent (and in the case of Brown et al's study as
more recent) than events that are difficult to think about. Taken together it may be
proposed that events people can bring to mind with ease will be rated as more frequent and
more recent than events they remember less vividly or (think they) know little about.
Finally, the way people see time frames as fitting within one another e.g. month being a
subcategory of a year, a day being a subcategory of a week etc. may also explain why
estimates of behaviours obtained from shorter time frames are usually greater than those
obtained from longer ones. Fiedler and Armbuster (1994) showed that frequency illusions
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occur when people try to split a given category and estimate frequencies within each
subcategory. In a series of experiments involving geometrical shapes they found that
splitting an event category into smaller subcategories increased the reported frequency of
events for the given category. This phenomenon increased with inaccurate memory for the
event. If this principle was applied to the health studies reported earlier, it may explain
why splitting the year into smaller categories (months) may lead to inflated frequencies in
the shorter, split category frame (month) and to underreporting in the whole category
(year).
In summary, it has been shown that people's behavioural frequency estimates will vary as
a function of the time frame they are asked to think about. The overall agreement seems to
be that people will give lower behavioural frequency reports for longer time frames.
Reasons behind this may have to do with memory decay in longer time frames, stronger
forward telescoping in longer time frames, dating errors as a function of event
memorability and category split effects.
7.1.2.4. Questionnaire - specific factors
Much research has looked at how people, in addition to their own knowledge about a given
autobiographical event, also rely on the questionnaire at hand to help them answer
behavioural questions about their past. This section examines some of the survey,
instrument — specific factors that are said to be influencing respondents' attempts to
accurately recall autobiographical information.
Recently, Schwarz (1999) provided a useful review of those psychological cognitive
factors that pertain to self- reporting of autobiographical behaviours. In summary there are
issues about the respondent's understanding of the question asked as well as their ability to
accurately estimate or count specific instances of the relevant behaviour they are
questioned about.
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For example, in most survey questions it is assumed that the respondent's interpretation of
the question is the same as that of the researcher's. For example, if a question asks for the
frequency with which a person with diabetes engaged in 20 minutes of physical exercise in
the past week, the interpretation of the term 'physical exercise' by the respondent should
match that of the researcher for accurate results to be obtained. If the researcher's notion of
'physical exercise' is equivalent to a gym workout but the respondent's interpretation is
more of walking the dog round the block, then respondents' answers may be unreliable and
invalid as they are likely to provide information about different behaviours to those that the
researcher / clinician was enquiring about.
The time frame of response options respondents are given to think about is also
particularly important in determining the meaning of the question. For example, it has been
found that when participants are provided with response options pertaining to longer time
frames (e.g. week, month) rather than shorter ones (e.g. day) they tend to interpret
questions as seeking more distinctive behaviours in the former case and less intense
experiences in the latter. Schwarz, Strack, Muller and Chassein (1988) asked subjects to
think about the frequency by which they felt 'really annoyed'. They found that when the
response scales ranged from 'less than once a year' to 'more than every 3 months' subjects
interpreted the question to be enquiring about more severe cases of annoyance than when
the response scale ranged from 'less than twice a week' to 'several times a day'.
A similar phenomenon is seen in the case of rating scales. The range of the rating scale
provided is likely to provide respondents with information as to what type of behaviour the
researcher is interested in. For example, Winkielman, Knauper and Schwarz (1998) asked
participants to report how frequently they got angry under two conditions i) using a short
(week) and ii) a longer (year) time frame. They found that subjects thought that the
researcher was interested in angering experiences that were more infrequent and more
intense if asked about the longer time frame while less severe, and more frequent cases of
anger were reported when asked about the shorter time frame. Similar findings were
reported in a health — related study which asked participants to say how often they 'cleaned
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their teeth' (Gaskell, O'Muircheartaigh and Wright, 1995, in Schwarz, 1999). It was found
that when participants were presented with longer time response formats (i.e. 'less often
than once a year' to 'more than once a month') they interpreted the question to mean
'having one's teeth cleaned by a dental hygienist'. When shorter time response formats
were presented however (i.e. response options ranging from 'less than once a week' to
'more than once a day') the meaning participants gave to the question changed to refer to
'brushing one's teeth'. These findings suggest that the wording of the question and the
specific time frame subjects are provided with in terms of response options, influence their
interpretation of ambiguous terms of the question.
In addition, it has been suggested that participants will normally rely on the rating scale
used by the survey question if they themselves have not enough easily accessible episodic
information about the event. For example, in a series of experiments (Schwarz, Hippler,
Deutsch and Strack 1988; Scwharz and Bienias, 1990) subjects were asked to report how
much time they, and 'the average undergraduate' spend watching TV, using two sets of
response alternatives. In one set, subjects were faced with shorter time frame response
options ranging from `up to half an hour' to 'more than 2.5 hours'. In another condition the
response alternatives ranged from `up to 2 hours' to 'more than 4.5 hours'. It was found
that when presented with the low response alternatives subjects reported less TV watching
than subjects given the higher frequency scale suggesting that in both cases respondents
were influenced by the response options available to them. However, this effect was less
pronounced when respondents estimated frequencies for oneself and most pronounced
when estimating frequencies for the 'average student'. Assuming that a respondent will
have more information available for behavioural frequencies pertaining to the self rather
than 'the average student', it seems reasonable to propose that the observed smaller
reliance on the given response scales seen in behavioural estimates given for oneself was
due to more information being accessible about self frequencies rather than frequencies
about the 'average student'.
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Finally, in a recent study examining the self reports of problem drinkers (Hays, Bell,
Gillogly, Hill, Giroux, Davis, Lewis, Damush and Nicholas, 1997) the researchers found
that the more precise response options the survey instrument adopted (e.g. asked about the
past 7, 30, 90 days') the more accurate the obtained alcohol behavioural frequencies. When
vague response options were used (such as 'several days', 'a few days' and so on) less
accurate data were obtained. This finding is in support of similar findings in the literature
which propose that the use of vague terms such as 'few', 'many', 'regularly' which may
lead to different interpretations by different respondents, should be avoided (Martin, 1982;
Baumrind, 1983, both in Hays et al., 1997).
In summary, it has been shown that characteristics specific to the questionnaire may be
used by respondents in order to answer behavioural frequency questions. The research that
has been reviewed so far suggested that people will interpret a given question differently
on the basis of the response alternatives provided, but that such a process will be less
pronounced when enough episodic information pertaining to the event at hand is available.
7.1.3. Using the Summary of Diabetes Self Care Activities (SDSCA) Questionnaire to
investigate some of the above issues
The literature reviewed above is suggestive of the possibility of vast errors affecting any
instance where people are asked to self report about the frequency they have engaged in
particular behaviours.
Errors in self report are obviously a serious matter especially in situations where erroneous
self reports may lead to inaccurate diagnoses of health problems or inaccurate health
advice being given. In the case of Type 2 diabetes it seems obvious that patient
autobiographical errors in their self reports of their diabetes self management activities
may lead to serious problems in managing the illness in an optimal way. For example, if a
person with Type 2 diabetes gives erroneous autobiographical information about their
medication taking patterns over the recent past, upon which a change in medication
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regimen is subsequently decided, it is obvious that in such cases diabetes self management
self report errors can prove dangerous.
Errors in diabetes self management self report have not been systematically explored. One
of the reasons for this may be that until recently a reliable, valid, quick, easy and widely
acceptable method to assess diabetes self management did not exist. However, Toobert and
Glasgow's (1994) SDSCA has passed general reliability and validity tests and in that sense
is a possible candidate for a precise, and at the same time easy to use, self report measure
of self management efforts. To that extent, it was decided to use the SDSCA as an
instrument to explore the possible existence of errors in diabetic participants' self reports
of their dietary, physical activity, medication and glucose testing efforts. The purpose of
exploring self reports in Type 2 diabetes using the SDSCA was two-fold; firstly it would
be useful to explore whether diabetic self reports as obtained by the SDSCA are relatively
error —free and in that sense the SDSCA can be used routinely in clinical practice as a
reliable means of collecting self care information. Secondly, as the SDSCA is a measure
likely to be used in research with Type 2 diabetic samples it would be important to be
aware of limitations of its use in terms if its susceptibility to self report biases.
The extensive testing of the general issue of self report errors in diabetes self management
is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, based on the findings reviewed above the
issue of time frames (e.g. Hoorens and Harris, 1998) affecting self reports (lower
behavioural frequencies reported in longer time frames for both healthy and unhealthy
behaviours) as well as the issue of the effects of splitting a category on estimating event
frequencies of the category event (e.g. Fiedler and Armbuster, 1994) were thought to be of
great concern in the case of Type 2 diabetic self reports. The reason for this is really quite
simple. If a diabetic person is likely to give the diabetes physician significantly different
self reports of past diabetes self management activities, as a function of i) the time frame
the physician enquires about (e.g. past week vs. past month) and ii) the precise term the
physician uses to describe the recent past in terms of whether it is a whole or a split
category (past week vs. past 7 days), it is important that we establish whether diabetic self
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reports are subject to variability brought about by time frame and category - split
differences. If this is the case, the time frame that is likely to yield the most accurate
behavioural frequencies needs be identified.
In exploring the above issues and in light of the research reviewed in this section, it was
thought sensible to design and run two pilot studies, using undergraduate students as
participants, to examine what methodology would be most useful in answering the above
questions while at the same time preserving the original SDSCA format as much as
possible.
The first pilot version (Pilot 1) was designed to adopt a similar design to that used by
Hoorens and Harris (1998) whereby participants were asked behavioural frequency
questions about two time frames (a shorter and a longer one) at the same time point. In
doing so it was thought important to avoid deviating from the time and category frames
that the SDSCA currently adopts.
The current SDSCA format adopts a split category frame in asking respondents to think
about the past 7 days (a split category) rather than the past week (a whole category). If
Fiedler and Armbuster's (1994) work is applicable to reports of behavioural frequencies
using the SDSCA, then it would be expected that asking participants to consider the past
week rather than the past 7 days should lead to a deflation of behavioural frequencies in the
former as compared to the latter format. It was thus decided to explore both a 'past 7 days'
and a 'past week' version of the SDSCA in a category split manipulation.
The time span literature reviewed earlier suggested that lower behavioural frequency
reports will be obtained if people are asked to report their behaviour over longer rather
than shorter periods of time. Several explanations for this observations were reported,
including ideas such as telescoping (e.g. Thompson et al., 1988), event dating errors as a
function of the vividness by which the event is represented in memory (e.g. Brown et al.,
1985), and memory decay in longer time frames (e.g. Wagenaar, 1986). However there
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does not seem to be any consensus in the literature as to how long a 'long time frame'
should be before the previously reported factors come into play. In an attempt to explore a
time frame that was longer than the currently adopted SDSCA 'past 7 days' yet short
enough to i) be practically easy for data collection purposes ii) not deviate too much form
the currently adopted SDSCA format and iii) resemble a time frame likely to be used in
clinical practice, it was decided to ask participants to think about the 'past month'.
Previous research (e.g. Hoorens and Harris, 1998) has asked participants about precise
numbers of behavioural events that have taken place in a specified time frame. Unlike
previous research however, the original SDSCA response options ask people about
percentages of behavioural frequencies rather than more exact responses. To the best of the
author's knowledge such behavioural frequency response formats have not been used
previously.
There are however advantages in using a more general response format such as the one
adopted by the SDSCA. Firstly, the data are fairly easy to collect and compare as no
conversion of responses (e.g. monthly and weekly data being translated into days) is
required in order to compare records across different time frames. That is, if someone
estimates their sweets' and desserts' consumption to be about 25% of the time in a week it
follows that the same percentage should be given for a month. Secondly, such general
behavioural frequency estimates may resemble the type of estimates seen in clinical
practice, e.g. a patient with Type 2 diabetes being asked about general estimates of their
self care activities in the recent (week) and more distant past (month). Finally, to
drastically change them would necessarily change the current SDSCA format, which
would mean evaluating an instrument that was extremely different to the one originally
developed and established to be reliable and valid. As a result, it was thought necessary to
preserve the current SDSCA response options format as much as possible.
A disadvantage of the above research methodology however is that frequency accuracy
will remain an unresolved issue as no verification of behavioural frequency reports is
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possible. The second pilot version (Pilot 2) was designed with verification in mind. This
version adopted an identical method to Pilot 1 in terms of reporting weekly (or 7—day) and
monthly records of behavioural frequencies, however participants were additionally asked
to fill out the (appropriately modified) SDSCA daily for a week before completing the
weekly and monthly measures at the same point as the Pilot 1 participants. The daily
records could then serve as a record against which the accuracy of the subsequently
collected weekly and monthly reports could be compared. Filling out the SDSCA daily for
a week is a similar activity to keeping a diet — diary, which has been shown not to affect
subsequent responding about the same period (Thompson, 1982). Taking the past week as
a record of the 'typical' week and using it to give estimates of behavioural frequencies
about longer time frames is a practice which has been justified in previous research and has
been used in the literature (e.g. Blair and Ganesh, 1991).
In summary, two pilot versions of investigations of the time span and category split effects
using the SDSCA were designed (see Fig. 7.1). The first explored the time span and
category split effects using a design similar to Hoorens and Harris (1998) which did not
offer any evidence as to the accuracy of self reports. The second pilot study incorporated,
in addition to the design seen in Pilot 1, a daily record —keeping stage which would later
serve as a record against which weekly and monthly estimates could be compared.
Figure 7.1: The research designs adopted in Pilot studies 1 and 2.
Pilot 1 
Time 	 	 Day 8
Estimates about the past week (or past 7 days)
Estimates about the past month
Pilot 2 
Days 1-7
Daily records of diet and
physical activity kept
Day 8
Estimates about the past week (or past 7 days)
Estimates about the past month
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7.2.	 Pilot 1 Research design and method 
7.2.1. Design
The effects of category split (week vs. 7-day) and time span (short vs. long as seen in
weekly -or 7-day- vs. monthly records) on participants' frequency estimates of dietary and
exercise habits were explored in a 2 x 2 mixed design where the category split factor was
between subjects while time span was a within subjects factor.
7.2.2. Participants
Sixty - two psychology and cognitive science undergraduates were recruited on a voluntary
basis. The cognitive science undergraduates (N= 26, female /male ratio 18 / 8) had a mean
age of 24.62 years (s.d. 8.39) and the psychology undergraduates (N= 36, female / male
ratio 29 / 7) a mean age of 25.37 years (s.d. 7.30). All participants were neve as to the
purpose of the study and were offered course credit for participating.
7.2.3. Materials
A modified version of the Toobert and Glasgow (1994) Summary of Self Care
Questionnaire was used.
Modification of the measure that was used with the students involved elimination of the
items enquiring about medication taking and glucose testing (original items nos. 9 -12 ) as
well as rephrasing of certain dietary care and exercise items. The first dietary item, which
enquired about keeping up with a 'recommended diet' was excluded as was item no.7 of the
original version, which enquired about exercise recommendations by the participant's
doctor. The rest of items on diet (original scale items nos. 2 - 5) and exercise (items nos. 6
and 8) were retained with slight changes in their wording to make them appropriate for use
with non diabetic participants. For example, original SDSCA item 2 which asked about
calorie limitations 'as recommended in healthy eating for diabetes control' was re-worded
in the modified SDSCA to ask about 'following a generally considered healthy diet'.
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Finally, both the general instructions on top of the questionnaire and specific terms in each
item's wording were modified in accordance with the research design, to enquire about
either the 'past week' or 'past 7 days' in the category split condition and the 'past week (or
7-days)' and the 'past month' in the time span manipulation. All the modified versions for
each condition as well as the original version of the measure can be found in Appendices
B1-B2.
7.2.4. Procedure
Participants were recruited and tested in groups at the start of a timetabled lecture. They
were told that their participation would involve completing anonymously and
confidentially two short questionnaires that asked about their dietary and exercise habits
over the recent past. Allocation to the week or 7-day condition was random. Following
completion of the first measure (week or 7 day) the completed questionnaire was collected
and the monthly measure was handed out for completion. Although no formal time limit
was imposed this procedure did not exceed 20 minutes. In the end, participants were
thanked and fully debriefed.
7.3.	 Results
Questionnaire data were scored, collated and entered in SPSS for analysis. Initial screening
took place to ensure that no data input errors had occurred and any such errors were
corrected. Exploratory and inferential analysis then followed. As the data were in the form
of ordered interval-based categories there was concern that they might be violating the
assumptions for parametric testing. However in the absence of a nonparametric equivalent
test that will deal with both main effects and interactions and given that ANOVA is
considered in the field to be a fairly robust test, it was decided to proceed with parametric
inferential analysis, correcting where appropriate in the case of homogeneity of variance
and / or confidence level violations. Figure 7.2 shows the terminology that will be adopted
interchangeably throughout, for simplicity's sake:
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Figure 7.2: The terminology used in each condition of the first pilot study
Condition 1 (week - month) 
Time 1
(weekly estimate)
Time 2
(monthly estimate)
month)Condition 2 (7-day -
---10.Time 1
(7-day estimate)
Time 2
(monthly estimate)
7.3.1. Descriptive analyses
Descriptives were computed separately for both the week - month condition (condition 1)
and the 7 day - month condition (condition 2), for each item, as well as for overall diet
(average of four dietary responses) and exercise (average of responses to two exercise
items) behavioural estimates. A table of the results for each item in each condition follows
where a higher mean suggests a higher percentage of behaviour took place. A reminder of
the content of each item is given as a footnote to this table.
Table 7.1: Mean (and s.d.) for dietary and exercise behavioural frequencies as estimated in weekly and
monthly (condition I) and 7-day and monthly (condition 2) formats.
Condition 1 (N=26) 	 Condition 2 (N=36)
Item weekly
estimate
mean (s.d)
monthly
estimate
mean (s.d)
7-day
estimate
mean (s.d)
monthly
estimate
mean (s.d)
1 50.96 (23.96) 65.39 (23.53) 48.61 (25.32) 50.00 (22.36)
2 54.81 (26.48) 61.54 (19.01) 54.86 (24.51) 55.56 (20.80)
3 41.35 (21.15) 43.27 (21.86) 40.28 (24.11) 36.81 (20.25)
4 40.39 (25.57) 37.50 (20.31) 26.54 (21.12) 29.07 (21.40)
5 33.65 (31.58) 36.54 (27.60) 35.42 (34) 38.89 (30.15)
6 19.23 (27.67) 21.15 (22.01) 24.31 (30.76) 27.08 (28.09)
All.dt 56.01 (18.07) 61.54 (16.46) 59.38-(16.94) 59.72 (13.81)
A1l.exr.26.44 (27.69) 28.85 (22.23) 29.86 (30.51) 32.99 (26.75)
Note: All.dt = overall diet, All exr.= overall exercise
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XXX: past week, past 7-days, past month as appropriate
Item 1: What percentage of the time did you follow what is generally considered a healthy let?
Item 2: During the past XXX what percentage of your meals included high fibre foods such as firc§1}D rood§„
fresh vegetables, whole grain bread, dried beans and peas, bran ?
Item 3: During the past XXX what percentage of your meals included high fat foods such as butter, -cc -
cream, oil, nuts and seeds, mayonnaise, avocado, deep-fried food, salad dressing, bacon, oilher nlit-catt
with fat or skin ?
Item 4: During the past XXX, what percentage of your meals included sweets and desserts such as pie,
cake, jam, soft drinks (regular not diet drinks), biscuits ?
Item 5: Over the past XXX, what percentage of the time did you participate in at least 20 mins. of physical
exercise ?
Item 6: Over the past XXX, what percentage of the time did you participate in a specific exercise session
other than what you do around the house or as part of your work ?
It seems that there is great variability in behavioural frequency estimates, as seen in the
fairly large standard deviations observed in each case. Despite these, the emerging pattern
of results seems to suggest that, in general, respondents seem to:
• report higher behavioural frequencies for longer time frames (month vs. either week or
7 day) when questioned about their general healthy diet habits (item 1), their healthy
food intake (item 2) and their exercise habits (items 5 and 6).
• provide answers that, when re-coded where appropriate and combined to form overall
'healthy diet' and exercise scores (All.dt, and All.exr.), seem to also overestimate for
longer time periods (month) as opposed to their past week or 7-day estimates.
• underestimate monthly frequencies of unhealthy behaviours (item 3: high fat foods,
item 4: sweets / desserts) but do so differently in each condition. So the weekly / month
participants seem to underestimate their past month as opposed to their past weekly
estimates for sweets / dessert consumption but not for high fat foods, while the 7-day
month condition shows this pattern for high fat foods but not desserts.
7.3.2. Inferential analyses
The above pattern of results was further explored in inferential testing. Mixed factor
ANOVAs were used to test for main effects of time span (shorter vs. longer time frames as
seen in week or 7-day vs. month estimates) and category split group (7-day vs. week
estimates) as well as for an interaction between the two (group x time) on responses to
each item. Bonferroni corrections were used where appropriate to investigate differences
further, in post hoc comparisons. These findings are described below.
-3I1C-- week - month
estimate (condition 1)
.43P 	
 7-day - month
estimate (condition 2)
week I/ 7day	 month
Time span
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Items 2 (high fibre foods), 3 (high fat foods), 5 (20 mins. exercise) and 6 (non housework
activity) as well as participants' overall exercise estimates yielded neither significant main
effects nor significant interactions, suggesting that such items were quite robust to both
time and category split manipulations. Estimates on item 1 (healthy diet), 4 (sweets) and
overall diet however yielded some unusual results which are shown in the graphs that
follow:
• Item 1 (healthy diet): There appeared to be both a significant main effect of time span
(F (1,60) = 9.48, p<.01) and a significant interaction (F (1 , 60) = 6.44, p<.05) with
participants overreporting in the month condition as opposed to the shorter time frame.
These results are shown in Figure 7.2:
Figure 7.2: The effects of time span and category split effect on estimates of healthy diet over shorter (week
or 7-day) and longer (month) time frames.
Given the difficulty of interpreting findings when both a main effect and an interaction are
significant, simple effects of time span were explored further at each level of the category
split factor. It turned out that, as the graph above suggests, there were no significant
differences between shorter and longer time frame estimates in the 7-day - month condition
(t (35) = -.36, p>.05) however there was a difference between shorter and longer time
frames in condition 1 i.e. the week - month condition (t (25)=5.09, p<.01).
45
week I/ 7day	 month
Time span
25
4() —
...
35
▪ 30 —
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• Item 4 (sweets / desserts consumption): A main effect of category split was seen where
those who were exposed to the week - month condition gave consistently higher
estimates than those exposed to the 7-day - month condition (F 0,60) = 4.44, p<.05). No
effects of time span (F( 1,60)=.10, p>.05) were seen. The interaction that seems to be
suggested in Figure 7.3, was not statistically significant, (F(l ,60)-- 3.05, p>.05).
Figure 7.3: the effect of category split effect on estimates of sweet and dessert consumption over shorter
(week or 7-day) and longer (month) time frames. Week - month condition respondents gave consistently
higher estimates of sweets / desserts consumption than their 7-day - month counterparts.
week - month
estimate (condition 1)
	  7-day - month
estimate (cohditic.m 2)
• Overall diet: Finally, when participants' dietary scores were re-coded and combined to
provide an overall behavioural estimate of the percentage of time they have engaged in
a healthy diet (i.e. followed a healthy diet, consumed high fibre foods and did not
consume high fat foods or sweets) over the past week (or 7-days) and the past month,
participants in both category split conditions initially appeared to overreport healthy
behaviours in the past month (F (1 ,60)=4.25, p<.05). However, when the data were
explored further it was obvious that this apparent effect of time span was really due to a
massive change in week vs. month estimates of people in condition 1 (t (25) = 3.11,
p<.01) rather than condition 2 where no significant difference was seen in estimates at
shorter and longer time periods (t(35) = .17, p>.05). An interaction between time span
and category split missed significance (F (l,60) = 3.30, p=.07). See Figure 7.4.
week - month
estimate (condition 1)
-0- 	
 7-day - month
estimate (condition 2)
week / 7day	 month
62 	
61—
60 —
59—
58—
57—
56—
55 	
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Figure 7.4: The effect of time on estimates overall healthy eating. Condition 1 participants over reptuated
healthy diet estimates in the past month as compared to the past week.
Time span
7.3.3. Summary
It seems that with the exception of items 1 (healthy diet) and 4 (sweets / desserts) as well
as participants' overall healthy diet scores as computed from their responses to all 'diet'
questions, the items were not subject to time span, category split effects or an interaction of
the two.
7.4.	 Discussion 
The obtained results suggested that estimates in both conditions were fairly robust to both
time span manipulations and category split effects. Respondents seemed to be
uninfluenced by either the time span (shorter vs. longer periods) they were reporting
behavioural frequencies for, or the time category (week; whole category, 7 days; split
category) they were asked to think about, when reporting behavioural frequencies of high
fibre intake, high fat intake and physical activity. In contrast, some effects of time category
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(week vs. 7-day), time span, and a combined effect of the two were seen in items enquiring
about sweets / desserts consumption and overall healthy diet activities.
When participants were asked to report the percentage of time that they followed what is
generally considered a healthy diet, people's responses to the question framed in the past
week where lower than their estimates about the past month. This observation was also
seen, though to a lesser (but not statistically reliable) extent, in responses of participants
who were exposed to questions about the past 7-days and the past month. It thus seemed
that there was overreporting of healthy behaviours in longer time frames but that was the
case only for participants who had previously considered their behaviour in the past week
(rather than 7-days) and month. The same, overreporting of healthy dietary behaviour in
longer time frames by condition 1 participants, was also seen when participants' responses
to all dietary items were re-coded appropriately and averaged to produce a 'healthy diet'
overall score.
These findings are in contrast to findings reported in the time span literature where longer
time frames seem to be yielding lower behavioural frequencies than shorter time spans
(e.g. Hoorens and Harris, 1998). One possible explanation may lie in the fact that previous
research asked about participants' behavioural frequencies in terms of specific number of
days / times that they engaged in a particular activity, rather than percentages of
behavioural frequencies which may have invited more generic knowledge - based answers.
If this is the case, then it may be that when participants are asked about their dietary
behaviour over the past week specific instances of departure from a healthy diet are easily
accessible (Graesser et al., 1980), however, in thinking about the past month such instances
may well be less well recalled. As such, people may have been tricked into thinking they
followed a healthier diet than they actually did in the shorter, more recent period.
In addition, a (reverse) category split effect was observed in the item asking about
participants' unhealthy eating habit of sweets / desserts consumption whereby, people in
condition 1 (thinking about the past week rather than past 7-days and the past month) gave
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consistently higher behavioural frequency responses than people in condition 2. There are
two reasons why this finding may have arisen.
Firstly a methodological confound could have been involved whereby although
participants in both week-month and 7-day - month samples were undergraduate students,
one group (condition 1) included psychology and the other (condition 2) cognitive science
undergraduates. It may well be that the obtained result is simply a methodological artefact
reflecting differences in unhealthy eating habits between the two groups of students. In
absence of verification records this may be an explanation that should be cautiously
accepted.
The second explanation has to do with the category split effect although, based on the
reviewed literature, such an explanation would propose that people in the split category (7-
day) condition should be overestimating consumption of sweets and desserts as compared
to subjects in the whole category (week) condition. The opposite effect was seen in this
pilot study. This is a surprising finding and should be replicated further before any
explanations about it are generalised. If however it is to be taken as reliable, it could be
that telescoping is playing a role here; it could be that splitting a category into sub-
categories (week to 7 days in condition 2) reduces the chance of material outside the split
category slipping in, by more careful reflection on the category boundaries. So, it is argued
that the boundaries of the 'past 7-days' period are perhaps easier to conceptualise than the
boundaries pertaining to the 'past week' e.g. the term 'week' may have different meanings
and lengths for different participants (for some the past week starts on a Monday for some
others on a Sunday, for some others it may be the same as the past 7 days). The past 7 days
however should refer to the past 7 days for all subjects and in that way the 'past 7 days'
frame is better defined for subjects. As such, it may be less prone to the effects of
telescoping (i.e. material from outside the relevant time frame slipping in). Consequently,
an inflation of frequencies for the split (yet better defined and less prone to telescoping
inaccuracies) 7-day condition may be more accurate than the non split but more fuzzy
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'week' category. Obviously, given the scale of this pilot work this is only a tentative post
hoc explanation and should be treated as such unless explored and replicated further.
Finally, there were no effects of either time or category on estimates of behavioural
frequencies for high fibre and high fat intake or any of the items asking about engaging in
physical activity. These findings suggest that perhaps very specific judgements about one's
diet (fibre and fat intake) may be less prone to time and category effects in that participants
may either not have any information about their fibre and fat intake or may have very
generic views about these issues which may be less prone to time and category effects - it
is well known that schematic ideas about the self are normally very stable and difficult to
modify (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). The same may apply to the physical activity items
whereby people may have a set view as to whether they are or are not physically active,
hence again may be less prone to frequency estimation errors as a function of time and
category frame.
In summary, with the exception of healthy diet judgements and views about sweet / dessert
consumption, people's frequency estimates at both shorter and slightly longer time frames
did not co-vary as a function of the category they were asked to think about. In that sense,
this pilot would suggest that the SDSCA is a fairly robust instrument to use in researching
people's views about their dietary and physical activity habits.
However, it may well be that in reflecting generic views about their dietary and exercise
profiles as perhaps invited by the response options (asking for percentages rather than
specific instances of events) and in that sense being unaffected by time or category effects,
people's responses are likely to be schema - based perceptions of their behavioural
frequencies rather than precise recollections of the past. If this is the case, they may be
contaminated by post hoc explanations and ideas as to what behavioural frequencies may
have plausibly taken place and in that sense such judgements, although unaffected by time
and category manipulations, yet may be inaccurate reflections of reality.
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It seems imperative that before we conclude that the SDSCA is protected against time and
category split frequency estimation errors and thus reach the conclusion that responses to it
are bias-free, the accuracy of such behavioural estimates should be established.
A second pilot study designed to test this aspect of the SDSCA follows in the next section.
73. Pilot 2 Research design and method 
7.5.1. Design
The effects of category split (week vs. 7 day) and time span (daily estimate, week or 7day
estimate, monthly estimate) on participants' frequency estimates of dietary and exercise
habits were explored in a 2 x 3 mixed design where the category split factor was between
subjects while time span was a within subjects factor.
7.5.2. Participants
Thirty - three first year psychology undergraduates were recruited on a voluntary basis.
The predominantly female sample (female /male ratio 30 / 3) had a mean age of 21.89 (s.d.
6.23). Participants were naïve as to the purpose of the study and were offered course credit
for participating.
7.5.3. Materials
Modified versions of the Toobert and Glasgow (1994) Summary of Self Care
Questionnaire were used. The changes on the weekly, 7 - day and monthly questionnaire
versions were described earlier in this chapter. In addition to these, a daily version of the
SDSCA was developed for the purposes of this study which asked an identical set of
questions as the previously described measures, but did so by inviting participants to think
about 'today' rather than the past week or 7-days and month. A further change occurred on
item 5 of this daily version where the response options associated with this item were re-
worded (a 'Yes' or 'No' option was provided to the question as to whether subjects had
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engaged in 20 mins. of physical exercise that day). See Appendix B2 for copy of the
modified daily SDSCA used.
7.5.4. Procedure
The recruitment and testing procedure consisted of two parts although, initially, only the
first part of the procedure was disclosed to participants. Participants were told that their
participation would involve completing anonymously and confidentially several short
questionnaires that asked about their dietary and exercise habits over the day. They were
informed that they would be required to do this consistently for a week, and that it was
extremely important that they adhered to the strict instructions of the study as to when to
hand in completed measures and when to collect others. Deviation from these instructions
meant that their data would not be valid and hence no course credit would be offered.
In the first part of the data collection process students were asked to complete the daily
version of the questionnaire for a week, however it was explained that this procedure
would be broken down in three stages. The first stage involved participants completing
their first daily measure on a Thursday and returning this measure on a Friday. At that
point they were given questionnaires for the next three days (Friday, Saturday, and
Sunday) to take away. They were than asked to return their completed questionnaires on
the Monday and to collect materials for completion in the next three days (Monday -
Wednesday). On the Thursday after that, they were asked to return the second batch of
completed daily questionnaires. This procedure ensured that participants recorded their
daily dietary and exercise habits as instructed rather than forgetting to do the task for
several days and filling out all 7 daily forms at the same time. Obviously, no formal check
could take place as to whether they did fill the forms precisely as instructed but breaking
down the process into three shorter time periods ensured that at least some of the forms
should have been completed on the required day.
Part 2 of the data collection procêss involved filling out the weekly (7-day) and monthly
records. On the Thursday after the week-long daily completion period, unexpectedly, the
Time 1
(weekly
estimate)
Day 8
Time 1
(7- day
estimate)
Day 8
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weekly (or 7-day) followed by the monthly SDSCA version were administered, in a group
setting at the beginning of a timetabled lecture and along the lines explained in the first
pilot study. In the end, participants were thanked and fully debriefed.
7.6.	 Results 
The data were scored, collated and entered in SPSS for analysis. Initial data screening was
undertaken to check for and correct any data input errors. Data collected from participants'
daily responses were averaged across the 7 days of completion, thus giving weekly
behavioural frequency records computed from the combination of records collected over
the past 7 days. These are referred to as 'daily records' to differentiate from the week (or 7-
day) records collected at the end of the 7-day period but they obviously refer to the same
week (or 7-day) period that participants completed the SDSCA for. For simplicity's sake,
the terminology used to refer to these periods is given in Figure 7.5.
Figure 7.5: The terminology used in each condition of the first pilot study
Condition 1 (daily records - week — month) 
Time 0
(daily estimates
collected for 7
days)
Days 1 - 7
Time 2
(monthly
estimate)
Day 8
Condition 2 (daily records - 7-day — month)
Time 0
(daily estimates
collected for 7
days)
Days 1 - 7
Time 2
(monthly
estimate)
Day 8
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7.6.1. Descriptive analyses
Descriptives were computed separately for the daily - week - month condition (condition
1) and the daily - 7 day - month condition (condition 2) for each item as well as for overall
diet (average of all dietary responses) and physical activity (average of two exercise items)
behavioural estimates. Table 7.2 presents the means and standard deviations for each item
in each condition where a higher mean suggests a higher behavioural frequency
percentage. A reminder of the content of each item is given as a footnote to the table.
Table 7.2: Mean (and s.d.) for dietary and exercise behavioural frequencies as estimated in daily - weekly -
monthly (condition 1) and daily -7- day - monthly (condition 2) formats.
dly
records
mean
(s.d)
Condition 1 (N=18)
week	 month
estimates	 records
mean	 mean
(s.d)
	
(s.d)
Condition 2 (N=15)
dly	 7-day
estimates	 estimates
mean	 mean
(s.d)	 (s.d)
month
records
mean
(s.d)
Item 1 52.78 51.39 50 54.52 55 51.67
(17.24) (21.82) (19.17) (19.68) (16.90) (22.09)
Item 2 48.47 48.61 48.61 40.71 50 55
(19.58) (23.44) (21.82) (13.62) (16.36) (19.36)
Item 3 35.12 36.11 41.67 31.67 36.66 38.33
(12.14) (12.78) (12.13) (15.44) (18.58) (22.84)
Item 4 22.82 31.94 34.72 21.19 28.33 26.67
(11.57) (14.36) (12.54) (10.50) (12.91) (14.84)
Item 5 60.32 52.78 47.22 29.52 26.67 33.33
(27.53) (33.09) (28.30) (23.20) (22.09) (22.49)
Item 6 16.47 20.83 26.39 4.76 11.67 21.67
(21.36) (21.44) (21.82) (5.83) (16.00) (18.58)
Ov.dt
	 60.83 57.99 55.56 60.59 60.00 60.42
(10.38) (12.83) (12.11) (12.24) (12.90) (15.61)
Ov.exr. 38.39 36.81 36.81 17.14 19.17 27.50
(18.45) (21.21) (19.87) (13.03) (14.84) (17.17)
Note: Ov.dt = overall diet, Ov. exr.= overall exercise,
XXX: today, past week, past 7-days, past month as appropriate
Item 1: What percentage of the time did you follow what is generally considered a healthy diet ?
Item 2: During the past XXX what percentage of your meals included high fibre foods such as fresh foods,
fresh vegetables, whole grain bread, dried beans and peas, bran ?
Item 3: During the past XXX what percentage of your meals included high fat foods such as butter, ice -
cream, oil, nuts and seeds, mayonnaise, avocado, deep-fried food, salad dressing, bacon, other meat
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with fat or skin ?
Item 4: During the past XXX, what percentage of your meals included sweets and desserts such as pie, cake,
jam, soft drinks (regular not diet drinks), biscuits ?
Item 5: Over the past XXX, what percentage of the time did you participate in at least 20 mins. of physical
exercise ?
Item 6: Over the past XXX, what percentage of the time did you participate in a specific exercise session
other than what you do around the house or as part of your work ?
It seems that, as in the earlier in pilot study, there is great variability in behavioural
frequency estimates, as seen in the fairly large standard deviations observed in each case.
This is to be expected given that the data is in the form of ordered categories and, although
these have interval properties, variability from one category scale point to the next is
unavoidable. Despite this, a rather complex pattern of results seems to emerge. This
suggests that, in general, there is great variability in the behavioural frequency reports
across conditions with just two of the 6 administered items (item 3 - fatty foods and 6 -
specific exercise sessions) yielding the same (overestimation increasing with longer time
periods) behavioural estimate patterns in both conditions.
It seems sensible to initially examine respective conditions individually. In doing so, the
following preliminary observations can be made:
Condition 1 
• Items 3 (fatty foods), 4 (sweets /desserts), and 6 (specific exercise session) show a
similar pattern of response where participants overestimate their behavioural
frequencies for all three items in longer time frames. For example, the data suggest that
more fatty foods were consumed over the past month than the past week and this latter
week estimate is greater than the average obtained for the same period from
participants' daily responses.
• The reverse pattern is seen however in their responses to items 1 (healthy diet) and 5
(20 mins. of exercise) as well as their 'overall healthy diet' score computed by
combining responses to all 'diet' items. Here, underestimation seems to occur in longer
time frames. For example, the data suggest that less healthy eating took place over the
past month than the past week and this latter weekly estimate is lower than the average
obtained for the same period from participants' daily responses.
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• Item 2 (high fibre foods) suggests a very sli ght overestimation in the weekly and
monthly records. A similar pattern is seen in the 'overall exercise' score where weekly
and monthly reports are identical and slightly above the daily estimate.
Condition 2 
• Items 2 (high fibre food), 3 (high fat food), 6 (specific exercise) and the 'overall
exercise' score computed from the average of responses to items 5 and 6, the exercise
items, show overestimation of these behavioural frequencies with longer time frames.
For example, now more high fat foods are said to be consumed over the past month as
opposed to the past 7 days, this 7-day estimate also being greater than that obtained
from participants' daily records.
• Items 1 (healthy diet) and 4 (sweets / desserts) show an unusual pattern where people's
7-day frequencies are both greater than those obtained from their daily averages and
than their monthly frequencies. For example, more sweets are said to be consumed
when asked about the past 7-days than is recorded from participants' average of their
daily responses for the same period, and this estimate is also less than their monthly
consumption of sweets.
• Finally, the opposite pattern is seen in item 5 (20 mins. exercise) and the participants'
overall healthy diet score whereby their 7-day estimates are smaller than both their
monthly estimates and the estimates about the past 7-days obtained from daily records.
7.6.2. Inferential analyses
In order to ensure that participants' daily behavioural records did not significantly differ
across category split conditions and, thus, that random allocation to conditions was
successful, independent groups t-tests were performed on participants' average daily
responses for each one item. There were no significant differences in responses to items 1-
4 (item 1 t (31) = -.29, p>.05, item 2 t (31) = 1.29, p>.05, item 3 t (31) = .72, p>.05, item 4 t
(31) = .42, p>.05). However participants' daily records differed in the exercise items 5 (t (31)
= 3.43, p<.05) and 6 (t (31) = 2.23, p<.05) with participants in condition 1 reporting more
physical activity in the daily records they kept for a week than those in condition 2. This
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was an anomaly and would need to be considered in any subsequent inferential analysis of
these items in the case of a significant interaction or category split main effect becoming
apparent.
Given the variability seen in the descriptive information reported above, it was decided to
avoid reaching any conclusions until inferential testing confirmed the preliminary
observations. Mixed factor ANOVAs were used to test for main effects of time span
(shorter vs. longer time frames as seen in daily vs. week (or 7-day) vs. month estimates)
and category split group (7-day vs. week estimates) as well as an interaction between the
two (group x time) on respondents' estimates of their dietary and exercise habits. Mauchly
sphericity test results were inspected and where ANOVA homogeneity of variance
assumptions were violated the more stringent Greenhouse - Geisser Epsilon was used
instead. Bonferroni corrections were also used where appropriate to investigate differences
further, in post hoc comparisons. These findings are described below.
Unlike the previously described pilot whereby numerous items were found to be robust to
the effects of time span and category split effects, in the present case the only items where
no effects were seen were items 1 (healthy diet) and the 'overall healthy diet' score
computed from participants' responses. Inferential analyses for all other items are
described below.
• Item 2 (high fibre food): There appeared to be both a significant main effect of time
span (F (2,62) = 4.09, p<.05) and a significant interaction (F (2,62) = 3.91, p<.05) with
participants overreporting in the month condition as opposed to the mean of their daily
frequency responses. When repeated t-tests were applied to examine the significant
main effect further, no significant differences were found in the daily - week - month
condition (time 0 vs. time 1 t (17) = -.04, p>.05, time 0 vs. time 2 t (17) = -.03, p>.05,
time 1 vs. time 2 t (17) = 0, p>.05). It seems that the apparent interaction is caused by
overestimation in condition 2. Repeated measures t-tests were thus performed to test
for simple effects in condition 2. Overestimation of high fibre intake is apparent in the
daily - week -
month estimate(condition 1)
	
 daily - 7-day -
month estimate(condition 2)
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monthly vs. daily estimates (time 2 vs. time 0 t (14) = -4.87, p<.016 as required for
Bonferroni corrected t-test). Overestimation is also seen in the 7-day estimates as
opposed to daily records for the same period (time 1 vs. time 2 t (14) = -2.55, p<.03)
however this result is not strictly significant under Bonferroni requirements. These
results are shown in Figure 7.6.
Figure 7.6: The effects of time span and category split effect on estimates of high fibre food intake over three
time frames. Daily - 7-day - month (condition 2) respondents seem to overestimate high fibre food intake in
their monthly (and to a lesser extent in their 7-day) estimates as opposed to estimates obtained from daily
records.
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• Item 3 (high fat foods): A main effect of time was seen (F(2, 62) =4.24, p<.0.02) however
ANOVA assumptions of homogeneity of variance were violated as seen in a statistically
significant Mauchly test (W=.78, chi =7.39, p<.05). As a result, the analysis was done
again using the stricter Greenhouse- Geisser Epsilon. The result remained significant
(F=4.24, p<.03). It was thus explored further with Bonferroni corrected t-tests which
suggested significant overreporting between month and daily records (t (32)=-2.49, p<.019)
but that was not the case for the other two comparisons (time 0 vs. time 1 t(32).=-1.58,
p>.05, time 1 vs. time 2 t(32)==-1.71, p>.05). It thus seems that both groups tended to over
report high fibre food intake when asked about the past month (time 2), as opposed to their
daily records (time 0). This is seen in Figure 7.7 that follows.
daily - week -
month estimate
(condition 1)
daily - 7-day -
month estimate
(condition 2)
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Figure 7.7: The effect of time span on estimates of high fat food intake consumption. Monthly estimates were
significantly higher than those obtained from daily records for both conditions.
daily	 week 7day	 month
Time span
daily - week -
month estimate
(condition 1)
	
 daily - 7-day-
month estimate
(condition 2)
• Item 4 (sweets / desserts): A significant main effect of time was seen here with participants
in both conditions overreporting sweets /desserts consumption both in the past month and
the past week (or 7 days), as opposed to their daily records (time 0 vs. time 2 t (32) = -5.61,
p<.01, time 0 vs. time it (32) = -5.53, p<.01). It seems that sweets / desserts consumption is
overestimated in longer time periods, and this is shown in Figure 7.8.
Figure 7.8: The effect of time on estimates of sweets/ desserts consumption where significant overreporting
occurs in longer time frames.
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• Item 5 (20 mins. of exercise): Here there was a significant main effect of category group
where the daily - week - month estimates (condition 1) were consistently higher across all
three time points than the daily - 7-day - month estimates (F (1,31) = 7.73, p<.01). This
could however partly be explained by the fact that this difference was present in the daily
records condition (Time 0) which makes any subsequent category split effect differences
redundant. Additionally, there was a significant interaction (F (2, 62) = 3.28, p<.05). This
was explored further by means of repeated t-tests. As the graph that follows would suggest,
there were no significant differences between estimates across time points in condition 2
(daily, 7-day, monthly estimates) (time 0 vs. time it (14) = 1.42, p>.05, time 0 vs. time 2 t
( 14) = -.79, p>.05, time 1 vs. time 2 t (14) - 1.74, p>.05). On the other hand, participants in
condition 1 tended to significantly underreport in their monthly estimates as compared to
their daily estimates (time 2 vs. time 0 t (17) = -2.24, p<.02) but this was not strictly
significant at the .016 level required by Bonferroni corrected analyses. No other
comparison in condition 1 was significant (time 0 vs. time It (17) = 1.29, p>.05, time 1 vs.
time 2 t (17) = 1.29, p>.05). These findings are shown in Figure 7.9.
Figure 7.9: The main effect of category split condition and a significant interaction between time span and
category split condition on 20 mins. of physical exercise, where monthly estimates are underreported in
condition 1.
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• Item 6 (specific exercise session): Here there was a significant main effect of time (F (2.62)
= 13.17, p<.01), where behavioural frequency estimates from both conditions 1 and 2
seemed to be subject to over estimation in longer time frames. This finding was confirmed
by repeated measures t-tests across conditions 1 and 2 (time 0 vs. time 1 t (32) = -2.28,
p<.03, time 0 vs. time 2 t (32) = -4.61, p<.01, time 1 vs. time 2 t (32) = -2.97, p<.01. The
graph pertaining to this finding is shown in Figure 7.10.
Figure 7.10: The main effect of time span where behavioural frequency overestimation in longer time
intervals occurs for both category split conditions.
• Overall exercise (average score for responses to items 5 and 6): There was a main effect of
group (F (1 ,31) = 8.27, p<.01) with people in condition 1 always yielding higher behavioural
frequency estimates than those in condition 2. Again, as in item 5, this should be expected
as the category split groups were in fact different in their baseline, daily estimates of
physical activity. There was also a significant interaction (F (2.62) = 3.17, p<.05), whereby
condition 1 participants didn't differ in their estimates between any of the three time
measurements (time 0 vs. time 1 t (17) = .45, p>.05, time 0 vs. time 2 t (17) = .40, p>.05, time
1 vs. time 2 t (17) = 0, p>.05). Condition 2 subjects however overestimated their monthly
and 7-daily physical activity as compared to their daily records (time 0 vs. time 2 t (14) = .-
2.68, p<.02, time 1 vs. time 2 t (14) = . -2.32, p<.04) but these results did not reach
statistical significance at the Bonferroni correction levels. These findings are shown in
Figure 7.11 that follows.
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Figure 7.11: A main effect of category split is seen with daily -weekly -monthly estimates being consistently
higher than those of participants in the daily - 7-day - month condition. A Bonferroni corrected non
significant interaction between time span and category split effect is also observed where condition 2
participants only, over report in both 7-day and monthly estimates as compared to their daily records.
Time span
7.6.3. Summary
It seems that, unlike the previous pilot study looking at weekly (7-daily) and month
estimates, a substantial amount of variability is present in participants' behavioural
frequency responses across the time span (times 0, 1 and 2) and across category split
groups (week vs. 7 day conditions). The only SDSCA items where effects of time category
split or both failed to appear was in item 1. All other items were affected by time (items, 3,
4 and 6), category split (items 5 and overall exercise) and a time x category interaction
(items 2, 5) although this effect is questionable for item 5 and the 'overall exercise' item.
7.7.	 Discussion 
The obtained results suggested that, unlike the first pilot study where no daily record of
behaviour for the recent past was available, with the exception of responses to the general
'healthy eating' questions (item 1), estimates in both conditions were subject to both time
span manipulations and category split effects. It seems that in this present study
respondents were influenced by both the time span (shorter vs. longer periods) they were
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reporting behavioural frequencies for and the time category (week; whole category, 7 -
days; split category) they were asked to think about, but these effects were different for
different items of the SDSCA.
Estimates about unhealthy dietary behaviours as seen in high fat intake (item 2) and sweet /
dessert (item 3) consumption were subject to time span effects with participants
overreporting in longer time frames as compared to their daily records (and their 7-day and
weekly records for the latter item). Time also had an effect on estimates of past
engagement in a specific exercise session (item 6) where, again, people's monthly
estimates were significantly inflated as compared to both their weekly and daily records.
On the other hand, when asked about the percentage of time participants had engaged in 20
mins. of physical exercise (item 5) as well as when the exercise SDSCA items were
combined to give an overall physical activity measure, the category the question was
framed in (past week vs. past 7 days) at first, appeared to have an effect on responses with
people asked about the past week (whole category) giving higher frequencies than people
asked about the past 7 days (split category). This effect, however, is questionable as it was
established that participants differed in their baseline measurements in the amount of
exercise they reported engaging in their daily records, making the above finding unreliable.
Moreover, an interaction between time and category frames was observed in high fibre
intake (item 2) where overestimation in longer time periods was seen in the split category
condition only, and in item 5 where underreporting of physical activity was seen in
responses of participants exposed to the whole category condition (week). However, this
latter finding did not reach significance at Bonferroni corrected levels and given the
confounded main category split effect also seen in this item, is difficult to interpret.
Finally, no effects of either time or category were seen in responses to the item asking
about a generally healthy diet (item 1) or the combined dietary responses (overall diet).
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OveiTeporting of unhealthy behaviours as seen in items 3 (fatty foods) and 4 (sweets and
desserts) is a finding in complete contrast to those reported in previous work in the area
(e.g. Bachman and O'Malley, 1987; Hoorens and Harris, 1998) which suggested
underreporting in longer time frames. Such previous research however has not examined
the accuracy of such reports as a function of time frame in that no records of actual
behavioural frequencies were available in either of those two studies. As a result,
comparisons between actual and estimated frequencies was not possible an observation
that may well explain why past researchers failed to find such an effect.
Telescoping may also explain the present findings. It could be that although daily reports
could not be subject to telescoping effects ('today' is a rather well defined time frame
unlikely to invite the recollection and report of events occurring outside this frame) weekly
(7-daily) and monthly estimates are; as memory for specific behavioural events becomes
less clear and more fuzzy in longer time frames (Thompson et al., 1988), events from
outside the reference periods are likely to be telescoped in longer time frames thus leading
to inflated behavioural frequencies in such longer time frames (Huttenlocher and Prohaska,
1988).
The current results may also have been subject to participants' errors in frequency
estimation judgements. It could be that when asked about specific unhealthy eating
episodes in the recent past (week and month), people try and enumerate such specific
events; having recalled a few they adjust their estimates for the period in question.
Depending on the ease by which such events will come to mind people may be more or
less accurate in their estimates. Given that the present sample consisted of undergraduate
students it may well be that unhealthy eating episodes come to mind fairly easily hence
leading to inflated judgements about such behaviours in the recent past.
The fibre intake (item 2) results may also be partly explained by the above. In this case too
long time frames gave rise to higher reported fibre intake episodes but that was the case
only for those participants who were asked to consider a split category (7—days) rather than
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a whole one (week). It may be that in this case splitting a category into subcategories
invites people to more easily enumerate specific episodes whereby they consumed high
fibre food, by considering each one of the past 7 days (rather than a less precise whole
chunk suggested by the term 'week'). In doing so, more such instances are likely to come
to mind. In following an anchoring and adjustment estimation strategy for perceived
frequent events as suggested in the literature (e.g. Conrad et al., 1988), people in the 7-day
condition may base their estimates at a higher anchoring point than their 'week'
counterparts thus reaching a more inflated estimate by starting adjusting at a higher
anchoring point (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
Similar arguments would apply to the observation of responses being inflated in longer
time frames in item 6 (specific exercise session) where again participants were seen to
report significantly higher attendance of specific exercise sessions in longer time frames.
So it could be that in thinking about the past week (7-days) and month, rather than
enumerating specific exercise sessions they attended, subjects relied on schematic
representations of their physical activity profile (e.g. "I am a physically active person") and
thus reported engaging in physical activity sessions that their daily records would suggest
they had not. Research in the effects of unrealistic optimism suggests that the vast majority
of the population would normally think they are more physically active than the average
person (e.g. Allied Dunbar Survey, 1992; Hoorens and Harris, 1998) hence such erroneous
schematic ideas might have been affecting participants' responses in this case.
It is surprising that item 5 responses (participation in 20 mins of physical exercise),
however, gave a completely opposite picture to that of underreporting of behaviour in the
month as opposed to daily records, seen in responses of condition 1 (albeit at a level not
acceptable as significant at Bonferroni corrected confidence levels). Given the difficulty
with interpreting the statistical significance of this item it seems sensible to suggest that no
major conclusion is drawn about it other than to note that when participants were asked
about a well defined instance of a physical activity session (item 5) general underreporting
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in longer time frames occurred, while the opposite was the case with the less well defined
and more vague physical activity item.
This variability in results obtained in these physical activity items, as well the lack of
consistency in results obtained in specific dietary behaviour items, suggest that combining
participants' responses to form 'overall' diet and exercise items is unwise and of no
practical or psychological significance. It was decided not to engage in such analysis of
'overall' combined items in the main study.
Another analysis that may have been reasonably performed but was not, is correlational
analysis between the 7 individual day scores with the weekly (or 7-day) and monthly
scores. Such analysis would have illustrated relationships between individual estimates of
behavioural frequencies across time and might have provided further insight into the
influences of time and category split effects on such estimates.
Obviously, as the two pilot studies were conducted on different samples a direct
comparison is not possible. However as they both took place at the same time and on
psychology and cognitive science undergraduates some general comparison may be
offered.
The main difference between the two pilot studies was that the second used people's
objective, daily (hence more accurate) records as means of verification of their estimates of
past behaviour. It is interesting to see that, unlike Pilot 1, when people's estimated
behavioural frequencies about the recent past were compared with more objective daily
records for the same period, the SDSCA was subject to both time and category split
manipulations. It thus seems appropriate to suggest that the instrument's apparent
robustness to such manipulations which was evidenced in the first pilot study is
questionable. As proposed earlier, it is likely that in the first pilot study the apparent
consistency in responses across time and category frames was perhaps in part due to
participants' automatic reporting of schematic information about their behavioural
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frequencies, rather than detailed recollections specific to the periods in question. As such,
they tended to be very similar to each other regardless of the time frame they referred to,
but at the same time, may have been inaccurate. To that extent, it seems sensible to
proceed with the second pilot study design in the main test of participants with diabetes.
No problems were reported by participants in terms of wording or design and data
collection arrangements in either study. On this basis, it was decided to proceed to the
main study with people with diabetes using modified versions of the SDSCA which are
very similar to the ones tested here for dietary and physical activity items, but also include
medication and blood glucose testing items which were inappropriate for testing with
undergraduate students.
An area of concern that the present pilot studies did not address is that of making
judgements about two different time points at the same time i.e. giving behavioural
frequencies about the past week (7 days) and month at the same time. Although no obvious
problems are apparent with such an arrangement and none have been reported in the
literature, it may well be that participants' responses to the second scale are influenced by
their responses to the first. Although there has been limited research in this area, it has
been the case that when participants are asked two time-related questions about the same
behaviour at the same time, their responses to the second time-framed question tended to
be more accurate than those to the first, regardless of the length of time frame adopted in
either question (Loftus, Klinger, Smith and Fiedler, 1990). It may be useful to avoid any
such order effects and also to ask questions about a longer time period (e.g. month) having
had some knowledge of the behavioural frequencies people actually engaged in, for some
of the time of the month in question. It thus seems sensible to collect weekly (or 7-day)
data at the end of a daily record keeping period, collect estimates about the same period
immediately after that period (as in pilot study 2) but then refrain from administering the
monthly version of the SDSCA until 30 days later. In this case, the monthly estimates will
be compared to two data collection points (the mean of the 7 daily records and the weekly
or 7-day estimates) for which some objective verification data will exist.
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In summary the results of this pilot study suggested that behavioural frequency estimates
using the SDSCA are subject to both time and category split manipulations though such
effects are differential for different items of the scale. It was also seen that the use of daily
records as means of establishing the accuracy of subsequent self reports is necessary for
most cases of dietary or physical activity reports.
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Chapter 8
Time span and category frame effects in reports of self care in Type 2
diabetes:
are self reports of self care bias-free ?
8.0. Summary 
The present chapter examines the accuracy of self reports of diabetes self care activities in
Type 2 diabetes over the recent past. The results of a sample of people with Type 2
diabetes who completed the Summary of Diabetes Self Care Activities (SDSCA) daily for
7 days, at the end of the same 7 day period and then 30 days later are presented and
evaluated in terms of the extent to which such reports are subject to category split and time
frame effects. The usefulness of the SDSCA in eliciting bias-free reports of past self care
activities both in its current format and in a recent modified version, are discussed.
8.1.	 Introduction 
The pilot work using the SDCSA described in Chapter 7 suggested that the SDSCA may
be subject to time span and category split effects. When diabetes - free undergraduate
participants filled out the measure as a means of reporting behavioural frequencies of
dietary and physical activity over the recent past, such reports were subject to both under
estimation and overestimation (differently for different SDSCA items) as a function of the
time frame participants were asked to consider (short: week or 7-days, long: month) and
the category frame used in the question (whole category: week vs. split category: 7 days).
It was interesting that although the SDSCA appeared to be fairly robust to such effects
when no verification record was available against which participants' responses could be
checked, this robustness disappeared in the second pilot study which collected and used
such verification information.
To the best of the author's knowledge, time span and category split manipulations have not
been systematically explored with people with Type 2 diabetes. However, it is known that
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diabetic people may be routinely asked (e.g. in patient physician consultations) to report
behavioural frequencies about their diabetes self care activities, such information perhaps
forming the basis for self management plan modification and adjustment. If the report of
such information is subject to any or all of the autobiographical memory, time frame or
category frame errors identified and discussed in Chapter 7, or cognitive deficits brought
about by depression or the illness itself, it follows that such reports of diabetes self care
activities may be quite unreliable.
The SDSCA is primarily a research tool and its use in collecting patient self care
information about the recent past is not widespread. If the SDSCA is a fairly reliable
instrument to use in collecting such autobiographical information, then perhaps its routine
use in clinical care may lead to more reliable self reports being collected from patients with
Type 2 diabetes.
What is of interest here is not just whether patients tend to over report / underreport
behavioural frequencies as a function of the time and category frame they are asked to
consider. Rather, it is important to establish the accuracy of such reports and evaluate
whether a particular time frame elicits more accurate responses than another. Therefore, it
was decided to proceed with a design similar to that adopted in the second pilot study
described and discussed in Chapter 7, i.e. collect daily behavioural frequency records iota
week and use these in verification of subsequently made weekly (or 7-day) and monthly
behavioural frequency estimates.
Finally, in order to address the issue of when in time each measure should be administered
(as discussed in Chapter 7) it was thought appropriate to deviate from the data collection
format currently adopted in the literature, which typically asks participants to make
behavioural frequency estimates about both shorter and longer time frames at the same
point in time (e.g. Bachman and O'Malley, 1987; Hoorens . and Harris, 1998). The reasons
for this are both conceptual and practical.
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The conceptual concern has to do with the fact that previous research (Loftus et al., 1990)
has suggested that asking participants to respond to the same behavioural frequency
question twice, albeit using two different time frames, leads to accuracy differences in such
responses. For example, it has been found that if the same question is asked twice about
two different time frames (e.g. "How many times did you visit your GP in the past year
?"and then the same question asked about the past 6 months), responses to the second
question are always more conservative than those to the first. One of the reasons that has
been proposed to explain this phenomenon is that if people are asked a similar question
twice, they tend to interpret the repetition of the question as evidence that the researcher is
unhappy with their first answer and would like a more detailed response the second time.
As such, responses to the same question given at the same time are confounded by order-
effects and may be misleading.
The practical concern revolves around the realism of the data collection process. It seems
more realistic to ask people to consider their behaviour about a given time period at the end
of that period (i.e. ask about the past week at the end of a given week and about the past
month at the end of the given month) rather than both at the same time. What is more, such
a format might resemble better what may be happening in clinical practice with regard to
asking questions about diabetes self care; it would seem plausible to ask people about a
preceding period of time rather than two such periods. In addition, in collecting
verification data for a week (through daily records) then asking about the past week and
the past month at the end of the 7 and then 30 day period respectively, makes the
verification process much more realistic as information of actual behavioural frequencies
exists for the whole of the 7 day and 1/4 of the 30 day period.
In summary, the current study aimed to explore the usefulness of the SDSCA as a measure
of collecting self report information about participants' self care activities in the recent past
(past week or 7 days and month) and evaluate the extent to which reports are subject to
time and category frame effects. In doing so it adopted a study design similar to that
adopted in the second pilot study discussed in Chapter 7 which endeavoured to evaluate
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participants' behavioural frequency estimates about two time frames, having collected
more objective information about the whole of the shorter and part of the longer time
periods, respectively.
8.2.	 Research design and method 
8.2.1. Design
The effects of the type of time category (whole: past week vs. split: past 7 days) and time
span (daily estimate, weekly or 7 - day estimate, monthly estimate) on behavioural
frequencies of dietary, exercise, glucose testing and diabetes medication taking were
explored in a 2 x 3 mixed design where the category factor was between subjects while
time span was a within subjects factor.
8.2.2. Participants
One hundred and eight patients with Type 2 diabetes registered with an East Anglia
diabetes centre were invited to take part in the study between May and December 1999.
Thirty nine chose not to participate - no demographic information is available for these
people. Participants who agreed to take part were assigned at random to one of two
conditions. Of the remaining 68, one participant was excluded on the basis of his •
depression profile. Fifteen participants either did not complete the full set of measures or
said they did but these were never received by the researcher. Fully completed
questionnaire data from 53 participants were obtained. The demographic and medical
profile characteristics for participants in each condition are shown in the table that follows.
The groups did not differ significantly on any of these variables.
Table 8.1: Demographic and medical history profile of participants in each condition
	Condition 1 (n=28)	 Condition 2 (n=25)
	
(daily —week — month)	 (daily — 7-day — month)
Male / female ratio 14 15 / 10
Mean (s.d) age in yrs. 61.50 (8.78) 62.92 (9.51)
Mean (s.d) BMI 29.64 (6.64) 29.69 (6.46)
/ 14
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(continued)
	
Condition 1 (n=28) 	 Condition 2 (n=25)
	
(daily —week — month)	 (daily — 7-day — month)
Mean (s.d) depression (HADS)	 3.93 (3.00)	 4.04 (3.06)
Mean (s.d) diabetes duration in yrs 8.00 (5.50) 	 5.74 (4.80)
On blood pressure medication	 10	 14
On heart condition medication	 6	 9
Diabetes medication
Diet	 2	 0
Tablets	 20	 18
Insulin	 4	 6
Tabs + insulin	 2	 1
8.2.3. Materials
• SDSCA 
Modified versions of the Toobert and Glasgow (1994) Summary of Self Care
Questionnaire were used. The overall changes on the daily, weekly, 7 - day and monthly
questionnaire versions were in terms of category and time frame of the set questions. That
is, depending on condition, participants were asked either about 'today', 'the past week'
and 'the past month' (condition 1) or about 'today', 'the past 7 days' and 'the past month'
(condition 2).
In addition to these, some slight additional modification took place in the SDSCA response
options. For example, the response options pertaining to item 1 ('did you follow your
recommended diet' were changed from 'always, usually, sometimes, rarely' to percentages
of time (0%, 25%. 50%, 75%, 100%), a response format identical to that adopted in items
2 - 5, 7 and 10 of the original SDSCA. Response options adopted in exercise items 6 and 8
(asking to circle number of days ranging from 0-7) were retained for the weekly, 7-day and
monthly versions but had to be changed for the daily version to a 'yes — no' format as
tested in the pilot studies reported in Chapter 7. Item 9 response alternatives were also
changed from 'every day, most days, some days, none of the days' to percentage options as
in items 1-5, 7 and 10. Finally, the response format was converted to percentages for items
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11 and 12 (medication taking). The full set of the modified items used can be found in
Appendices C1-C4.
• Other materials 
An invitation to participate was developed. This gave participants some general
information about the study and asked participants to either fill in their contact details so
they could be recruited or to sign the form showing their intent to not participate. The
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983) was also used to
measure participants' depression levels over the past week (or 7 days). A consent form was
developed for participants to sign before agreeing to take part in the study. In addition, a
demographic information questionnaire was developed to collect age, gender, duration of
diabetes, BMI, heart, blood pressure and diabetes medication profile information. Finally,
letters to accompany the SDSCA measures were composed and stamped addressed
envelopes were provided for the measures' safe return.
8.2.4. Procedure
Eligible participants were handed out an invitation to participate in a study aiming to
'understand better the challenges people with Type 2 diabetes often face in managing their
condition'. They were told that their participation would involve filling out questionnaires
about their diabetes self care activities, at home and in their own time. If they agreed to
participate they were asked to fill out a reply slip with their contact details and return it to
the health care assistant who originally handed out the invitation. The researcher was then
passed on this information and contacted volunteer subjects by phone.
At that point participants were informed of the overall procedure as well as their right to
withdraw at any point and without penalty. No specific details were given at this time to
suggest that participants would be filling the same SDSCA questionnaire at three different
time points, however the overall time span which was involved in the study was disclosed.
This was to ensure that participants were aware of the commitment that was expected in
this project in terms of time, as well as to check that they were not going to be unavailable
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(e.g. on holiday) for some part of the data collection period. At the same time,
demographic and medical profile information on subjects' age, duration of diabetes,
diabetes, blood pressure and heart condition medication was collected.
Volunteers were sent on a Friday, to reach them by Monday, a pack containing 7 'daily'
versions of the SDSCA with the date each was due for completion filled out on top. They
were also sent a consent form to sign and return as well as instructions on how to fill out
each of the 7 daily questionnaires. They were asked to start filling out the first daily
questionnaire on the Monday (full dates were provided) at the end of the day. They were
instructed to carry on filling out questionnaires up until Wednesday (inclusive). At that
point they were asked to return the completed questionnaires for Monday, Tuesday and
Wednesday to the researcher using one of the two stamped addressed envelopes provided.
They were further instructed to fill out the remaining questionnaires (Thursday — Sunday)
which they were asked to post to the researcher on the Monday of the following week. This
procedure followed a similar pattern to that adopted in the pilot studies of this work and
was designed to increase adherence to instructions to complete records daily.
On the Monday of the following week, participants received the weekly / 7-day SDSCA as
appropriate, as well as the HADS for completion. The instructions that accompanied the
questionnaires were clear in urging participants to complete and return these questionnaires
immediately (in order to avoid recollections of behavioural frequencies over the past week
being affected by longer time intervals). Thirty days later, participants received the
monthly version of the SDSCA along with instructions urging them to complete this final
measure immediately and thanking them for their participation.
Throughout the study participants were provided with the researcher's contact details and
were encouraged to get in touch if they were unclear about any aspect of the work.
Day 8
----10. Time 1
(weekly
estimate)
Time 2
(monthly
estimate)
Day 30
---10. Time 1
(7- day
estimate)
Day 8
n.
Time 2
(monthly
estimate)
Day 30
Time 0
(daily estimates
collected for 7
days)
Days 1 - 7
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8.3.	 Results 
The data were scored, collated and entered in SPSS for analysis. Initial data screening was
undertaken to check for and correct any data input errors. Data collected from participants'
daily responses were averaged across the 7 days of completion, thus giving weekly
behavioural estimates computed from the combination of records collected over the past 7
days. These are referred to as 'daily records' to differentiate from the week (or 7-day)
records collected at the end of the 7-day period, but they obviously refer to the same week
(or 7-day) period for which participants completed the SDSCA. The terminology used to
refer to these periods is given in Figure 8.1.
Figure 8.1: The conditions or the present study
Condition 1 (daily records - week— month) 
Time 0
(daily estimates
collected for 7
days)
Days 1 - 7
Condition 2 (daily records - 7-day — month)
In addition, and before any descriptives could be computed some conversions had to take
place on some of the SDSCA items to make the analysis simpler. These changes applied
to items 6, 8 and 9 where participants were asked about their participation in 20 mins. of
physical exercise (item 6), participation in a specific physical activity session other than
housework (item 8) and whether they tested their BG levels (item 9).
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Answers to all three items in the daily estimates condition involved participants selecting
either a "Yes' or a 'No' response to having performed each of the three activities. In the
weekly (7-day) condition, subjects were asked to select the number of days (from a range
of 0 - 7) in the past week (or 7 days) they engaged in each of the above activities. A similar
response format (range 0 — 30 days) was adopted for the monthly condition. In order to
make data analysis uniform across SDSCA responses it was decided to convert these
responses to percentage of time, thus following the response and analysis pattern seen in
the rest of SDCSA items. As a result, for these items, at time 0, 1 and 2 the number of
days participants answered 'yes' to performing each activity were converted into
percentage of time spent on the activity, assuming 7 days in a week and 30 days in a
month.
8.3.1. Descriptive analyses
Descriptives were computed separately for the daily - week - month condition (condition
1) and the daily - 7 day - month condition (condition 2) for each item. The mean and
standard deviation for each item in each condition are given in Table 8.2. A higher mean
suggests a higher percent of time performing the activity. A reminder of the content of
each item is given in the footnote to the table.
Inspection of Table 8.2 suggests a set of extremely variable results which does not easily
lend itself to a quick assessment of participants' patterns of behavioural frequency
estimates. With the exception of item 11 in condition 2, there does not seem to be a single
item where the responses obtained from participants' daily records are the same as the
weekly (or 7 day) and monthly estimates. Additionally, with the exception of item 8 where
there seems to be overestimation of behavioural frequencies in longer time frames, and
item 10 where Time 1 estimates appear to be higher than Time 0 but lower than Time 2,
there is no other item where participants in both category split conditions have
demonstrated a similar pattern of responses.
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Table 8.2: Mean (and s.d.) for dietary, exercise, BO testing and medication taking behavioural frequencies as
estimated in daily - weekly - monthly (condition 1) and daily - 7- day - monthly (condition 2) formats.
Item
dly
estimates
mean
(s.d)
Condition 1
week
estimates
mean
(s.d)
month
estimates
mean
(s.d)
Condition 2
dly	 7 day
estimates	 estimates
mean
	
mean
(s.d)	 (s.d)
month
estimates
mean
(s.d)
1 78.51 74.07 71.15 82.43 75 74
(14.16) (17.65) (13.59) (18.56) (21.65) (19.74)
2 70.60 65.38 72 76.79 72.83 69.79
(19.07) (28.35) (18.14) (21.35) (22.50) (23.29)
3 71.58 71.43 78.70 79 77 80
(24.99) (24.26) (17.95) (20.32) (22.73) (20.41)
4 22.62 23.21 24.07 22.86 32 22
(20.50) (20.33) (16.23) (15.74) (26.54) (19.53)
5 9.99 10.71 16.67 13.23 16.67 13
(9.58) (14.32) (12.00) (13.77) (21.70) (14.65)
6 51.02 49.49 60.55 48 49.14 49.24
(39.35) (41.78) (37.76) (36.86) (40.42) (39.43)
7 44.88 47.00 52.08 39.77 45.65 39.77
(32.24) (40.39) (37.53) (35.80) (44.37) (36.73)
8 38.78 40.31 45.28 38.29 41.14 42.27
(35.82) (39.47) (40.06) (37.05) (42.12) (40.74)
9 67.86 69.31 62.44 63.69 63.35 64.44
(35.77) (35.37) (37.36) (39.06) (39.20) (40.32)
10 70.50 92.00 87.50 66.07 75.00 72.83
(31.00) (18.71) (23.31) (38.89) (32.86) (33.64)
11 98.81 95.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
(2.91) (11.18) (00.00) (00.00) (00.00) (00.00)
12 100.00 97.83 100.00 98.87 98.68 98.68
(00.00) (10.43) (00.00) (2.67) (5.74) (5.74)
Item I: What percentage of the time did you follow your recommended diet XXX?
Item 2: Over the past XXX what percentage of the time did you successfully limit your calories as
recommended in healthy eating for diabetes control ?
Item 3: During the past XXX what percentage of your meals included high fibre foods such as fresh foods,
fresh vegetables, whole grain breads, dried beans and peas, bran ?
Item 4: During the past XXX what percentage of your meals included high fat foods such as butter, ice -
cream, oil, nuts and seeds, mayonnaise, avocado, deep-fried food, salad dressing, bacon, other meat with fat
or skin ?
Item 5: During the past XXX, what percentage of your meals included sweets and desserts such as pie, cake,
jam, soft drinks (re gular not diet drinks), biscuits ?
Item 6: In XXX on how many days did you participate in at least 20 mins of physical exercise ?
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Item 7: In the past XXX what percentage of the time did you exercise the amount suggested by your doctor
(e.g. if your doctor recommended 30 minutes of physical activity) ?
Item 8: In XXX on how many days, did you participate in a specific exercise session other than
what you do around the house or as part of your work ?
Item 9: In XXX on how many days die you test your glucose (blood sugar) level ?
Item 10: Over XXX what percentage of the glucose (blood sugar or urine) tests recommended by
your doctor did you actually perform ?
Item 11: What percentage of your recommended insulin injections did you take in the past XXX
that you were supposed to ?
Item 12: In XXX what percentage of your recommended number of pills to control diabetes did
you take that you were supposed to ?
Nevertheless, there are several general observations that can be made. Firstly, the dietary
items (1-5) seem to elicit the greatest discrepancies between estimates at different time
points and across conditions. Overall high percentages of behavioural frequency estimates
were seen in those items that enquired about healthy (items 1-3) dietary behaviour and the
lowest percentages of behavioural responses appeared to be in those items asking about
unhealthy dietary behaviour (items 4 and 5). Secondly, there was virtually no variability in
the items examining medication taking patterns with responses deviating very little from
the 100% point. Similarly, for item 9 which asks about blood glucose testing, participants'
responses were very similar to each other but lower than the medication taking responses,
ranging from 63 to 69%. Item 10 however, which also looks at glucose testing, did not
conform to this pattern of response and will be explored further later in this section.
The physical activity items (6 — 8) yielded responses just below or very near to the mid —
point of the response scale i.e. 35-50% suggesting two interpretations. Either the sample
was normally distributed with most people exercising some of the time and very few
exercising very much or very little, or there were two types of people, exercisers and non
exercisers, resulting in a bimodal distribution. Participants' responses across conditions
were collapsed into the three time span frames investigated in this study (daily, week or 7-
days, month) and were examined graphically. These findings, for each physical activity
item are presented in Figure 8.2.
Item 6, which asked about percentage of time spent participating in at least 20 minutes of
physical exercise confirmed that the data were not normally distributed.
Daily records
Weekly/ 7 -day records
5
5
0
25	 3 75 I'll'
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Figure 8.2: Frequency with which participants said they engaged in 20 mins of physical activity in each time
frame (mean of daily records, weekly / 7-day records, monthly records)
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Responses to item 7 (percentage of time spent exercising as suggested by the respondent's
doctor) showed a similarly non-normal pattern of response with only few people falling at
the mid — point of a bell shaped distribution (See Figure 8.3).
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Figure 8.3: Frequency with which participants said they engaged in physical activity as suggested by their
physician in each time frame (mean of daily records, weekly / 7-day records, monthly records)
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Very similar results were obtained with respect to the last exercise item which asked
people to report the percentage of time they participated in a specific exercise session other
than what they do around the house or as part of their work (item 8). The data again
suggested bimodal results whereby participants generally fell in one of two response
groupings, those who exercised and those who did not, with fairly few people in between
(see Figure 8.4).
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Figure 8.4: Frequency with which participants said they engaged in a specific exercise session in each time
frame (mean of daily records, weekly / 7-day records, monthly records)
Daily records	 Week /7day records
Monthly records
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Finally, there is, as would be expected with ordered categorical responses, considerable
variability in behavioural estimates as seen in the large standard deviations in responses to
each item. As the observed variability is present across time frames and category split
manipulations (and hence not unique to any one item / time or category frame) it was not
judged inappropriate to proceed with robust parametric analyses in order to explore the
above pattern of results further.
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8.3.2. Inferential analyses
Mixed factor ANOVAs were used to test for main effects of time span and category split
group as well as an interaction between the two, on respondents' estimates of their dietary,
exercise BG testing and medication taking behaviours. Although it is generally argued that
ANOVA is a very robust test to use even in cases where its assumptions are violated,
Mauchly sphericity test results were inspected and where ANOVA homogeneity of
variance assumptions were violated the more stringent Greenhouse - Geisser Epsilon was
used instead. Bonferroni corrections were also used where appropriate to investigate
differences further in post hoc comparisons although, where the results seemed
psychologically significant and were accompanied by statistical significance seen in p.
values much smaller than 0.05 but not quite small enough to reach a significant Bonferroni
corrected p. level (of normally p<.016 for three way comparisons), psychological
significance outweighed strictly corrected statistical significance. These findings,
separately for each SDSCA item, are described below.
Firstly, it was necessary to establish that participants' daily records for each SDSCA item
were not different across category split conditions, thus establishing that random allocation
to conditions had been successful in that participants did not differ in their daily
behavioural records which would serve as a baseline verification measure. Independent t-
tests were performed on each item to test for differences in daily estimates across the two
conditions. There were no significant differences between conditions in daily records of
any one SDSCA item (item i t
 (50) = -.86, p>.05, item 2 t (48) = -1.08, p>.05, item 3 t (51) = -
1.18, p>.05, item 4 t (51) = -.05, p>.05, item 5 t (42.22) = -.98, p>.05, item 6 t (51) = .29, p>.05,
item 7 t (46) = .52, p>.05, item 8 t (51) = .05, p>.05, item 9 t (50) = .40, p>.05, item 10 t (47) =
.44, p>.05, item 11 t (5) = -.1.00, p>.05, item 12 t (18) = 1.84, p>.05)
Subsequently, inferential testing for main effects and interactions took place. The results
are presented separately for dietary self care, physical activity, glucose testing and
medication taking.
daily - week -
month estimate(condition 1)
•
▪
	 daily - 7day -
month estimate(condition 2)
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Dietary self care
• Item 1: This item asked about percentage of time people followed their recommended
diet. Although there were no category split effects (F (1,49) = . 16, p>.05) or a category
x time interaction (F (2,98) = 1.17, p>.05), a significant main effect of time was seen (F
(2,98) = 13.52, p<.01) where both groups reported less dietary adherence in both their
week / 7-day (t (51) = 3.29, p<.01) and monthly (t (50) = 4.86, p<.01) estimates as
compared to their daily records. This effect is shown in Figure 8.5
Figure 8.5: Underestimation of diet adherence in longer time periods
Time span
• Item 2: There were no significant main effects (time span F (2,98) = 1.70, p>.05,
category split F (2,98) = . 15, p>.05) or a significant interaction (F (2,98) = 2.63, p>.05) in
the item asking about limiting one's calories as recommended in healthy eating for
diabetes control.
• Item 3: The same pattern of nonsignificant results was seen in the item asking about
the percentage of time people consumed high fibre foods. There were no significant
main effects (time span F (2, too ) = 3.06, p>.05, category split F (1.50) = .39, p>.05) or a
significant interaction (F (2, too) = .62, p>.05) in people's estimates of high fibre food
consumption.
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• Item 4: This item asked about participants' consumption of high fat foods. There were
no effects of either time span (F (2, loco = 2.38, p>.05) or category split (F ( y() ) = .58,
p>.05). There was, however, a significant interaction between time span and category
split where, although condition 1 estimates were not significantly different at any one
time point (daily —week t(27) = -.25, p>.05, daily — month t (26) = -1.11, p>.05, week —
month t (26) = -1, p>.05), in condition 2, 7-day estimates were overestimated as
compared to both daily records (t (24) = -2.12, p<.05) and monthly records (t (24) = 2.83,
p<.01). This effect is seen in Figure 8.6.
Figure 8.6: Overestimation of Time 1 (7 day) estimates for condition 2 participants only in estimates of
high fat food consumption
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• Item 5: Participants were asked to estimate the percentage of time they consumed
sweets / desserts at the three time points. The data violated homogeneity of variance
assumptions as seen in a significant Mauchly sphericity test (W = .87, X2 (2) = 6.64,
p<.05) so the stricter Greenhouse Geisser test was performed instead. The results
suggested that there were no main effects of either time span (F (137, 98) = 2.32, p>.05)
or category split (F (1 ,49) = .50, p>.05). There was, however, a significant interaction
between time frame and category condition (F (1.77, 98) = 4.44, p<.05). It seems that
although condition 2 estimates (daily - 7-day — month) were, surprisingly, not
-MC-- daily - week -
month estimate
(condition 1)
AO 	
 daily - 7-day -
month estimate
(condition 2)
I	 I	 1daily	 week / 7-day	 month
Time span
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significantly different from each other at any one time point (daily —7-day t (23) = -.98,
p>.05, daily — month t (24)= -.13, p>.05, 7-day — month t (23) = 1.14, p>.05) monthly
estimates in condition 1 (daily — week — month) differed significantly from both
weekly ones (week — month t (26) = -2.56, p<.02) and daily records (daily — month t (26)
= -3.72, p<.01). This effect is seen in Figure 8.7.
Figure 8.7: Condition I participants show significant overestimation of sweet / dessert
consumption in both weekly and monthly estimates.
Physical activity
• Item 6: There were no differences between any time span frames or between category
split conditions in the percentage of time people said they engaged in 20 mins of
physical exercise (time span F (2, 88) = 1.00, p>.05, category split F (1,44) = .31, p>.05,
interaction F (2,88) = 1.05, p>.05).
• Item 7: No differences were observed in estimates of physical activity as recommended
by participants' doctors (time span F (2, 88) = 1.50, p>.05, category split F (1 ,44) = .62,
p>.05, interaction F (2,88) = .98, p>.05).
• Item 8: No differences were observed in the last exercise item enquiring about
percentage of time engaging in physical activity other than what is performed round the
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I
7-day	 monthda 
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house or as part of one's work (time span F (2,88) = . 62, p>.05, category split F (1,44) =
.03, p>.05, interaction F (2,88) = . 11, p>.05).
Glucose testing
• Item 9: No differences were found in estimates of percentage of time participants said
they tested their BG level across time and category frames (time span F (2, 90) = 1.05,
p>.05, category split F (1,45) = . 00, p>.05, interaction F (2,90) = 1.19, p>.05).
• Item 10: No differences appeared in estimates of whether people performed blood or
urine glucose tests as instructed by their doctor, as a function of category split
condition (category split F (1 ,42) = 1.48, p>.05). However, there was a time span effect
(F (2, 84) = 11.81, p<.01) where people in both conditions tended to overestimate their
BG testing activities frequency in both the weekly (or 7-day) reports (t (46) = -4.23,
p<.01) and monthly estimates (t (45) = -3.93, p<.01) as compared to their daily records.
No interaction between time and category frame was observed (F (2,84) = 2.68, p>.05).
These findings are shown Figure 8.8.
Figure 8.8: A main effect of time frame is seen in overreporting of glucose testing in longer time
frames as compared to mean of daily records.
Time span
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Medication taking
• Items 11 and 12: These items asked about participants' estimates of the percentage of
time they took diabetes tablets (item 11) and insulin injections (item 12) as
recommended. The means shown in Table 8.2 clearly show lack of any variance across
conditions and or time frames worthy of further exploration.
8.3.3. Summary
It seems that four out of the twelve SDSCA items were subject to either time span effects
or interaction effects. In sum, there was a main effect of time in item 1 (following
recommended diet) as seen in lower behavioural frequencies in both weekly (or 7-day) and
monthly estimates, and item 10 (performing recommended glucose tests), as seen in
overreporting of such behaviours in both week (or 7-day) and monthly estimates.
Items 4 (fatty foods) and 5 (sweets / desserts) were subject to time x category interactions
although this pattern was different for each item. Condition 2 participants overestimated
fatty food consumption in the past 7 days, but that was not the case for participants in
condition 1. On the other hand sweets/ desserts' consumption over the past month was
overestimated by participants in condition 1 as compared to both daily and weekly records,
although that was not the case for participants in condition 2.
Exercise (items 6, 7, 8) medication taking (items 11 and 12), high fibre intake (item 2) and
BU testing (item 9) estimates were unaffected by time / category manipulations.
8.4.	 Discussion 
This study examined the usefulness of the SDSCA in eliciting accurate behavioural
frequency estimates of diabetes self care activities over the recent past. In general, it was
found that the SDSCA was fairly robust to both time span and category split manipulations
with items asking about limiting calorific intake (item 2), consuming high fibre food (item
3), engaging in physical activity (items 6, 7 and 8), BG testing (item 9) and medication
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taking (items 11 and 12) being unaffected by either the time frame or the category frame
the question was phrased in. Overall, it would seem that most (8) of the SDSCA's (12)
items produced nonsignificantly different estimates of past diabetes self care when used
with Type 2 diabetes patients. Items however asking about following a recommended diet
(item 1), unhealthy eating as seen in fatty food and sweet consumption (items 4 and 5) and
glucose testing (item 10) were subject to time (items 1 and 10) and time x category
interactions (items 4 and 5). Results for each of these items will now be discussed in turn.
Item 1 asked participants about the percentage of time they followed their recommended
diet in a given time frame. A significant effect of time frame was seen where participants
in both category split conditions underestimated their dietary adherence in both Time 1
(week or 7-days) and Time 2 (past month) frequency estimates as compared to the average
of their daily records for the given week (or 7-days). However, all three estimates were
quite high ranging from about 70% to 83% of the time thus suggesting, overall, very well
self managing samples. This underestimation is in line with findings previously reported in
the literature that suggested that lower behavioural frequencies are given in longer time
frames (e.g. Hoorens and Harris 1998). It is unlikely that the reason behind such
underestimation of dietary adherence in the time frames explored here would lie in
memory decay seen with passing time. Some of the estimates were given for periods as
recent as the past week, so it is unlikely that participants would have forgotten what
percentage of time they kept to their recommended diet in that so very recent period. It is
more likely that events of dietary nonadherence were telescoped from less recent periods
thus deflating the overall report of successful dietary self care. A person with Type 2
diabetes is recommended a low fat high carbohydrate diet, and dietary adherence may be
driven by schematic processes. Therefore, instances of deviations (e.g. in eating fatty or
sweet foods) should stand out in people's memory hence giving them the impression that
they did not really follow their recommended diet. Research suggests that schema -
atypical information will be recalled better in shorter time frames (e.g. Graesser et al.,
1990) as well as that the easier an event is to recall the more frequent (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974) and recent (Brown et al., 1985) it will be perceived to be. Therefore, it
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is proposed that participants' underestimation of good dietary self care in both the recent
(week and 7-days) as well as more distant (month) past may have been due to forward
telescoping of events of dietary nonadherence from an earlier time period into the
reference period they were asked to consider. In order to confirm this explanation however,
dietary intake diaries would have to be kept for a long period right before and including the
reference period in question, in order to establish whether and to what extent material may
be intruding from earlier time frames.
In terms of accuracy, it seems that participants' self reports of their dietary self care about
a period as short as the past week (or 7-days) are likely to be inaccurate and, as seen in this
study, deflated to suggest poorer dietary self care than actually took place. Asking people a
loosely defined question such as the one posed in item 1 of the SDSCA (which contains no
definition of what a 'recommended diet' is, and assumes that people do have a
recommended diet which they follow and can hence report on) may lead to inaccurate
reports and should perhaps be avoided.
In a recent modification of the SDSCA (Toobert, Hampson and Glasgow, 2000), this item
was re - worded to ask about following 'a healthful eating plan' rather than a
recommended diet. It is argued that such a revision may be go some way in dealing with
instances where a patient, in not having been explicitly recommended a specific diet, finds
the question misleading. However, asking about a healthful diet may be as general and
loosely defined a question as the one appearing in the original SDCSA version. It is
suggested that explicitly defining what the researchers mean by the term 'healthful diet'
may well be helpful in eliciting more reliable time —span - free responses, to the particular
item.
Interestingly, item 1 was not subject to a category split effect of a category x time
interaction. The reason for this may be that in being a question which asks about a general
(rather than specific) instance of behaviour, it invites schematic —based answers. Such
answers would involve a general impression frequency estimation strategy (general views
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about dietary adherence) rather than a strict recall and count enumeration strategy (i.e.
thinking about specific events of dietary adherence). This may in itself be a strategy robust
to category split effects. Such an explanation would need to be confirmed by further
research involving interviewing participants about strategies they used to arrive at any one
given estimate.
Item 2, asking about calorie limiting as recommended in diabetes control, may have been
subject to similar schematic effects as responses here were found to be subject to neither
time nor category split effects. Like item 1, behavioural estimates of calorie limitation
were again quite high suggesting that overall the sample was pretty well-managing. It is
quite likely that, like item 1, the question did not invite recollection of specific behavioural
events in any time frame, and as such participants relied on schematic ideas about the
extent to which they calorie-count in an attempt to follow a recommended diet. It is
known (e.g. Markus, 1977) that schematic ideas about the self are usually resistant to time
and change so it is not surprising that they were unaffected here by time and or category
split manipulations.
Unlike item 1 though, this question was not likely to invite the recall of schematic atypical
instances. That is, it is unlikely that a diabetic person who may normally calorie-count will
suddenly remember the one occasion in a given time frame where they did not do that, and
hence deflate estimates of such behaviour taking place. It would appear that to the extent to
which a particular question asks for recollection of general (rather than specific) dietary
behaviour, and in doing so does not invite recollection of atypical schematic information
relating to that behaviour, it will be robust to time and category split effects. Obviously
such a finding needs to be replicated in future work before being generalised.
Item 3, on the other hand, which enquired about a very specific dietary event, was found to
also be resistant to both time and category split effects. Like items 1 and 2, in this case
too, reports of good dietary self care as seen in high fibre food intake (ranging from 71% to
80% of the time) were observed, suggesting that fairly well-adherent participants had a
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pretty good idea about the extent to which they followed a high-fibre diet. It is interesting
that although items 1 and 3 are essentially asking the same question, i.e. whether people
followed a healthy diet, when the question is framed in general (item 1: following a
recommended diet) rather than specific (item 3: eating high fibre foods such as ....) terms
it is subject to time span effects. This is an interesting finding and worthy of further
investigation as it may be that for healthy eating behaviours, asking specific questions
which involve examples of the type of behaviour the question enquires about may lead to
more accurate reports than asking about general, dietary -related, yet non-specific
behaviours. It is promising that in Toobert et al's (2000) recent review of the SDCSA this
item has remained in the scale, and similarly another well defined, diet - specific item has
been added Con how many of the last 7 days did you eat five or more servings of fruits and
vegetables ?'). It is argued that such well defined, specific questions about healthy dietary
behaviours may be particularly useful in eliciting unbiased self reports, as they appear to
be resistant to both time and category split effects.
The results observed in items 4 and 5 would suggest that the benefits of asking specific
rather than general dietary behaviour questions are limited to items asking about healthy
diet only, as both items 4 and 5 which asked about specific instances of unhealthy eating
were subject to time and category frame effects. For example, condition 2 (split category)
participants responding to item 4 which asked about the percentage of meals that included
high fat foods, showed inflated Time 1 responses (7-day) as compared to both their
monthly and daily records, these being very similar to each other. This effect was not seen
however in responses obtained from participants in condition 1 whose responses were not
significantly different from each other at any one time point. In other words, what was seen
here was a classic split category effect where people in the split condition (7-days as
opposed to week) only, demonstrated inflation of their unhealthy eating behavioural
estimates for that specific split category time frame only, as Fiedler and Armbuster's
(1994) work would suggest. It thus seems that fatty food consumption is subject to the
inflating effects of splitting a category and in doing so such estimates are extremely
inaccurate (as verified against the participants' daily records).
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A reason behind the inflation of perceived frequencies in a split category may be the result
of a-schematic material being more vividly remembered, hence more easily accessible
and, as the availability heuristic would propose, judged as more frequent. For example, it
may be that partitioning a whole category into smaller subcategories (a week into each of
7 days) may lead people to engage in a more thorough search of their memory as to what
dietary events took place during that period. In enumerating such dietary events, the
question is asking people to focus on atypical or 'bad' (for a well managing diabetic
person) dietary intake (fatty foods). It is known that such atypical a-schematic information
will be particularly well remembered in the short term (e.g. Graesser et al., 1980) meaning
that it will come to mind fairly easily. In doing so, and according to Tversky and
Kahneman's (1974) work, the frequency of its occurrence will be inflated as a function of
ease of availability. If breaking down a category enhances a more thorough memory search
and thus makes atypical events more easily available, it follows that the frequency of such
events will be overestimated.
A second explanation may have to do with a flawed frequency estimation strategy taking
place. It could be that breaking a whole category into subcategories may invite people to
initially enumerate specific events of fatty food intake for each one of the given
subcategories separately (e.g. consider each of the 7 days separately and search for
instances of the behavioural event in question taking place). It is known that when as few
as 5 events are enumerated, such a strategy is likely to be abandoned (Blair and Burton,
1987) and be replaced by an estimation strategy for the rest of the remaining time frame.
The results of the original enumeration however may be used as a baseline upon which
subsequent estimation will be based (Conrad et al., 1998). If atypical fatty food
consumption events are distinctive thus likely to be easily recalled, it is likely that they will
be included in the enumeration part of the frequency judgement strategy and as such will
serve as an inflated anchoring point upon which estimates for the rest of the period will be
based, thus yielding overall inflated estimates of dietary nonadherence. Obviously, it
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follows that such post hoc explanations should be further explored in experimental testing
before they are generalised.
It is unfortunate that the recently revised SDSCA has adopted a split category format in
asking about fatty food consumption in the recent past (past 7 days). An additional
difference in the revised version is the response format adopted which now asks about
specific number of days the respondent engaged in the particular behaviour rather than a
percentage of time. It may be that the error-promoting effects of splitting a whole category
into subcategories may be more pronounced now; the currently revised question format
may require a thorough memory search (in order to deal with the amended detail-requiring
response format) of several subcategories (each one of 7 days) and as such may be more
likely to be subject to enumeration errors as discussed earlier. Further research using the
new version of the SDSCA will be helpful in identifying whether it is likely to be affected
by time x category split interactions as suggested by the findings of the present study.
Surprisingly, similar interaction effects were not observed in item 5 which also asked
about unhealthy dietary habits (sweets and desserts consumption). In terms of the range of
responses obtained for this item, participants seemed to be doing well, with reported
percentages of meals including sweets and desserts ranging within very low values from 10
to 17%. This highest percentage was seen in the monthly estimates of participants in
condition 1 as well as the 7-day estimates of participants in condition 2. Respondents in
both conditions reported identical response trends however to those seen in item 4, with
condition 1 people tending to over report in the month as opposed to daily and weekly
records while condition 2 people tended to over report in the 7-day condition as compared
to the daily and monthly records (see Figures 8.6 and 8.7). However, this trend was
statistically nonsignificant. What was significant in this item was an overestimation of
sweet / dessert consumption in estimates about the past month as compared to daily
records and weekly estimates in responses obtained from participants allocated to
condition 1 only (daily — week — month), hence leading to a statistically reliable interaction
being seen in these data.
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This finding is in complete contrast to work in this area (e.g. Hoorens and Harris 1998)
which has suggested underestimation of both healthy and unhealthy behaviours in longer
time frames. An explanation for such overreporting of sweet / dessert consumption in the
past month may be indicative of forward telescoping. It is known that the degree to which
items will be telescoped from an earlier period (e.g. the past 2 months) into a more recent
period is greater for longer time frames (e.g. Thompson et al., 1988). It is quite likely that
diabetic participants may have overestimated their unhealthy eating behaviour in the past
month as a result of being able to recollect engaging in such behaviour in the recent past
but perhaps not strictly in the past one month. The literature would suggest that such dating
errors are quite commonplace (Huttenlocher and Prohaska, 1997) and as the question did
not emphasise time accuracy (by e.g. pointing out that the past 30 days but no longer back
was the period of interest here) may have been expected.
Another reasonable assumption may be that the daily and weekly records obtained for this
item were inaccurately low and hence inappropriate records to extrapolate monthly
responses from. This could have been due to the participants' perhaps believing that their
self care records were evaluated in this research, thus modifying their sweets consumption
for the week they kept records for and as a result making it an atypical time frame, one
which one could not generalise from. This is fairy unlikely however in that such a pattern
should have been seen in item 4 above which too, asked about unhealthy eating. Then
again it may be easier to restrict sweets / desserts intake rather than fatty food intake if you
believe your self care performance is evaluated so perhaps that is the reason why we saw
this pattern of results in this item but not on the one asking about fatty food consumption.
Also, many patients think erroneously that restricting sweets is more important than
restricting fatty food. Interestingly, in the recent SDCSA modification (Toobert et al.,
2000) the item has been dropped to reflect changing trends to healthy eating which now
focus on diet flexibility and counting carbohydrates rather than sweet consumption.
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Items 6, 7 and 8 which enquired about participants' estimates of physical activity for any
Given period, were subject to neither time span or category frame effects. The obtained
responses also suggested that people were overall, not particularly well - managing in
terms of engagement in physical activity, with people either being fairly physically active
or not physically active at all. The responses obtained from these two groups of people
yielded overall behavioural estimates of time engaging in physical activity in the 50% or
less, region.
The relatively poor self care patterns in terms of physical activity that are suggested in this
research are expected and are widely seen in the self management literature which
concludes that physical activity self care is among those areas of diabetes self management
that diabetic people find most challenging (e.g. Krug, Haire-Joshu and Heady, 1991). From
a time span perceptive, what is of interest is that people's estimates of their physical
activity seem to be unaffected by either time or category split manipulations. The fact that
the obtained data fell into more or less two response categories of people who either did
lots of exercise or none at all, may well explain this finding. It could be that older people
with Type 2 diabetes have schematic, self-referent ideas about whether they are / aren't
physically active. In being questioned about specific physical activity behaviours over a
given period it is likely that such schematic, and as such easy to retrieve, ideas about
oneself take priority over a thorough memory search of specific physical activity events.
As such, no actual frequency estimation strategies take place here and hence errors in
frequency estimates as a function of time / category split are not observed.
This idea, although not formally recorded, was suggested by the participants' responses to
all physical activity items. There was a tendency for people to respond in more or less
identical ways to all three items asking about different aspects of physical activity,
normally by using the extremes of the response scale (0% or 100%). Similarly, very few
people responded in variable ways to the three exercise items and even fewer used the mid
point of the response scale.
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One reason why physical activity items may have been subject to schematic response sets
rather than a thorough memory search and frequency estimation, may have to do with the
way the questions were phrased. It could be that if participants were unclear as to what
exactly the question was asking them — as informal feedback from recruited participants
suggested was the case for most - then enumerating instances of, what appeared to them to
be a poorly defined behavioural episode, may be extremely difficult. As such, and in
attempt to make some response to an ill-defined question, participants may have relied on
general ideas that pertained to the general nature of the question they were being asked
about. If that was the case, then it would be expected that they would treat all three
exercise items of the SDSCA as the same, i.e. a question about their exercise habits. As
such, a uniform and invariable mode of response would be expected.
For example, item 6 asked participants about the extent to which they participated in at
least 20 mins of physical exercise in a given time period yet the term 'physical exercise'
was not defined and may have meant different things to different participants. Item 7 asked
for the amount of time people exercised as suggested by their doctor, assuming that people
with diabetes were given specific physical activity advice by their doctor (informal
discussion with most of the recruited participants suggested that that was clearly not the
case). Perhaps exercise prescriptions are the trend in US samples for which the SDSCA
was primarily designed, but may not be appropriate for use with UK samples until such
exercise —prescriptive behaviour also becomes the trend in this country. Finally, item 8
asked about exercise sessions other than what participants do around the house or as part of
their work but at the same time failed to differentiate whether the activity this item asked
people to think about was in any way different from the type of activity they had been
asked about in item 6. In an attempt to avoid seeming inconsistent, the same response to
that given in item 6 may have been likely.
Thankfully, the recently revised SDCSA addresses some of the above concerns. For
instance, there are now only two items on exercise and both are more clearly defined. The
first asks about the number of days the respondent engaged in at least 30 minutes of
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then inflated behavioural reports were given compared to the number of tests that were
actually performed on the basis of the collected daily records. It is argued that participants
are likely to have relied on schematic self referent knowledge about their glucose testing in
the first case (e.g. I know I am the kind of person who generally tests their blood sugar
level so I must have done it). In the second case however, in that the question asks people
to perform a more complex cognitive task (not only recall but also compare their
behavioural frequency to a given standard) perhaps an estimation strategy is more likely to
have taken place and hence frequency estimation errors may have been more likely to
affect the task at hand. The literature would, however, suggest that such estimates of
behavioural frequency should have led to underreporting in longer time frames, so the
current finding might not be supportive of such a view.
An explanation for this may partly involve social desirability issues. In asking about the
testing performed as was suggested by the participant's physician, the question is inviting
people to say to what extent they deviated from given advice i.e. to what extent they were
nonadherent. It is well known (see Rand, 2000 for a review) that people who self manage
an illness strive to appear well managing (and thus adherent) and in being questioned
directly about the extent to which they deviated from an adherence standard, they may be
likely to produce socially desirable, hence inflated behavioural estimates. This social
desirability issue might only be applicable to this rather than previously discussed items
which enquired about dietary or physical activity self care behaviours. The reason for this
may be that with the exception of item 7 (an ill defined physical activity item) no other
item asks the respondent to directly compare their behaviour against a well defined
standard i.e. what they were recommended by their doctor. As such, a socially desirable
answer may be less likely in those cases.
The new SDCSA version by Toobert et al., (2000) has retained both BG items although the
response options are more precise now, asking about the number of days patients engaged
in the particular behaviours. As such, they may be differentially affected (if at all) by time
and category split manipulations.
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Finally, behavioural frequency responses to items enquiring about medication taking were
very high and extremely invariable suggesting that frequency estimates about this well
managed aspect of diabetes self care are robust to both time and category effects. It is
argued that in this case too, participants' apparently error-free estimates may have been the
result of reliance on their schematic knowledge about whether they normally take
medication as prescribed or not. As such, schematic ideas are unlikely to be different in
different time frames (e.g. Fiske and Taylor 1991), and hence the observed consistency in
responses was obtained. The same has been inferred in a recent review of studies using the
SDSCA in the past by Toobert et al. (2000) who concluded that Ithe revised SDCSAJ does
not include questions on medication taking because of strong ceiling effects and a lack of
variability among respondents' (p.947).
In summary, it seems that the SDSCA is, in general terms, fairly robust to both time and
category split manipulations with the majority of its items, and in particular items asking
about behavioural frequencies about respondents' BG and / or urine testing, medication
taking, fibre intake and calorific limitation behaviours, being uninfluenced by either time
or category frame effects. In addition, such reports appeared to also be very accurate to the
extent that self report records obtained on a daily basis for a week, could serve as
predictors of the behaviours that may be normally taking place in that week as well as a
slightly longer past period.
As such, it would appear that the SDSCA in its slightly modified format examined here,
may in fact be quite a useful instrument to use with a sample of people with Type 2
diabetes in eliciting behavioural frequency estimates about several areas of diabetes self
management. However, before accepting such a view it should be noted that four of the
twelve items examined here did give biased responses, affected by time and category split
which would suggest caution before using such items further.
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Two of those items were subject to complex time x category interaction patterns and
involved asking questions about specific unhealthy dietary habits (fatty food and sweets
intake). The other two were subject to time effects only; overestimation of reported
behaviours in longer time periods was observed in an item asking a well defined, quite
specific question about glucose testing while underestimation of reported behaviour in
such periods was seen in an ill-defined item asking about following one's recommended
diet. Explanations as to why the observed patterns of response may be occurring were
outlined earlier although most of these would need further confirmation before being
generalised. Also, given the relatively small sample size in this study there remains the
necessity for these findings to be replicated before being generalised.
The overall message however is that to the extent that self reports are unavoidable in
assessing people's self care activities, the SDSCA may be a useful tool in obtaining such
reports about people's efforts to i) limit their calorific intake (item 2) ii) consume high
fibre foods (item 3), iii) engage in physical activity (items 4-6 but further research is
needed with respect to ensuring that participants are treating these three items as distinct
from each other and are happy with the adopted wording) iv) general blood glucose testing
(item 9) and finally v) medication taking. It would appear that, overall, the reason behind
the observed robustness of these items to time and category frame effects may have to do
with the questions inviting people to provide schema — based information about their
behaviour rather than rely on frequency estimation strategies which, as reviewed in the
previous chapter, can be prone to estimation errors.
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Chapter 9
General Discussion
The present thesis examined cognitive functioning in people with Type 2 diabetes in two
related areas. It considered cognitive functioning as assessed by and revealed in
performance in traditional neuropsychological tests. In addition, it examined a more
practical aspect of cognitive performance, namely people's ability to give accurate
estimates of behavioural frequency estimates of their past diabetes self care activities. In
doing so the following specific questions were investigated:
• Is there a relationship between cognitive function and diabetes self management ?
• Is there cognitive impairment in people with Type 2 diabetes as compared to diabetes-
free controls ?
• Is implicit memory preserved in people with Type 2 diabetes ?
• Are self reports of past diabetes self care activities affected by item format ?
The extent to which the work presented in this thesis has succeeded in providing an insight
to the above, as well as limitations of the presented work and suggestions for future
research will now be discussed for each question in turn.
Is there a relationship between cognitive function and diabetes self management ? 
The work reported in Chapter 5 provided evidence to suggest that there is a relationship
between cognition and self care in diabetes as well as that cognitive and diabetes-specific
cognitive factors are predictive of self management behaviours in Type 2 diabetes.
Such findings would be in support of the idea that indeed, people's self care and their
cognitive function are related, and that the two may well be responsible for sharing some
of the observed behavioural variability in both cognitive performance and self management
activities.
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At the onset of the present research a big gap was identified in the literature. It seemed that
there were two distinct areas of research in Type 2 diabetes; research looking into diabetes
self management and research investigating cognitive functioning in people with the
illness. It is surprising that, but for the present thesis and one recently published study by
Sinclair et al.,(2000), this gap still exists. So the self management literature is yet to
systematically consider the possibility that self care behaviours may be related to and be
predicted by patients' cognitive functioning. Instead current work on the self management
of Type 2 diabetes is still being centred around social, environmental, education and
personality variables (see Glasgow, Fisher, Anderson, LaGreca, Marrera, Johnson, Rubin
and Cox, 1999 for a review) that may be mediating self care attempts with the odd
warning at the end of published papers that 'Clients must become good problem solvers
and make careful assessments before choosing behaviors that will keep their blood glucose
levels within target parameters. Cognition is an important intervening variable that cannot
be overlooked when studying this population' (Sullivan and Joseph, 1998, p.76). At the
same time, studies in the domain of cognitive function in people with the illness, whilst not
making any serious attempts to ascertain what the implications of their findings may be for
diabetes self management, usually end their work with comments such as 'Cognitive
impairment may be considered a potential long-term outcome of diabetes that clinicians
should be aware of while taking care of older adults with diabetes' (Gregg et al., 2000,
p.197). The single, recently published study by Sinclair et al., (2000) which found a
positive relationship between cognitive dysfunction and diabetes self management is a
good start, but its several shortcomings which were discussed earlier do not allow
generalisation of this study's results.
In fact, the results of the current thesis would suggest that the relationship between
cognition and self care in Type 2 diabetes is more complex than originally envisaged.
Although some aspects of self care were related to enhanced cognitive functioning as one
would expect (e.g. better mental flexibility related to better physical activity self care),
some others (e.g. better dietary self care) appeared to be predicted by poor cognitive
functioning (limited abstract problem solving).
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What is more, the direction of the relationship is still far from clear; is it that poor self care
leads to a decline in cognitive functioning (mediated by poor diabetes control) which in
turn increases diabetes-related threats to subsequent cognitive performance ? Or could it be
that poor cognitive performance is responsible for poor self care (as seen in poor diabetes
control) which then itself leads to further cognitive impairment ?
The cross-sectional, correlational nature of the present work necessarily limits the extent to
which such questions can be answered. Prospective work is imperative before any
direction of causality is investigated further and subsequently established. The strengths of
the work presented here however, lie in the fact that there is now clear evidence to support
the existence of an unambiguous, although modest in size, relationship between self care
and cognitive function. As such, the current work has succeeded in identifying the
relationship between cognition and self care as an area worthy of further scientific enquiry,
and highlighting the fact that such a relationship may perhaps be less straightforward and
more complex than originally thought.
The present findings may also have implications for clinical practice. If cognitive
functioning and diabetes self care are related and cognitive performance can predict self
care, then cognitive assessment of patients with diabetes should perhaps be routinely
performed in order to identify individuals who may find self care particularly challenging.
Additional help and support could then be offered to such people in an attempt to improve
diabetes self management. This view has been repeatedly expressed in the literature to
include the study by Sinclair et al., (2000) who recommended that '...screening for
cognitive dysfunction should be an integral part of the assessment process for older adults
with diabetes mellitus'. Given that different cognitive tests (and subsequently cognitive
domains) were found to be associated differentially with different areas of self care, those
tests with the strongest relationship with self care might be used as indicators of likely self
management success. Obviously, the cross-sectional correlational nature of this work
limits the extent to which such suggestions can be made with confidence.
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The tools that are available at present to explore the relationship between cognition and
diabetes self management are also very far from adept. The neuropsychological tests that
have been used in the present and other similar research have been primarily developed for
use with samples other than Type 2 diabetes patients. There has been no standardisation in
their use with people with diabetes and any agreement on which tests should be routinely
used for the screening of such patients is lacking. A similar observation is apparent in the
self management area; although there is now agreement that management efforts in one
self care area are usually unrelated to management efforts in an another (e.g. Eakin and
Glasgow, 1996) no obvious standards of self care are widely available against which self
care can be assessed. Means of formal standardised assessment of routine self care
activities are also lacking.
Given the absence of reliable tools to investigate the area, attempting to correlate
performance which has been assessed using objective, yet perhaps inappropriate for use
with Type 2 diabetes samples, cognitive tests in one hand and self report hence less
reliable measures of diabetes self management on the other, may be a risky exercise.
However, if the current findings are interpreted in the light of the identified weaknesses
inherent in the research tools used, this might mean that the benefits of now having some
initial preliminary ideas as to whether there is a relationship between cognition and self
care perhaps outweigh the limitations attached to the research tools at hand.
Is there cognitive impairment in people with Type 2 diabetes as compared to diabetes- free 
controls ?
This apparent difficulty in the reliability of the research tools available, is even more
pronounced when differences in cognitive performance are examined between Type 2
diabetes and diabetes - free samples. Here, it is of utmost importance to be confident that
the means used to identify cognitive impairment and / or pathologise the existence of such
impairment are entirely appropriate, reliable and valid. The lack of any guidelines as to
what cognitive tests should be routinely used with Type 2 diabetes patients only adds to the
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uncertainty that the current literature findings on cognitive impairment in Type 2 diabetes
convey. It would appear that, currently, although some cognitive impairment has been
identified in Type 2 diabetes, the extent and locus of such deficiency are still unknown.
What is more, as no two studies have used the same battery of cognitive tests or
methodological and statistical controls, it is extremely difficult to compare findings across
studies.
The work presented in Chapter 6 attempted to examine whether there is cognitive
impairment in people with Type 2 diabetes. Given the variability in methods and tests used
in the past, a strict methodological approach was adopted whereby only widely and
previously used cognitive tests were administered and the only difference between the
samples tested was the existence (or not) of Type 2 diabetes. In the presence of such
stringent methodology and control, some cognitive impairment was evidenced, but that
was not widespread and limited only to verbal memory and ability to mentally manipulate
and recall logical sequences in the short term. In fact, when the data were re-analysed in an
attempt to investigate whether part of the previously reported widespread cognitive
dysfunction in Type 2 diabetes patients might lie in the absence of appropriate
methodological and statistical control, this idea was confirmed.
It would appear that people with Type 2 diabetes may well be cognitively disadvantaged
than their diabetes-free counterparts. However this impairment appears to neither be linked
to diabetes per se nor to be widespread. Further, given the unreliability inherent in the
research tools used to establish it, it is proposed that it is inappropriate to treat it as factual
or indeed pathologise it. In addition, the present findings would suggest that unless
appropriate methodological controls are in place, the widespread cognitive dysfunction that
should have been attributed to factors other than diabetes may erroneously be ascribed to
the illness.
Nevertheless, some impairment in cognitive functioning in Type 2 diabetes was seen in the
work presented here. The extent and magnitude of it however appeared to be limited so it
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is proposed that the burdens it may bring to successful self care may well be negligible.
The areas where people with diabetes were seen to be impaired compared to their diabetes-
free counterparts were those of verbal memory, in particular memory for logical sequences
(Logical Memory Story A) and complex auditory attention (serial Subtraction of 7s, SS7),
a task which again focused on manipulating verbally logical (numerical) sequences. There
are two observations worthy of further discussion here. The first is that the impairment was
small (albeit statistically significant) and limited to the diabetic sample's performance on
the first test of logical memory, i.e. Logical Memory A. If a serious organic dysfunction
was present, one that is likely to adversely affect self care, one would expect it to reveal
itself in both tests of verbal memory, especially as both have traditionally been treated as
identical in terms of the demands they place on the participant (Lezak, 1995). It would
appear that the difficulty people with diabetes might be facing here has motivational rather
than organic causes; when given a second chance at the same cognitive task, their
performance improved to be comparable to that of the diabetes-free sample.
This finding may have implications for clinical practice. It may well be that self care
advice should be given in small logical steps, repeatedly, to enhance the diabetic person's
chances of being able to recall it in the short term. As the present research did not test for
long term recall, it may well be that once this initial short term recall difficulty is dealt
with, long term recall is unaffected. Further research should consider testing people with
diabetes on long term in addition to short term verbal recall.
The second observation has to do with the ecological validity of the Serial Subtraction of
7s test, where people with Type 2 diabetes were seen to be taking longer to complete than
diabetes-free people. Here, the diabetic sample was found to be clearly impaired in a test of
complex auditory attention and mental flexibility. Given the novelty of the task (subtract
7s from 100 under timed conditions), if there is a motivational difficulty in people with
Type 2 diabetes as suggested earlier, perhaps a second chance at the task would have
produced different results. Future research might benefit from exploring this issue further.
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If however we accept the current findings at face value, then it seems that people with
Type 2 diabetes have problems subtracting, as quickly as possible, 7s from 100 and in fact
take longer to do so than people without diabetes. This finding could have quite distinct
implications for clinical practice, depending on how we choose to interpret it. If we accept
that the SS7 test is ecologically valid, then self care providers should approach the task of
educating people with Type 2 diabetes knowing that they are working with a sample of
people who find tasks likely to require complex auditory attention, challenging. If on the
other hand we hypothesise that taking 7s away from 100 under timed conditions is a task
that has very little relevance to diabetes self management, then the implications of the
apparent impaired performance on this task for clinical practice may be minimal. The latter
view may also be strengthened by the fact that the diabetic sample's cognitive performance
on other tests that also measure complex auditory attention (e.g. digit span) was no
different to that of the control sample's. Further research is needed to try and disentangle
organic and motivational factors that may be affecting the performance of people with
diabetes on neuropsychological tests.
In addition, the cross - sectional, research that was undertaken here with a relatively small
sample size limits the extent to which sensible conclusions can be drawn about the possible
effects of such dysfunction on everyday life. Prospective work using research tools that are
widely accepted as appropriate for use with Type 2 diabetes samples is necessary before
further investigating the extent and magnitude of cognitive impairment in this sample of
people. The strengths of the current work lie in determining the importance of strict
methodological and statistical control before suggestions of a link between diabetes and
cognitive dysfunction are made. Accordingly, it is proposed that findings from studies that
have adopted very relaxed methodological controls (e.g. Cerizza et al., 1990; Worrall et al.,
1993; Helkala et al., 1995; Vanhanen et al., 1996; Assisi et al, 1996) should be interpreted
in the light of the current thesis' findings that methodology and statistical controls can
have a great effect on increasing the probability of Type 1 .error.
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Is implicit memory preserved in people with Type 2 diabetes ? 
Another strength of the present work lies in the finding that implicit memory, a cognitive
process not previously researched in Type 2 diabetes, may remain unaffected by the
illness. A newly developed conceptual - perceptual implicit memory test, as described and
evaluated in Chapter 4, was used in the present research as means of exploring implicit
memory in people with Type 2 diabetes. It was used in correlational research investigating
the relationship between diabetes and cognitive function as well as in experimental
research looking for differences in implicit memory performance between people with
diabetes and diabetes-free individuals. It was found that there was a relationship between
implicit memory processes and BU testing but the direction of the relationship was not as
would be expected, with people who showed better implicit memory self reporting poorer,
rather than superior, self care. Further, no differences were seen between people with Type
2 diabetes and matched controls in implicit memory when strict methodological and
statistical controls were employed, however the diabetic sample appeared to be performing
more poorly than the controls at the implicit task when these controls were removed. The
implications of this finding with respect to the importance of control were discussed
earlier. Moreover, it would appear that implicit processes are, to a limited extent, related to
self care and also remain unaffected by Type 2 diabetes.
It is worrying however that both in the pilot work reported in Chapter 4 and in work
reported in subsequent chapters using the newly developed implicit memory test, the
amounts of implicit learning demonstrated were rather small. This was seen to be true both
in the research that tested people with diabetes and in the pilot work on the implicit task,
testing healthy student volunteers. On the basis of the earlier reviewed literature on
implicit memory, it was seen that older adults may find conceptual implicit memory tests
hard to do (Rybash, 1996). However there was no reason why young healthy adults should
be showing limited implicit learning. It would appear that the task used here, which
utilised a conceptual orienting stage but a perceptual implicit memory stage, may have led
to floor effects seen in the performance of all people tested on it, regardless of age or
health status. It may well be that the initial conceptual orienting task, confounded with the
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perceptual nature of the implicit test itself, led to deflated performance at both pilot and
main tests. In explicit memory research it is well known (as seen in research in Transfer
Appropriate Processing) that unless the orienting and testing stages are similar explicit
memory performance will suffer (Morris, Bransford and Franks, 1977). Future research in
the implicit memory of people with Type 2 diabetes may benefit from utilising either a
wholly conceptual or a wholly perceptual test to avoid the possibility of confounded
results. In doing so, the question of the extent to which such samples show preserved
implicit memory will be more easily and clearly evaluated and as such, suggestions about
using implicit memory skills in education about everyday diabetes self care may be made
possible.
Are self reports of past diabetes self care activities affected by item format ?
Having explored cognitive functioning in people with Type 2 diabetes from a laboratory
based psychometric perspective, the current thesis went on to explore cognitive processes
involved in self care tasks from a more practical perspective, namely the routine reporting
of self care information about the recent past. In doing so, two studies were designed and
piloted on diabetes-free undergraduate volunteers using appropriately modified versions of
the SDS CA. The results were discussed in Chapter 7. It was found that when behavioural
frequency information about two recent periods (the past week or 7 days and the past
month) was requested at the same point in time, the questionnaire elicited responses that
appeared to be robust to time span and category split effects. When however these reports
were contrasted to reports obtained from participants' daily records for one of the two
periods they were reporting on, the SDSCA appeared to be subject to response bias effects.
On that basis, it was decided to collect daily, weekly and monthly behavioural frequency
reports from the sample with Type 2 diabetes, the results of which appeared and were
discussed in Chapter 8. It was shown that overall the SDSCA was moderately effective at
eliciting error-free reports of past diabetes self care activities, with items enquiring about
medication taking, blood glucose testing, physical activity and healthy dietary habits being
overall unaffected by time and category —split effects. It was also suggested that parts of
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the currently adapted SDSCA versions were likely to elicit schema-based information
rather than require the participant to engage in detailed frequency estimation strategies. As
such, information that was likely to have been generated in schematic, rather than
frequency estimated, ways was found to be unaffected by time and category effects.
There are a couple of major issues arising from the above findings that are worthy of
further discussion. Firstly there is the difficulty with interpreting the findings from the two
pilot studies as well as the main study in the light of the extensive variability seen in the
results; it was evident that responses to any one SDSCA item appeared to be uniformly
dissimilar across pilot and main studies. The second important issue has to do with the lack
of research into the cognitive processes going on when people with Type 2 diabetes are
routinely asked to report on their diabetes self care as part of consultations with their
diabetes care team.
As far as the variability in the pattern of findings seen across the work carried out in
Chapters 7 and 8 is concerned, such extensive variability is, on a first level, somewhat
disconcerting. It would have been much easier to interpret findings with confidence if
particular items always seemed to be affected by, for example, time span but not category
split manipulations or vice versa. Or if some items, but not others, were always subject to
interactions of time span and category split. This was not the case and made interpretation
of the current results difficult. Nevertheless there may be several possible reasons for this
unwanted yet observed variability.
It could well be that estimating behavioural frequencies of healthy and unhealthy
behaviours by means of self report questionnaires is in itself an exercise contaminated with
error — a view supported by the wealth of studies on errors people make when self
reporting self referent information in surveys. It is also suggested that some conditions of
self reporting will enhance the chances of this error becoming apparent while others will
not. In the present studies, when responses were required about behavioural frequencies for
two recent periods in the past but when no record as to what actually happened during that
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period (by e.g. inspection of daily records) existed, very little variability was seen in
people's responses. In the second pilot study however when responses about the same
recent periods in the past were contrasted with daily records for one of these periods, much
variability was evident.
It is important that future research looks into this phenomenon more closely. It is quite
important that we understand why one research design (Pilot 1) produced so very different
responses to a very similar other research design (Pilot 2) especially given that respondents
can be assumed to have been quite similar in terms of demographic characteristics,
attitudes and lifestyles.
Variability was also present in responses obtained from people with Type 2 diabetes as
discussed in Chapter 8. Overall, however the SDSCA appeared to be fairly robust to time
span and category split manipulations with only 4 of 12 items being affected by these
response bias factors. This is a fairly encouraging initial finding, although the items that
were seen to be affected, mainly had to do with aspects of the self care regime that diabetes
patients have been found to find challenging i.e. dietary care (e.g. Ary, Toobert, Wilson
and Glasgow, 1986), and to a lesser extent, with BG testing. This is an important
observation because it would appear to be the case that when people with Type 2 diabetes
are asked to estimate behavioural frequencies of self care behaviours that pose a challenge
for them, such estimates are likely to be inaccurate. Such an observation may have
considerable implications for clinical practice especially if self care regime decisions are
routinely made on the basis of patients' (biased) self reports rather than more objective
criteria.
The second major issue arising from the findings discussed in Chapters 7 and 8 is directly
related to the above matter and has to do with the complete lack of research to date
investigating cognitive processes in people with Type 2 diabetes in relation to how such
processes may be affecting self reports of self care, and, indirectly, the design of self
management programmes. To the best of the author's knowledge, at the time of writing, no
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systematic research has taken place to evaluate the accuracy of and processes involved in
the routine collection of information from patients about their past self care activities.
Given that such self reports are likely to form the basis upon which further self care
recommendations are made, the observed lack of research in this field is surprising. The
observation however that, to date, no well validated methods exist to obtain objective
information about past self care and against which patient self reports could be evaluated,
might have been partly responsible for the lack of research into this subject.
Since the studies reported in Chapters 7 and 8 were carried out, a new version of the
SDSCA was published (Toobert et al., 2000). The deviations of this new scale from the
ones tested here were identified earlier and were briefly discussed. Future research using
this latest form of the SDCSA to evaluate accuracy of self report would be beneficial in
establishing whether the modified format is a reliable and valid means of obtaining
accurate self care self reports from patients with Type 2 diabetes. If it is, its routine use in
clinical practice may be appropriate and serve as a standardised method of collecting
reliable and valid patient self reports about diabetes self management.
Summary
In summary, the present thesis has established that cognitive functioning in people with
Type 2 diabetes is as complex a process as originally envisaged and as the current
literature on the topic would suggest. The work carried out suggested that some cognitive
impairment is likely to be present in adults with Type 2 diabetes but such impairment is
limited to the verbal manipulation of logical sequences in the short term and its origins not
well understood. This finding is in line with most current literature findings which are
suggestive of modest cognitive impairment in verbal memory processes of people with
Type 2 diabetes. The present work has also established that much of the liberally
controlled studies in the area which have normally found widespread cognitive impairment
in people with diabetes need to be critically questioned. The data collected and analysed
here clearly showed how the absence of strict controls may be linked to inflated apparent
impairment in studies comparing people with the illness as opposed to diabetes-free
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people. It was also shown that implicit memory appears to be intact in people with the
illness although limitations in the task used would call for this initial finding to be
replicated with different tasks and larger samples before generalised further.
The work investigating whether there was a relationship between cognitive function and
diabetes self care suggested that indeed cognitive performance and self care activities are
related and that cognitive performance can predict some variability in people's self care
activities. Such a relationship however was seen to be far from straightforward as better
cognitive functioning did not necessarily predict better self reported self care. Finally, the
issue of self reports of self care in Type 2 diabetes was investigated in terms of the time
span and the time category adopted in the posed question. Modified versions of the
SDSCA were used in experiments aiming to understand better how different items of the
questionnaire may be subject to different self report biases. Overall the SDSCA was seen
to be fairly reliable in eliciting error-free reports of past self care however a recently
modified version should now be evaluated along similar lines. The implications of all the
above for clinical practice were noted.
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Appendix A
Table of initial correlations (as reported in Chapter 5, section 5.4.3.)
Initial correlations - excluding multi and univariate outliers (cases 10, 14, 21, 31)
Pairwise Correlations
Variable by Variable Correlation N p. value
SC_EXERC SC_DIET 0.0439 47 0.7697
SC_TSTNG SC_DIET 0.1284 47 0.3899
SC_TSTNG SC_EXERC -0.0676 47 0.6514
SC_MEDCT SC_DIET 0.2004 43 0.1975
SC_MEDCT SC_EXERC 0.1303 43 0.4048
SC_MEDCT SC_TSTNG 0.2594 43 0.0931
AGE SC_DIET 0.1585 47 0.2872
AGE SC_EXERC 0.2594 47 0.0783
AGE SC_TSTNG -0.1377 47 0.3561
AGE SC_MEDCT 0.2796 43 0.0694
BMI SC_DIET 0.0846 47 0.572
BMI SC_EXERC -0.4162 47 0.0036
BMI SC_TSTNG 0.3288 47 0.024
BMI SC_MEDCT -0.079 43 0.6148
BMI AGE -0.348 47 0.0165
DURATION SC_DIET 0.1463 47 0.3263
DURATION SC_EXERC 0.1322 47 0.3759
DURATION SC_TSTNG -0.273 47 0.0634
DURATION SC_MEDCT 0.1699 43 0.276
DURATION AGE 0.1687 47 0.2569
DURATION BMI -0.1987 47 0.1807
DIGIT_FW SC_DIET 0.1367 46 0.365
DIGIT_FW SC_EXERC 0.3251 46 0.0275
DIGIT_FW SC_TSTNG -0.1321 46 0.3813
DIGIT_FW SC_MEDCT -0.0049 42 0.9753
DIGIT_FW AGE -0.1828 46 0.224
DIGIT_FW BMI -0.063 46 0.6772
DIG1T_FW DURATION -0.042 46 0.7818
DIGIT_BW SC_DIET 0.0884 46 0.559
DIGIT_BW SC_EXERC 0.1989 46 0.1852
DIGIT_BW SC_TSTNG -0.1666 46 0.2685
DIGIT_BW SC_MEDCT -0.0454 42 0.7752
DIGIT_BW AGE -0.1299 46 0.3894
DIGIT_BW BMI -0.1177 46 0.436
DIGIT_BW DURATION 0.0223 46 0.883
DIGIT_BW DIGIT_FW 0.6164 46 0
DGT_SYMB SC_DIET 0.128 46 0.3966
DGT_SYMB SC_EXERC 0.028 46 0.8534
DGT_SYMB SC_TSTNG 0.057 46 0.7067
DGT_SYMB SC_MEDCT -0.2826 42 0.0698
DGT_SYMB AGE -0.5107 46 0.0003
269
DGT_SYMB BMI 0.1408 46 0.3507
DGT_SYMB DURATION -0.2571 46 0.0846
DGT_SYMB DIGIT_FW 0.3055 46 0.0389
DGT_SYMB DIGIT_BW 0.5501 46 0.0001
SS7_T1ME SC_DIET 0.1401 40 0.3887
SS7_TIME SC_EXERC -0.3329 40 0.0358
SS7_TIME SC_TSTNG 0.0427 40 0.7934
SS7_TIME SC_MEDCT 0.148 36 0.3889
SS7_TIME AGE -0.0021 40 0.9899
SS7_TIME BMI -0.047 40 0.7732
SS7_TIME DURATION -0.095 40 0.5597
SS7_TIME DIGIT_FW -0.2482 39 0.1276
SS7_TIME DIGIT_BW -0.2304 39 0.1581
SS7_TIME DGT_SYMB 0.0528 39 0.7496
HAD SC_DIET -0.4334 47 0.0023
HAD SC_EXERC 0.0858 47 0.5663
HAD SC_TSTNG -0.0408 47 0.7854
HAD SC_MEDCT 0.1049 43 0.503
HAD AGE 0.0129 47 0.9314
HAD BMI 0.0606 47 0.6859
HAD DURATION 0.0578 47 0.6997
HAD DIGIT_FW 0.0494 46 0.7443
HAD DIGIT_BW 0.0285 46 0.8507
HAD DGT_SYMB -0.06 46 0.692
HAD SS7_TIME -0.0615 40 0.7061
NART SC_DIET -0.2009 46 0.1806
NART SC_EXERC -0.1689 46 0.2617
NART SC_TSTNG 0.0926 46 0.5405
NART SC_MEDCT 0.1146 42 0.4697
NART AGE
-0.1273 46 0.399
NART BMI 0.2804 46 0.0591
NART DURATION 0.0456 46 0.7637
NART DIGIT_FW
-0.4035 45 0.006
NART DIGIT_BW
-0.454 45 0.0017
NART DGT_SYMB
-0.3306 45 0.0266
NART SS7_TIME
-0.0083 39 0.9602
NART HAD 0.1811 46 0.2283
MEMA SC_DIET 0.0902 47 0.5466
MEMA SC_EXERC
-0.2292 47 0.1212
MEMA SC_TSTNG 0.1386 47 0.3529
MEMA SC_MEDCT -0.0061 43 0.9689
MEMA AGE
-0.368 47 0.0109
MEMA BMI
-0.026 47 0.8621
MEMA DURATION 0.1171 47 0.4332
MEMA DIGIT_FW 0.0971 46 0.5208
MEMA DIGIT_BW 0.3283 46 0.0259
MEMA DGT_SYMB 0.4353 46 0.0025
MEMA SS7_TIME 0.0892 40 0.5839
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MEMA HAD -0.0413 47 0.7827
MEMA NART -0.077 46 0.6109
MEMB SC_DIET 0.0519 47 0.7291
MEMB SC_EXERC -0.0085 47 0.9548
MEMB SC_TSTNG 0.1071 47 0.4735
MEMB SC_MEDCT -0.0983 43 0.5305
MEMB AGE -0.2477 47 0.0932
MEMB BMI -0.1259 47 0.399
MEMB DURATION 0.1146 47 0.4429
MEMB DIGIT_FW . 0.1944 46 0.1954
MEMB DIGIT_BW 0.4196 46 0.0037
MEMB DGT_SYMB 0.4761 46 0.0008
MEMB SS7_TIME -0.0565 40 0.7292
MEMB HAD 0.0618 47 0.68
MEMB NART -0.3572 46 0.0148
MEMB MEMA 0.5778 47 0
SMQ SC_DIET -0.1719 47 0.2478
SMQ SC_EXERC -0.1325 47 0.3746
SMQ SC_TSTNG -0.1352 47 0.3647
SMQ SC_MEDCT 0.1937 43 0.2133
SMQ AGE 0.256 47 0.0825
SMQ BMI -0.0121 47 0.9355
SMQ DURATION 0.1453 47 0.3298
SMQ DIGIT FW -0.222 46 0.1381
SMQ DIGIT_BW -0.2105 46 0.1602
SMQ DGT_SYMB -0.4024 46 0.0056
SMQ SS7_TIME 0.0878 40 0.5899
SMQ HAD 0.3769 47 0.009
SMQ NART 0.1691 46 0.2613
SMQ MEMA -0.2906 47 0.0475
SMQ MEMB -0.0792 47 0.5968
A_TIME SC_DIET -0.022 47 0.8833
A_TIME SC_EXERC 0.1259 47 0.3992
A_TIME SC_TSTNG 0.0405 47 0.7868
A_TIME SC_MEDCT 0.3656 43 0.0159
A_TIME AGE 0.5577 47 0
A_TIME BMI -0.0455 47 0.7615
A_TIME DURATION 0.2874 47 0.0501
A_TIME DIGIT_FW -0.1468 46 0.3303
A_TIME DIGIT_BW -0.309 46 0.0367
A_TIME DGT_SYMB -0.6753 46 0
A_TIME SS7_TIME 0.0987 40 0.5447
A_TIME HAD 0.1519 47 0.3082
A_TIME NART 0.1093 46 0.4696
A_TIME MEMA -0.3847 47 0.0076
A_TIME MEMB -0.309 47 0.0346
A_TIME SMQ 0.2523 47 0.0871
B_T1ME SC_DIET -0.0016 46 0.9914
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B_TIME SC_EXERC -0.1238 46 0.4125
B_TIME SC_TSTNG -0.2204 46 0.1411
B_TIME SC_MEDCT 0.1732 42 0.2728
B_TIME AGE 0.3757 46 0.0101
B_TIME BMI -0.1609 46 0.2854
B_TIME DURATION 0.3044 46 0.0397
B TIME DIGIT_FW -0.2839 45 0.0587
B_T1ME DIGIT_BW -0.3184 45 0.033
B_TIME DGT_SYMB -0.6251 45 0
B_TIME SS7_TIME	 . 0.1457 39 0.3761
B_TIME HAD 0.0054 46 0.9716
B_TIME NART 0.2887 45 0.0544
B_TIME MEMA -0.2329 46 0.1193
B_TIME MEMB -0.3617 46 0.0135
B_TIME SMQ 0.1321 46 0.3814
B_TIME A_TIME 0.605 46 0
SLV_STRG SC_DIET 0.3953 46 0.0065
SLV_STRG SC_EXERC 0.1359 46 0.3677
SLV_STRG SC_TS'TNG 0.2076 46 0.1661
SLV_STRG SC_MEDCT 0.169 42 0.2846
SLV_STRG AGE -0.0905 46 0.5499
SLV_STRG BMI -0.0378 46 0.803
SLV_STRG DURATION 0.2773 46 0.0621
SLV_STRG DIGIT_FW 0.0348 46 0.8183
SLV_STRG DIGIT_BW 0.1842 46 0.2204
SLV_STRG DGT_SYMB 0.2726 46 0.0668
SLV_STRG SS7_TIME 0.2338 39 0.1519
SLV_STRG HAD -0.2532 46 0.0896
SLV_STRG NART -0.127 45 0.4059
SLV_STRG MEMA 0.2746 46 0.0648
SLV_STRG MEMB 0.2933 46 0.0479
SLV_STRG SMQ -0.3907 46 0.0073
SLV_STRG A_TIME -0.0317 46 0.8346
SLV_STRG B_TIME -0.0561 45 0.7144
SLV_QUAL SC_DIET 0.3872 46 0.0079
SLV_QUAL SC_EXERC 0.1156 46 0.4443
SLV_QUAL SC_TSTNG 0.1947 46 0.1947
SLV_QUAL SC_MEDCT 0.1087 42 0.4933
SLV_QUAL AGE 0.1428 46 0.3438
SLV_QUAL BMI -0.0966 46 0.5233
SLV_QUAL DURATION 0.1698 46 0.2592
SLV_QUAL DIGIT_FW -0.1795 46 0.2326
SLV_QUAL DIGIT_BW -0.1364 46 0.366
SLV_QUAL DGT_SYMB 0.1803 46 0.2304
SLV_QUAL SS7_TIME 0.2332 39 0.1531
SLV_QUAL HAD -0.0544 46 0.7195
SLV_QUAL NART -0.13 45 0.3946
SLV_QUAL MEMA 0.1493 46 0.3222
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SLV_QUAL MEMB 0.3985 46 0.0061
SLV_QUAL SMQ 0.0261 46 0.8633
SLV_QUAL A_TIME -0.0467 46 0.7579
SLV_QUAL B_TIME -0.0966 45 0.5278
SLV_QUAL SLV_STRG 0.323 46 0.0285
TOTIMPL SC_DIET -0.1964 47 0.1858
TOTIMPL SC_EXERC 0.0676 47 0.6516
TOTIMPL SC_TSTNG -0.2774 47 0.0591
TOTIMPL SC_MEDCT -0.1004 43 0.5218
TOTIMPL AGE 0.1545 47 0.2997
TOTIMPL BMI -0.2059 47 0.165
TOT...NFL DURATION 0.0764 47 0.6097
TOTIMPL DIGIT_FW 0.0561 46 0.7113
TOTIMPL DIGIT_BW 0.0801 46 0.5968
TOTIMPL DGT_SYMB -0.0918 46 0.5439
TOT_IMPL S57_TIME 0.1552 40 0.3388
TOTIMPL HAD -0.0683 47 0.6481
TOTIMPL NART 0.0267 46 0.8602
TOTIMPL MEMA -0.0961 47 0.5206
TOTIMPL MEMB -0.1567 47 0.2928
TOT_IMPL SMQ 0.1647 47 0.2686
TOT_IMPL A_TIME -0.0741 47 0.6206
TOTIMPL B_TIME 0.0109 46 0.9429
TOTIMPL SLV_STRG -0.0999 46 0.5087
TOT_IMPL SLV_QUAL -0.2477 46 0.097
TOT_REC SC_DIET 0.1326 47 0.3744
TOT_REC SC_EXERC 0.0451 47 0.7633
TOT_REC SC_TSTNG 0.107 47 0.4742
TOT_REC SC_MEDCT -0.1593 43 0.3076
TOT_REC AGE -0.1117 47 0.4549
TOT_REC BMI 0.2251 47 0.1281
TOT_REC DURATION -0.0634 47 0.672
TOT_REC DIGIT_FW 0.2435 46 0.103
TOT_REC DIG1T_BW 0.222 46 0.1381
TOT_REC DGT_SYMB 0.4088 46 0.0048
TOT_REC 5S7_TIME -0.1485 40 0.3603
TOT_REC HAD 0.1209 47 0.4184
TOT_REC NART -0.2489 46 0.0953
TOT_REC MEMA 0.2599 47 0.0777
TOT_REC MEMB 0.4923 47 0.0004
TOT_REC SMQ 0.032 47 0.8308
TOT_REC A_TIME -0.2938 47 0.045
TOT_REC B_T1ME -0.3876 46 0.0078
TOT_REC SLV_STRG 0.1666 46 0.2686
TOT_REC SLV_QUAL 0.2332 46 0.1188
TOT_REC TOT_IMPL -0.1864 47 0.2096
WCST_CAT SC_DIET -0.2546 34 0.1461
WCST_CAT SC_EXERC 0.3122 34 0.0723
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WCST_CAT
WCST_CAT
WCST_CAT
WCST_CAT
WCST_CAT
WCST_CAT
WCST_CAT
WCST_CAT
WCST_CAT
WCST_CAT
WCST_CAT
WCST_CAT
WCST_CAT
WCST_CAT
WCST_CAT
WCST_CAT
WCST_CAT
WCST_CAT
WCST_CAT
WCST_CAT
WCST_PRS
WCST_PRS
WCST_PRS
WCST_PRS
WCST_PRS
WCST_PRS
WCST_PRS
WCST_PRS
WCST_PRS
WCST_PRS
WCST_PRS
WCST_PRS
WCST_PRS
WCST_PRS
WCST_PRS
WCST_PRS
WCST_PRS
WCST_PRS
WCST_PRS
WCST_PRS
WCST_PRS
WCST_PRS
WCST_PRS
SC_TSTNG
SC_MEDCT
AGE
BMI
DURATION
DIGIT_FW
DIGIT_BW
DGT_SYMB
SS7_TIME
HAD
NART
MEMA
MEMB
SMQ
A_TIME
B_TIME
SLV_STRG
SLV_QUAL
TOT IMPL
TOT_REC
SC_DIET
SC_EXERC
SC_TSTNG
SC_MEDCT
AGE
BMI
DURATION
DIGIT_FW
DIGIT_BW
DGT SYMB
SS7_T1ME
HAD
NART
MEMA
MEMB
SMQ
A_TIME
B_TIME
SLV_STRG
SLV_QUAL
TOTIMPL
TOT_REC
WCST_CAT
•
-0.1432
-0.3341
-0.1615
-0.3124
-0.1988
0.1618
0.1602
0.3166
0.0999
-0.3108
-0.2447
-0.0886
-0.0394
-0.3001
-0.2682
-0.1783
-0.1648
-0.167
0.4216
-0.1841
0.2237
-0.191
-0.0325
0.2202
0.188
-0.0419
0.2492
-0.1291
-0.1226
-0.0916
0.0157
-0.0935
0.0484
0.3717
0.2879
-0.162
0.1321
0.2067
0.2237
0.1743
-0.198
0.3187
-0.4782
34
31
34
34
34
33
33
33
31
34
33
34
34
34
34
34
33
33
34
34
34
34
34
31
34
34
34
33
33
33
31
34
33
34
34
34
34
34
33
33
34
34
34
0.4192
0.0662
0.3616
0.072
0.2597
0.3683
0.3732
0.0727
0.5929
0.0736
0.17
0.6184
0.825
0.0847
0.1251
0.313
0.3595
0.353
0.013
0.2972
0.2034
0.2792
0.8552
0.234
0.2869
0.8138
0.1552
0.4741
0.4966
0.6122
0.9334
0.599
0.7889
0.0304
0.0987
0.3601
0.4565
0.2408
0.2107
0.332
0.2616
0.0662
0.0042
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Appendix B 
M. The original Summary of Diabetes Self care Activities (SDCSA) questionnaire
SUMMARY OF DIABETES SELF CARE ACTIVITIES
Instructions: Thank you for taking the time to fill this out. The questions below ask you
about your diabetes self care activities during the past 7 days. If you were sick during the
past 7 days, please think back to the last 7 days that you were not sick. Please answer the
questions as honestly and accurately as you can by circling the response that applies to
you. Your responses will be confidential.
DIET
The first few questions ask you about your eating habits over the last 7 days. If you have
not been given a specific diet by your doctor or dietician, answer question 1 according to
the general guidelines you have received.
1. How often did you follow your recommended diet over the last 7 days ?
Always	 Usually	 Sometimes	 Rarely	 Never
2. What percentage of the time did you successfully limit your calories as recommended in
healthy eating for diabetes control ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
3. During the past week, what percentage of your meals included high fibre foods such as
fresh foods, fresh vegetables, whole grain breads, dried beans and peas, bran ?
0%	 25%	 50%
	 75%	 100%
4. During the past week, what percentage of your meals included high fat foods such as
butter, ice cream, oil, nuts and seeds, mayonnaise, avocado, deep-fried food, salad
dressing, bacon, other meat with fat / skin ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
5. During the past week, what percentage of your meals included sweets and desserts such
as pie, cake, jam, soft drinks (regular, not diet drinks), biscuits ?
0%	 25%	 50%
	 75%	 100%
EXERCISE
6. On how many of the last 7 days did you participate in at least 20 minutes of physical
exercise ?
0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
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7. Over the past 7 days what percentage of the time did you exercise the amount suggested
by your doctor ? (For example, if your doctor recommended 30 minutes of activity)
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
8. On how many of the last 7 days did you participate in a specific exercise session other
than what you do around the house or as part of your work ?
0	 1.	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
GLUCOSE TESTING
9. On how many of the past 7 days (that you were not sick) did you test your glucose
(blood sugar) level ?
Every day	 Most days	 Some of the days	 None of the days
10. Over the last 7 days (that you were not sick) what percentage of the glucose (blood
sugar or urine)tests recommended by your doctor did you actually perform ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
DIABETES MEDICATION
11. How many of your recommended insulin injections did you take in the last 7 days that
you were supposed to ?
All of them	 Most of them	 Some of them	 None of them
I do not take insulin
12. How many of your recommended number of pills to control diabetes did you take that
you were supposed to ?
All of them	 Most of them	 Some of them	 None of them
I do not take pills to control my diabetes
THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP! 
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B2. The modified Summary of Diabetes Self care Activities (SDCSA) questionnaires
used in Pilot 1 and 2 (the Daily SDSCA used in Pilot 2 only)
DAILY SUMMARY OF SELF CARE QUESTIONNAIRE
Instructions: Thank you for taking the time to fill this out. The questions below ask
you about your diet & exercise activities over today _(date) 	 . Please answer the
questions as honestly and accurately as you can by circling the response that applies to
you. There are no right or wrong answers. Your responses will be anonymous and
confidential.
DIET
The first few questions ask you about your eating habits over the day.
1. Today, what percentage of the time did you follow what is generally considered a
'healthy' diet?
0%	 25%	 50%
	 75%	 100%
2. Today, what percentage of your meals included high fibre foods such as fresh
foods, fresh vegetables, whole grain bread, dried beans and peas, bran ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
3. Today, what percentage of your meals included high fat foods such as butter, ice
cream, oil, nuts and seeds, mayonnaise, avocado, deep-fried food, salad dressing,
bacon, other meat with fat / skin ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
4. Today, what percentage of your meals included sweets and desserts such as pie,
cake, jam, soft drinks (regular, not diet drinks), biscuits ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
EXERCISE
The final two questions ask you about exercise taking over the day.
5. Today did you participate in at least 20 minutes of physical exercise ?
yes
	
no
6. Today, what percentage of the time did you participate in a specific exercise
session other than what you do around the house or as part of your work ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
	
Your anonymity number: 	 	 Age:	 Sex:
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WEEKLY SUMMARY OF SELF CARE QUESTIONNAIRE
Instructions: Thank you for taking the time to fill this out. The questions below ask
you about your diet & exercise activities over the past week. Please answer the
questions as honestly and accurately as you can by circling the response that applies to
you. There are no right or wrong answers. Your responses will be anonymous and
confidential.
DIET
The first few questions ask you about your eating habits over the past week.
I. What percentage of the time did you follow what is generally considered a 'healthy'
diet over the past week ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
2. During the past week, what percentage of your meals included high fibre foods such
as fresh foods, fresh vegetables, whole grain bread, dried beans and peas, bran ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
3. During the past week, what percentage of your meals included high fat foods such as
butter, ice cream, oil, nuts and seeds, mayonnaise, avocado, deep-fried food, salad
dressing, bacon, other meat with fat / skin ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
4. During the past week, what percentage of your meals included sweets and desserts
such as pie, cake, jam, soft drinks (regular, not diet drinks), biscuits ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
EXERCISE
The final two questions ask you about exercise taking over the past week.
5. Over the past week what percentage of the time did you participate in at least 20
minutes of physical exercise ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
6. Over the past week what percentage of the time did you participate in a specific
exercise session other than what you do around the house or as part of your work ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
Your anonymity number: Age: 	 	 Sex:
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7 DAY SUMMARY OF SELF CARE QUESTIONNAIRE
Instructions: Thank you for taking the time to fill this out. The questions below ask
you about your diet & exercise activities over the past 7 days. Please answer the
questions as honestly and accurately as you can by circling the response that applies
to you. There are no right or wrong answers. Your responses will be anonymous and
confidential.
DIET
The first few questions ask you about your eating habits over the past 7 days.
1. What percentage of the time did you follow what is generally considered a 'healthy'
diet over the past 7 days ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
2. During the past 7 days, what percentage of your meals included high fibre foods
such as fresh foods, fresh vegetables, whole grain bread, dried beans and peas, bran ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
3. During the past 7 days, what percentage of your meals included high fat foods such
as butter, ice cream, oil, nuts and seeds, mayonnaise, avocado, deep-fried food, salad
dressing, bacon, other meat with fat / skin ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
4. During the past 7 days, what percentage of your meals included sweets and desserts
such as pie, cake, jam, soft drinks (regular, not diet drinks), biscuits ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
EXERCISE
The final two questions ask you about exercise taking over the past 7 days.
5. Over the past 7 days what percentage of the time did you participate in at least 20
minutes of physical exercise ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
6. Over the past 7 days what percentage of the time did you participate in a specific
exercise session other than what you do around the house or as part of your work ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
Your anonymity number: 	 	 Age:	 Sex:
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MONTHLY SUMMARY OF SELF CARE QUESTIONNAIRE
Instructions: Thank you for taking the time to fill this out. The questions below ask
you about your diet & exercise activities over the past month. Please answer the
questions as honestly and accurately as you can by circling the response that applies to
you. There are no right or wrong answers. Your responses will be anonymous and
confidential.
DIET
The first few questions ask you about your eating habits over the past month.
1. What percentage of the time did you follow what is generally considered a 'healthy'
diet over the past month ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
2. During the past month, what percentage of your meals included high fibre foods
such as fresh foods, fresh vegetables, whole grain bread, dried beans and peas, bran ?
0%	 25%	 50%
	 75%	 100%
3. During the past month, what percentage of your meals included high fat foods such
as butter, ice cream, oil, nuts and seeds, mayonnaise, avocado, deep-fried food, salad
dressing, bacon, other meat with fat / skin ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
4. During the past month, what percentage of your meals included sweets and desserts
such as pie, cake, jam, soft drinks (regular, not diet drinks), biscuits ?
0%	 25%	 50%
	 75%	 100%
EXERCISE
The final two questions ask you about exercise taking over the past month.
5. Over the past month what percentage of the time did you participate in at least 20
minutes of physical exercise ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
6. Over the past month what percentage of the time did you participate in a specific
exercise session other than what you do around the house or as part of your work ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
Your anonymity number: 	 	 Age:	 Sex:
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Appendix C 
Cl. The modified daily SDSCA
DAILY SUMMARY OF DIABETES SELF CARE ACTIVITIES
Thank you for taking the time to fill this out. The questions below ask you about your
diabetes self care activities today 	 . Please
answer the questions as honestly and accurately as you can by circling the response that
applies to you. Your responses will remain anonymous and confidential.
DIET	
.
The first few questions ask you about your eating habits over the day. If you have not
been given a specific diet by your doctor or dietician, answer question 1 according to the
general guidelines you have received.
1. Today, what percentage of the time did you follow your recommended diet ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
2. Today, what percentage of the time did you successfully limit your calories as
recommended in healthy eating for diabetes control ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
3. Today, what percentage of your meals included high fibre foods such as fresh foods,
fresh vegetables, whole grain breads, dried beans and peas, bran ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
4. Today, what percentage of your meals included high fat foods such as butter, ice
cream, oil, nuts and seeds, mayonnaise, avocado, deep-fried food, salad dressing, bacon,
other meat with fat / skin ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
5. Today, what percentage of your meals included sweets and desserts such as pie, cake,
jam, soft drinks (regular not diet drinks), biscuits ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
EXERCISE
6. Today, did you participate in at least 20 minutes of physical exercise ?
Yes	 No
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7. Today, what percentage of the time did you exercise the amount suggested by your
doctor ? (For example, if your doctor recommended 30 minutes of activity)
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
8. Today, did you participate in a specific exercise session other than what you do around
the house or as part of your work ?
Yes	 No
GLUCOSE TESTING
9. Did you test your glucose (blood sugar) level today ?
Yes	 No
10. Today, what percentage of the glucose (blood sugar or urine) tests recommended by
your doctor did you actually perform ?
0%	 25%	 50%
	 75%	 100%
DIABETES MEDICATION
11. Today, what percentage of your recommended insulin injections did you take that you
were supposed to ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
I do not take insulin
12. Today, what percentage of your recommended number of pills to control diabetes did
you take that you were supposed to ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
I do not take pills to control my diabetes
THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP
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C2.	 The modified weekly SDCSA
WEEKLY SUMMARY OF DIABETES SELF CARE ACTIVITIES
Thank you for taking the time to fill this out. The questions below ask you about your
diabetes self care activities during the past week. Please answer the questions as honestly
and accurately as you can by circling the response that applies to you. Your responses
will remain anonymous and confidential.
DIET
The first few questions ask you about your eating habits over the past week. If you have
not been given a specific diet by your doctor or dietician, answer question 1 according to
the general guidelines you have received.
1. What percentage of the time did you follow your recommended diet over the past
week ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
2. Over the past week, what percentage of the time did you successfully limit your
calories as recommended in healthy eating for diabetes control ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
3. During the past week, what percentage of your meals included high fibre foods such as
fresh foods, fresh vegetables, whole grain breads, dried beans and peas, bran ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
4. During the past week, what percentage of your meals included high fat foods such as
butter, ice cream, oil, nuts and seeds, mayonnaise, avocado, deep-fried food, salad
dressing, bacon, other meat with fat / skin ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%
	 100%
5. During the past week, what percentage of your meals included sweets and desserts
such as pie, cake, jam, soft drinks (regular not diet drinks), biscuits ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
EXERCISE
6. Over the past week, on how many days did you participate in at least 20 minutes of
physical exercise ?
0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
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7. Over the past week, what percentage of the time did you exercise the amount
suggested by your doctor ? (For example, if your doctor recommended 30 minutes of
activity)
0%	 25%	 50%
	 75%	 100%
8. Over the past week, on how many days did you participate in a specific exercise
session other than what you do around the house or as part of your work ?
0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
GLUCOSE TESTING
9. Over the past week, on how many days did you test your glucose (blood sugar)
level ?
0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
10. Over the past week, what percentage of the glucose (blood sugar or urine)tests
recommended by your doctor did you actually perform ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
DIABETES MEDICATION
11. What percentage of your recommended insulin injections did you take over the past
week that you were supposed to ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
I do not take insulin
12. Over the past week, what percentage of your recommended number of pills to control
diabetes did you take that you were supposed to ?
0%	 25%	 50%
	 75%	 100%
I do not take pills to control my diabetes
THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP
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C3.	 The modified 7-day SDSCA
7 DAY SUMMARY OF DIABETES SELF CARE ACTIVITIES
Thank you for taking the time to fill this out. The questions below ask you about your
diabetes self care activities during the past 7 days. Please answer the questions as
honestly and accurately as you can by circling the response that applies to you. Your
responses will remain anonymous and confidential.
DIET
The first few questions ask you about your eating habits over the past 7 days. If you have
not been given a specific diet by your doctor or dietician, answer question 1 according to
the general guidelines you have received.
1. What percentage of the time did you follow your recommended diet over the past 7
days ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
2. Over the past 7 days, what percentage of the time did you successfully limit your
calories as recommended in healthy eating for diabetes control ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
3. During the past 7 days, what percentage of your meals included high fibre foods such
as fresh foods, fresh vegetables, whole grain breads, dried beans and peas, bran ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
4. During the past 7 days, what percentage of your meals included high fat foods such as
butter, ice cream, oil, nuts and seeds, mayonnaise, avocado, deep-fried food, salad
dressing, bacon, other meat with fat / skin ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
5. During the past 7 days, what percentage of your meals included sweets and desserts
such as pie, cake, jam, soft drinks (regular not diet drinks), biscuits ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
EXERCISE
6. On how many of the past 7 days did you participate in at least 20 minutes of physical
exercise ?
0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
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7. In the past 7 days, what percentage of the time did you exercise the amount suggested
by your doctor ? (For example, if your doctor recommended 30 minutes of activity)
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
8. On how many of the past 7 days did you participate in a specific exercise session other
than what you do around the house or as part of your work ?
0	 1.	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
GLUCOSE TESTING
9. On how many of the past 7 days did you test your glucose (blood sugar) level ?
0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
10. Over the past 7 days, what percentage of the glucose (blood sugar or urine) tests
recommended by your doctor did you actually perform ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
DIABETES MEDICATION
11. What percentage of your recommended insulin injections did you take in the past 7
days that you were supposed to ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
I do not take insulin
12. In the past 7 days what percentage of your recommended number of pills to control
diabetes did you take that you were supposed to ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%
	 100%
I do not take pills to control my diabetes
THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP
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C4.	 The modified monthly SDSCA
MONTHLY SUMMARY OF DIABETES SELF CARE ACTIVITIES
Thank you for taking the time to fill this out. The questions below ask you about your
diabetes self care activities during the past month. Please answer the questions as
honestly and accurately as you can by circling the response that applies to you. Your
responses will remain anonymous and confidential.
DIET
The first few questions ask you about your eating habits over the past month. If you have
not been given a specific diet by your doctor or dietician, answer question 1 according to
the general guidelines you have received.
1. What percentage of the time did you follow your recommended diet over the past
month ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
2. Over the past month, what percentage of the time did you successfully limit your
calories as recommended in healthy eating for diabetes control ?
0%	 25%	 50%
	 75%	 100%
3. During the past month, what percentage of your meals included high fibre foods such
as fresh foods, fresh vegetables, whole grain breads, dried beans and peas, bran ?
0%	 25%	 50%
	 75%	 100%
4. During the past month, what percentage of your meals included high fat foods such as
butter, ice cream, oil, nuts and seeds, mayonnaise, avocado, deep-fried food, salad
dressing, bacon, other meat with fat / skin ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
5. During the past month, what percentage of your meals included sweets and desserts
such as pie, cake, jam, soft drinks (regular not diet drinks), biscuits ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
EXERCISE
6. Over the past month, on how many days did you participate in at least 20 minutes of
physical exercise ?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
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7. Over the past month, what percentage of the time did you exercise the amount
suggested by your doctor ? (For example, if your doctor recommended 30 minutes of
activity)
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
8. Over the past month, on how many days did you participate in a specific exercise
session other than what you do around the house or as part of your work ?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
GLUCOSE TESTING
9. Over the past month, on how many days did you test your glucose (blood sugar)
level ?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
10. Over the past month, what percentage of the glucose (blood sugar or urine) tests
recommended by your doctor did you actually perform ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
DIABETES MEDICATION
11. What percentage of your recommended insulin injections did you take over the past
month that you were supposed to ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
I do not take insulin
12. Over the past month, what percentage of your recommended number of pills to
control diabetes did you take that you were supposed to ?
0%	 25%	 50%	 75%	 100%
I do not take pills to control my diabetes
THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP
